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Abstract 
This thes1s empirically investigates the motive for and the timing of mitial public 
offermgs (IPOs) m the UK. Due to an apparent lack of research, the two questions as to 
why firms choose to go public and how they time their !PO are left under-addressed m 
the ex1stmg !PO literature. Answers to these questions are critical to understand !PO 
activities and the extent to which firms can make efficient use of the stock market 
The empmcal stud1es in this thesis were based on a large and umque sample of 183 UK 
IPOs that floated on the London Stock Exchange durmg 1998-2003 and a control group 
of 2135 UK firms that remained private during 1996-2007. All firms considered in the 
sample were non-financial firms Both cross-sectwnal and panel data techniques were 
employed to thoroughly examine the data from various angles 
F1rst, a conventional panel pro bit approach was applied to examme the determmants of 
the probability of going public, and a panel fixed effects model was used to evaluate the 
effects of !PO deciSIOn on financial performance of firms It was revealed that the 
likelihood of an !PO mcreases m capital investment and ownership dispersion whereas 
decreases in mternal cash generation and sales !PO activity mcreases in a bull market. 
Independent firms appear to go public to rmse capital to fund investment whereas IPOs 
of subsid1anes seem to be driven by corporate re-structuring and divestment. After !PO, 
!PO firms continue to increase theu sales and firm value is s1gmficantly Improved 
Following this, a recent cross-sectional approach was adopted to analyse the 
determmants of !PO structure. The determmants of the type and the size of share were 
exammed respectively in a multinomial logit model, and OLS and 2SLS models. The 
results showed that more established firms with h1gh market valuatiOn are more likely 
to mclude secondary shares. Divesting v1a an !PO is more likely to happen at a higher 
market return. More h1ghly levered firms with more concentrated managerial 
shareholdings offer larger s1ze of primary shares whereas firms m a better financial 
positiOn sell larger size of secondary shares. It appears that the UK stock market enables 
access to financing for both young and growth firms that are constramed by weak 
internal cash generatiOn and mature firms that are constrained by debt burden. 
The determmants of the s1ze of share and the probability of gomg public were then 
Ill 
estimated m a simultaneous equations system- a bivariate sample selectiOn model. This 
new approach developed m th1s thesis makes it possible to control for potential 
problems of omitted variable and examine the Impact of pnvate mformat10n that an !PO 
firm may possess. In addition, the consequences of !PO were further assessed by 
computmg 'treatlnent effects'. The findmgs suggested that the determinants of !PO 
decisiOn can be mcorporated mto a unified investment-divestment framework !PO 
firms appear to possess pnvate informatiOn about the value of the1r growth potential 
The higher the value, the greater is the capital raised wh1le the lower 1s the number of 
shares divested !PO firms also appear to time the1r offerings at the peak of theu 
growth 
In conjunction With the pnmary focus on an investigatiOn of !PO decision, this thesis 
also looked into the determinants of !PO underpncmg and !PO short-run performance 
m the context of !PO decision It was found that the IPOs that mvolve d1vestmg 
shareholdmgs are less underpriced, so as to reduce insiders' wealth losses Underpricing 
IS used as a means to discriminate among mvestors so as to protect original controlhng 
shareholders' control nghts. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis supported the view that the UK stock market plays a 
positive role in supporting firm growth, especially for financially constrained smaller 
growth firms. It was highhghted that the UK IPOs utihse the stock market as a charmel 
for financmg more than as a fac1hty for shareholders to sell out. This IS an Important 
distingmshing feature as between the UK market and avmlable evidence for continental 
European markets. 
Keywords: !PO decision; !PO motives; !PO timmg; !PO underpricing, Primary shares 
and secondary shares, The UK stock market. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations of This Thesis 
An imtial public offenng of equity (hereafter referred to as !PO) is the first sale of 
shares by an unlisted firm to the pubhc Once the stock of the company ts listed on a 
stock exchange and the shares are traded publicly in the stock market, a market pnce for 
the company's shares is estabhshed and liquidtty for the shares ts created. Along wtth 
the process of gomg public, the capttal structure and the ownership structure of the 
company are changed There is also evtdence that firms' operating performance changes 
after their IPOs. 
The changes that occur from pre-market to post-market dtstinguish !PO activities from 
other events m the life of a firm, making the study of IPOs a subject of considerable 
research mterests There has been a huge volume of research on the !PO process and the 
Immediate post-IPO experience concentratmg in particular on the underpricmg 
phenomenon (Rock, 1986); thts refers to the widely observed anomaly that the offer 
price tends to be well below the first day's tradmg price Jenkinson and Ljungqvtst 
(2001), Ritter and Welch (2002) and L]ungqvist (2006) surveyed different aspects of 
this hterature. However, the fundamental and arguably substantially more Important 
question ts that why firms choose to go pubhc in the first place and how they time their 
!PO, and this questiOn has received much less attentiOn The theoretical work in this 
field ts less well-developed and of more recent origin. Moreover, due to a lack of data, 
the empmcal work is even more limited 
Gomg public is not a stage that every firm wtll go through dunng its growth. Firms that 
choose to undertake an !PO vary in age, size, financtal charactenstics, ownership 
structure, and industrial attributes, and their !PO dectsions can be driven by different 
motives Existmg theoretical models mamly focus on one of the two most important 
reasons1 for gomg public first, to raise fresh equity capttal in order to fund current or 
1 Rfiell (1996) provtdes an overview of other benefits of bemg a public company the pubhc shares created with a 
market pnce can be used as acqmsJtJOn currency or for an employee remuneratiOn scheme, the firm's reputatton and 
mvestor recogmt10n are enhanced followmg the IPO, and tts mdustnal competJttveness may be Improved 
I 
future investment and expanswn, or to repay debt, or second, to enable some existmg 
shareholders to divest and cash m theu shareholdings and to maximise their proceeds 
from selhng the ownership, or to facilitate owners to complete an eventual transfer of 
control. 
Closely connected with the 'why' questwn, IS the 'when' questwn It seems clear that 
motive and timmg are closely related to one another and cannot easily be separated 
(Rltter and Welch, 2002) The timing element of a decision to go pubhc includes two 
dimenswns: at what stage in the life of a firm and m what kmd of market conditwns 
will it choose to go public? 
The timing of rmsing capital is irrelevant m an efficient market where secunty prices 
reveal all informatiOn However, due to the presence of asymmetric informatiOn 
problems, private information may not be observed or mferred m the same way by all 
market participants, who may consequently place different valuations on the same 
security at different times Therefore, firms can time their public equity offenngs to 
exploit cheaper fresh equity capital (Chemmanur and Fulgh1eri (1999), Subrahmanyam 
and Titman (1999), Clementi (2002), Pastor and Veronesi (2005) and Benninga, 
Helmantel and Sarig (2005)). 
The timmg of divestment and change of control is associated with agency problems, 
idiOsyncratic risks and adverse selection costs For early start-ups, concentrated 
ownership and mternal control are generally preferred, as the few insider 
block-shareholders (such as entrepreneurs, private eqmty or venture capital) typically 
have expertise and are actively involved in rnonitormg activities, which helps to 
improve firm value. As firms grow more mature, agency conflicts between managers 
and shareholders and firm specific risks may mcrease significantly. Transfer of 
ownership or control nghts via going pubhc may become a better choice at this point of 
time, as contmuously quoted stock pnces help to enhance managenal mcentives and 
improve the efficiency with which outsiders can evaluate firms' growth prospects. At 
the same time, mformative stock prices help to reduce the adverse selection problems 
between buyers and sellers which occur in a direct sale. This enables the origmal owner 
to consider exiting in a two-stage process in which, at the second stage, proceeds from 
2 
the sale are determmed m a more efficient market thus maximismg the process for the 
selling shareholders (Zingales (1995), Mello and Parsons (1998), Ellingsen and 
Rydqvist (1997), Wagner (2002)) 
In the theoretical literature there are two mam gaps. First, although the two types of 
motive can JOintly drive an IPO deCISIOn, none of the existing theoretical models 
incorporate both m a umfied framework. Second, in the varwus theoretical models the 
timing of IPO decisions are analysed separately for the two types of !PO motives, but in 
the real world they are not necessarily mutually exclus1ve. To understand fully the 
dec1sion to go public, it is important that the two types of motive and the related timing 
pattern are examined in a umfied framework in empincal research. 
There are only few empirical papers that address the question of the motive and tlmmg 
of going public The best known empincal paper IS by Pagano, Panetta and Zingales 
(1998), who analysed the determinants of the !PO deciswn for a large sample of Italian 
firms They compared public and pnvate firms and found that the likelihood of going 
public is positively related to firm size and industry market -to-book rat10 The Italian 
firms m the1r sample were likely to use the !PO to rebalance their financial structure 
and to facilitate future borrowings rather than to finance an Immediate investment 
Instead of studying a dataset including both public and pnvate firms, an alternative 
approach is to examine the !PO structure of existmg public firms. An IPO may cons1st 
of primary shares, secondary shares, or a mixture of both Pnmary shares are newly 
created and therefore raise new money for the company, whereas secondary shares are 
those already ex1stmg that are sold by current shareholders and, prima fac1e, permit 
these shareholders an exit route. In an interesting recent contnbutwn, Huyghebaert and 
Van Hulle (2006) studied the determinants of the size of pnmary and secondary 
portions m a sample Belgian IPOs and they concluded that the type of shares offered m 
these IPOs directly reveals mformatwn about the motivatiOn for the !PO. 
However, neither Pagano et al (1998) nor Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) fully 
answered the questwn 'why' and 'when'. In addition, Italy and Belgmm are both French 
civil law countries French civ1l law countries, among the four legal systems - French 
3 
civil law, German clVlllaw, Scandinavian law and English common law countnes, have 
the weakest protection for mvestors2 Weak protection by law for outside investors IS 
assoc~ated with strong expropnat10n by managers Consequently, mvestors will find it 
difficult to share firm's profit Wtthout a large number of confident outstde mvestors, 1t 
will be hard for firms to ratse eqmty externally from the stock market La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Stlanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2002) found that better protectiOn of minority 
shareholders mcreases the valuatwn of firms. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vtshny (1997) also showed that countries that protect shareholders have more valuable 
stock markets and a htgher rate of !PO actlVlties. Therefore, although the evtdence 
found m Italy and Belgium suggested that the reasons for firms to resort to public 
eqmty market tend to be related to shareholder extt, it is necessary to re-examme the 
decision to go public in a market that has a different legal ongin. 
The motlvatwn and timing for firms to go public ts vital in revealing a complete ptcture 
of!PO activities and elucidating the extent to winch firms can make efficient use of the 
stock market. It may also shed hght on the causes of underpncmg and other 
characteristics ofpost-IPO performance Considering the lack of empmcal research that 
systemically examme the two types of !PO motives and the related timing pattern, in 
thts thests I mvestigate the !PO motive and timing in a umfied framework I choose to 
focus on the UK market This is because 1t ts one of the most important !PO markets, 
and for thts market, there IS a surprising lack of empirical research on the determinants 
of lP Os In contrast to Italy and Belgium, the UK legal system ts based on common law, 
which is generally agreed to provtde the best available protectwn for shareholders (La 
Porta et a/ (1997, 1999)). It would be mteresting to find out whether or not !PO firms 
in the UK perform stmilarly to those in French civil law countries, and more generally 
the role of the stock market in the UK 
2 La Porta, Lopez-de-Siianes, Shle1fer and V!Shny (1996) exammed protection of shareholders and creditors by legal 
rules, the ongm of the legal rules, and the quahty of the law enforcement m 49 countries The legal protection of 
shareholders was measured by anti-director nghts mdex and one-share one-vote, and the legal protectiOn of creditors 
was measured by credttor nghts mdex The quality of law enforcement was measured by efficiency of the JUdiciary 
system, rule of law, degree of corruption, nsk of forced nauonahsatJon by the government, hkehhood of contract 
repudiatiOn by the government, and quahty of accountmg standards It was found that French CIVIl law countnes 
generally have the weakest, and common law countnes the strongest, legal protecttons of mvestors, wtth German and 
Scandmavtan ctvli Jaw countnes located m the mtddle 
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1.2 Objectives 
In this thes1s, it is my intention to fully examine the deternumng factors of an !PO 
decision includmg both the motives and timing, and thus answer the question of both 
'why' and 'when' I w1ll base my empirical analys1s m the UK context usmg recent data. 
G1ven the complexity of a decisiOn to go public, I will examme the data from var1ous 
angles using different methodologies This involves applying both cross-sectwnal and 
panel data techniques. As there 1s no theoretical model that incorporates both the 
mvestment and divestment motives m one framework, I w1ll empirically test the 
hypothesis that the investment and divestment motives are not mutually exclusive but 
can jomtly shape an !PO deciSIOn Fmally, I will examme the determmants of 
underpncing in the context of the !PO dec1sion, to connect the reasons for going public 
to the observed differences in the degree of underpncmg across firms over time 
1.3 Methodology 
One popular methodology that many empincal researchers have used to study the 
dec1s10n to go public is to compare !PO firms against private firms, conventionally 
usmg a pro bit or logit model to study the likelihood of going public, followed by a fixed 
effects model to examme the consequences of the IPOs. Examples mclude Pagano et al 
(1998), Fischer (2000), Chemmanur, He and Handy (2007), Rosen, Smart and Zutter 
(2005). A drawback of this method is that the data of pnvate firms are quite difficult to 
collect, both cross-sectionally and over any meaningful time horizon. In this thesis, I 
collect a panel dataset from varwus sources (some are downloaded from databases 
while some others are hand-collected from documents and webs1tes). I first apply the 
conventional panel approach by answering the more general question· why does a firm 
choose to go public rather than stay private? 
An alternative to the panel approach is to examme the determmants of the s1zes of 
primary and secondary shares using a cross-sectional data of !PO firms at the offenng 
(Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006). Th1s approach requires less data, and can also 
generate mteresting results from a different perspective. Usmg this approach, 1t is 
poss1ble both to decompose the investment and divestment motives and look at the 
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determining factors of an !PO. Therefore, after the panel approach, I apply th1s more 
recent cross-sectional approach to mvestigate the determinants of mvestment-dnven 
and divestment-driven IPOs 
In addition to the existing methodologies, I examine the deciSIOn to go public in a 
bivariate sample selection model that estimates the determmants of the size of primary 
(secondary) share and the determmants of !PO choice (agamst staying pnvate) in a 
simultaneous equatwns system. As far as I am aware, this is the first study that applies 
the sample selectwn model to analyse the decJsJon to go public, although selection 
models have found a wide range of applications m other fields of corporate finance. 
Using this approach, 1t 1s poss1ble to test the hypothesis that the mvestment and the 
divestment motives jointly dnve an !PO By includmg an extra equation (the !PO 
ch01ce) to the equations of the s1zes of primary and secondary shares, additwnal 
mformation is added, thus providing extra results 
Finally, I investigate the underpricmg of the sample IPOs usmg event study 
methodology, and examme the determinants of the degree of underpricing usmg OLS 
regression. Short-run performance of the sample IPOs IS compared across firms w1th 
different !PO, ownership and control structures. The relatiOnship between underpncmg 
and the !PO and ownership and control structures is analysed. 
1.4 Contributions 
This thes1s contnbutes to the literature mainly m four ways. Fust, 1t provides new 
empmcal evidence. It systematically exammes the determinants of an !PO declSlon, 
gives answers to the important questions of why and when firms go public It offers 
new evidence from the UK market, which 1s distinguished from other markets 
documented in the !PO decision literature. This makes it possible to compare !PO 
deciswns across markets w1th different mstitutional features and legal foundatwns. The 
data used m the thesis are recent, which makes the empincal results up to date 
Second, varwus methodologies (old and new) are applied, and thus the !PO dec1sion 1s 
fully examined from various perspectives to make certain that results from different 
6 
methodologies are consistent. In particular, the application of the bivanate sample 
selection model is new to the empmcal literature of !PO deCISIOn 
Third, the test of the hypothesis that investment-related and divestment-related motives 
jointly dnve an !PO decision may have implications for new theoretical model 
Fourth, It links the underpncmg phenomenon to the !PO deciswn, which helps to 
interpret the underpncmg anomaly from a fundamental point of view 
1.5 Outline 
The research ts organised into four empmcal chapters The chapters are mterconnected 
but each one addresses a different aspect of the decisiOn to go public usmg a different 
methodology The rest of the thesis IS structured in the following manner Chapter 2 
reviews theoretical and empmcal work on the !PO decision Chapter 3 mtroduces the 
mstitutional charactenstics of the UK stock market and its pnmary equity market, and 
reviews existing empincal studies about UK IPOs Chapter 4 describes data and sources. 
Chapters 5 to 8 consist of four empincal studies. In Chapter 5, I apply a panel prob1t 
approach to examine the ex ante determinants of the decision to go public, and a fixed 
effects model to examine the ex post consequences of the !PO decisiOn. In Chapter 6, I 
use cross-sectiOnal techniques to investigate the motivatiOn and timing of the !PO 
decision by analysmg the determinants of the !PO structure. In Chapter 7, I employ a 
bivariate sample selectiOn approach to examine the determinants of a complete !PO 
decision while emphasising the role of private mformation in shapmg the !PO structure, 
and use a treatment effects approach to discover the function of the stock market m 
helpmg firms to grow and enhance firm value. In Chapter 8, I mvestigate the relation 
between !PO structure, ownership and control and !PO underpricmg, and study the 
determmants of the underpncing of the sample UK IPOs. Chapter 9 concludes 
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2 Financing, Exit, Ownership and Control, and the Decision to Go Public 
A Revzew of the Theory and Evzdence on /PO Motzvation and Tzmzng 
Theones of the decision to go public do not fall easily m to neat compartments, but they 
are often organised into one of two broad strands of literature. hfe cycle theory and 
market t1mmg theory (Ritter and Welch, 2002). W1thm these different strands of 
literature It is common to d1stmgmsh two types of motive: first, to raise equity capital 
for investment, second, to allow origmal shareholders to divest or to exit. Life cycle 
theory IS built upon these two alternative motives for going public, It stresses that the 
optimal time for an !PO IS determined by the asymmetnc informatiOn and agency 
problems that firms face at different stages m their life cycle (Zmgales, 1995, Ellmgsen 
and Rydqv1st, 1997; Mello and Parsons, 1998; Pagano and Roe!!, 1998, Maug, 2001; 
Wagner, 2002; Chemmanur and Fulgh1en, 1999, MaksimoviC and P1chler, 2001) 
Market timmg theory on the other hand focuses mainly on the motive of rmsmg equity 
capital for investment; and it emphasises that the optimal time for an !PO IS determmed 
by the potential market valuatiOn of the company (Subrahmanyam and T1tman, 1999, 
Clementi, 2002; Pastor and Veronesi, 2005; Benninga et al, 2005). However, the 
classical theory of capital structure also has Implication for the determmants of going 
public, thus the seminal Jensen-Meckling capital structure paper (Jensen and Mecklmg, 
1976) and the asymmetnc informatiOn based capital structure theory (Myers, 1984; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984) can equally well be interpreted as an analysis ofiPOs. 
2.1 Theory of Capital Structure 
The theory of capital structure concerns the question of what determmes the mix of debt 
and equity for a firm It is essentially bmlt within the framework of rmsing finance for 
investment According to different assumptiOns about market efficiency, It can be 
divided into two branches - trade-off theory and peckmg order theory While the 
trade-off theory assumes that the capital market IS efficient and there exists an optimal 
capital structure as a result of tax considerations (Miller, 1977) or agency conflicts 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the pecking order theory emphasises the asymmetric 
mformatmn problem which results in a 'peckmg order' of financmg (Myers, 1984; 
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Myers and Majluf, 1984) Although not directly linked to deciswn to go public, 1ts 
arguments about the impact of agency conflicts and information asymmetnes on cap1tal 
structure offer a very good starting pomt to uncover the reasons for going pubhc- after 
all, pubhc equity financing via an !PO forms an important resource of equity cap1tal for 
many firms 
2.1.1 Agency Conflicts 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) based their explanatiOns about opt1mal 
capital structure on agency conflicts, and they argued that an optimal capital structure is 
determined by a trade-off between the benefit of debt agamst the agency cost of debt 
The benefit arises from the confl1ct between managers and shareholders. Managers have 
an incentive to make less effort m managing the company wh1le expropriatmg firm 
resources for the1r private benefit Shareholders on the other hand need to bear the 
resulting loss of firm value. Creditors in h1ghly levered firms w1ll monitor management 
more closely to avmd nsks of bankruptcy Therefore, a larger fraction of debt can 
motivate managers to work harder to pay off the debt, which will consequently m1tigate 
the mefficiency that ar1ses from the manager-shareholder conflict However, this comes 
w1th an agency cost of debt The cost ar1ses from the confl1ct between bondholders and 
shareholders. Bondholders would have to bear the fmlure 1f the firm goes bankrupt 
whereas shareholders would obtain the gams 1f the investment yields larger returns than 
the value of the debt. Therefore, shareholders may benefit from mvestmg in a very risky 
project even if it is a poor investment. Bondholders can anticipate the shareholders' 
mcentlve to invest m a value-decreasmg project, and thereby increase the cost of debt. 
Jensen and Meckhng argued that there should be an optimal m1x of debt and equity that 
mmim1ses the total agency costs incurred by the firm m financing 1ts investment. 
An interesting prediction from Jensen and Meckling's theones is that leverage IS 
positively related both to cash inflows from operations and to firm (or mdustry) age, but 
negatively related to firm (or mdustry) risks and growth opportumties. This implies that 
older firms and firms with higher cash inflows may prefer debt to eqmty -for example, 
they may have lower incentive to ra1se pubhc eqmty. On the other hand, nsk1er firms 
and firms with h1gher growth opportunities may prefer eqmty to debt - for example, 
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they may be more likely to seek public equity However, J ensen and Meckhng did not 
dtstlnguish between pnvate and pubhc equity In addttiOn, thetr argument about the 
confltct between managers and shareholders has its hmitations because the extent to 
which such a conflict is hkely to be a problem for a firm depends on the firm's own 
corporate governance - for example, this may be a neghgtble problem to a firm whtch 
ts largely owned by tts managers 
2.1.2 Information Asymmetries 
While the assumption that the market is efficient ts too strong, the peckmg order theory 
drops thts assumption. It ts based on the argument that there are asymmetric 
informatiOn problems associated with external financmg This leads to the conclusiOn 
that there ts no optimal mtx of debt and eqmty, although a firm's capttal structure ts 
destgned to improve efficiency in makmg investment decisions 
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) assumed that there are informatiOn 
asymmetries between managers and mvestors. Managers are better informed about firm 
value than mvestors, suggestmg that managers would have to dtscount the pnce of a 
firm's secunty to compensate for the nsk that investors believe that they will be taking. 
The 'asymmetric mformatton dtscount' of tssumg risky security indtcates that 
mternally-generated cash are a better source of funds than external financing The 
informatiOn discount can be so severe - tt may exceed the NPV of the project - that it 
creates a possibthty that a firm will pass up a positive-NPV investment when mternal 
funds are msufficient. The other posstbthty is that the firm chooses to ratse external 
financing to fund the posttlve-NPV proJect In this case, safer secunttes will be tssued 
before nskier ones. Debt ts safer than equity. Both have mformation dtscount, but the 
dtscount is larger on equity. Therefore, debt Will be preferred to equity financing. 
Accordingly, a firm's financmg activities follow a 'peckmg order' first internal funds 
are used, then external debt financing, and external eqmty financmg as a last resort. 
Although debt has lower informatiOn discount than equity, there are limitations of debt 
financing. First, there is a moral hazard problem of managers. Mangers who borrow 
substantially have an increased incenttve to take nsks that lead to default. Thts may give 
10 
rise to credit rationing That 1s, the borrowers cannot obtam a loan even 1f they are 
willing to pay a h1gh interest rate (Stiglitz and We1ss, 1981) Second, a large debt 
burden may result in a debt overhang problem. Firms w1th a high level of debt may find 
it difficult to negotiate with previous lenders or new creditors so as to fund an 
mvestment w1th positive NPV. This is because the proceeds generated by the new 
investment must be used to repay the old debt first, and therefore may be unavailable to 
repay the new claimants (Myers, 1977) The above financial constraints may prevent 
private firms from realising all the1r mvestment opportumtles and therefore reduce firm 
value. In this case, the firm can benefit from external equity, such as a wider source of 
pubhc eqmty, which can help 1t to avoid potential financial constramts In addition, 
going pubhc may also improve access to debt markets by mitigating asymmetnc 
mformation problems Therefore, it seems poss1ble to mfer that the firms w1th higher 
leverage are more likely to seek equity capital, for example from the public eqmty 
market. 
Yet, hke the trade-off theory, the peckmg order theory does not offer a d1rect answer to 
the question as to why public equity would be preferred to pnvate equity. Th1s 1ssue is 
addressed more specifically by life cycle theory and market timing theory 
2.2 Life Cycle Theory 
At a certain stage of a firm's hfe cycle, it can become more beneficial for a firm to go 
public rather than to stay private The forces that drive the IPO dec1s10n may arise from 
var10us constramts associated with bemg pnvate. These could include mcreasing firm 
nsks (wh1ch may result m over-investment or may reduce the funds that the firm can 
raise), a lack of information to evaluate the performance of the firm and 1ts growth 
prospects, managenal incentive problems, or over-monitonng by the external large 
shareholders on the controlling shareholders. These various problems can affect the 
investment dec1s10n of the firm, curb its growth and reduce firm value. When these 
constraints can be overcome by gomg public at acceptable costs, an IPO decision w1ll 
be made Going pubhc at an optimal time during the firm's hfe cycle can help the firm 
to max1mise the amount of equity financing raised for 1ts investment, improve 1ts 
ownership and control structure, and help 1t to create a market pnce which can facilitate 
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the original owners or the venture capital (V C)'s exit plan (i.e. divestment). 
2.2.1 Raising Funds for Investment 
Diversification versus information costs 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri ( 1999) focused on the investment motive They argued that 
raising financing from public investors creates liquidity for the firm's eqmty and Will 
enable block shareholders to diversify their portfolios; the firm will also enjoy stronger 
bargammg power against a large numbers of outside risk neutral3 public investors 
Conversely, nsk averse private equity suppliers will reqmre a high risk premmm for 
prov1dmg the firm a large portiOn of their private funds, and the firm will be weak at 
bargaming against a hm1ted number of funds suppliers. 
Alongside the benefit of public equity in reducing the risk premmm required by outside 
suppliers of funds, there IS a cost imposed by the asymmetnc mformation problem. The 
issuer may be better informed about a firm value; outside investors on the other hand, 
can reduce their mformational disadvantage at a cost, by evaluatmg the firm as a bad or 
good one. If public mvestors can evaluate the IPO firm at some cost; overall, there will 
be Sizeable duplication of the costs of mformation production, and ultimately It is the 
firm that needs to pay for the total costs incurred (most likely m a form of underpncing). 
If the duplication costs are too high, it will make the public eqmty financing process 
extremely expensive The mformation costs are decreasing m the available mformation 
about the firm that has been accumulated m the pubhc domain, and increasing in the 
difficulty of evaluation. For example, older and mature firms are hkely to be less costly 
to evaluate because they have accumulated a history m the market and are less complex 
to evaluate. By contrast, the small number of private eqmty suppliers typically have 
specmhsed expertise and incur lower mformation costs4 Therefore, the equilibrium 
3 Chemmanur and Fulgh1en (1999) argued that the cruc1al difference between the VC and the pubhc mvestors ts that 
VC IS less diversified and have greater bargammg power agamst the entrepreneur compared to the IPO mvestors The 
differences between the VC and the IPO mvestors m the1r attitude toward nsk do not affect the results of theu model 
Therefore, there 1s no s1gmficant loss of generality (but keepmg analytn::al Slmphcuy) from assummg that the IPO 
mvestors are nsk neutral 
4 The costs of m formation production assocmted with the mformat10nal asymmetnes m the market can be equally 
well mterpreted by adverse selection theory (Rock, 1 986) Some mvestors are less m formed than the other mvestors 
about the value ofiPO firms, th1s creates a standard 'lemons' problem, suggestmg that bad IPOs are l1kely to dnve 
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timing of an IPO involves a trade-off between the nsk premium demanded by pnvate 
eqUity for a lack of diversification against the duplication costs m information 
production by public investors. 
According to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), there are four key factors determmmg 
the optimal time to go public for firms First, firm age Older and mature firms have 
fewer uncertainties and are easier to evaluate, and thus mcur lower informatwn costs. 
On the other hand, pnvate equity tends to demand a high risk premium for a lack of 
liqmd1ty. Therefore, older and mature firms are more likely to go public. 
Second, cap1tal investment. The greater the capital mvestment, the more expens1ve 1t 
w1ll be for a firm to resort to pnvate equity, suppliers of wh1ch w1ll reqmre a greater 
expected rate of return for investing a larger fraction of their wealth in the firm. In 
additwn, pnvate equity will have better bargammg power agamst the entrepreneur. As a 
result, the price of each share sold w1ll be lesser, and the total number of shares issued 
must be increased for any given amount of capital raised On the other hand, when more 
external eqmty IS needed to finance greater cap1tal mvestment, 1t 1s more expens1ve for 
a poor firm to pretend to be a good one and thus 1t IS less likely that distorted 
mformation about the true value of the firm will be included in the offer price. Th1s 
greatly reduces informatiOn costs for pubhc investors. Therefore, firms with greater 
capital mvestment are hkely to go public at an earlier stage 
Thud, firm nsks R.!sk1er firms (e.g h1gh-tech firms) have high uncertainties, and thus a 
greater risk premmm will be demanded by pnvate equity. Therefore, they are more 
hkely to go public at an earlier stage, m order to obtam a better bargaming pos1t10n 
agamst investors. 
Fourth, difficulties in firm evaluatwn The more expensive it is for public equity to 
evaluate a firm, the less attractive it w1ll be So if certam information about the firm is 
important for evaluatwn but is hard and costly to obtam by the pubhc, gomg pubhc w1ll 
good ones out of the pub he market To avmd a fa1lure m Its offenng, the firm may underpnce Jts IPO to Signal Its 
quahty Young and small firms have httle track record and hence the adverse selectiOn costs (underpncmg costs) will 
be especmlly h1gh for them 
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be less likely. Therefore, a firm operating m an industry which 1s characterised by low 
evaluatiOn costs and less asymmetry of mformation is more likely to go public For 
similar reasons, it will be easier for a firm to go public if 1t is from an mdustry for 
wh1ch there has already been a substantial number of firms hsted on the market, as the 
informatiOn sp1llover can help it to reduce the costs of gomg pubhc. 
From the perspective of the market as a whole, the h1gher the effic1ency of a market in 
reveahng information about firms ( e g. a market with many active financial 
intermediarieS who play an Important role m information productwn), the lower the 
costs of mformation production for outs1de investors Therefore, the average age of 
public firms is expected to be younger in more efficient and developed markets. In 
addition, an unanticipated mcrease in the profitability of a given mdustry can lead to a 
decrease in the threshold of evaluation costs of gomg public for other unlisted firms in 
the same industry, which can make the1r IPOs easier Consequently, firms from the 
same mdustry tend to go public almost simultaneously, resulting in a 'hot issue' The 
unanticipated mcrease in the industnal profitability will be reflected m an unexpected 
increase m market returns of the already listed firms from the same industry Therefore, 
a 'hot 1ssue' is expected to happen when the market returns of an mdustry become 
abnormally h1gh 
Technological innovation 
Maksimov1c and Pichler (200 I) emphasised the Impact of technology factors on the 
decision to go public, and differentiated two types of risks that arise from intense 
technology innovation. They argued that firms in an mdustry that 1s experiencmg rap1d 
technolog1cal change have advantages m new product markets but face two maJOr risks· 
(a) technology nsk- the nsk of a failure m the new technology, (b) new entry nsk- the 
risk of losmg confidentiality because of revealmg mformatwn about theu financial and 
mvestment deciSIOns to potential entrants. 
For an mdustry in wh1ch the cost of the first stage investment5 is higher than that of the 
s The first stage mvestment mcludes mvestment m research and m developmg new technology It IS a sunk cost for 
the p1oneer firms m the mdustry, whereas IS an mtttal cost for potentml entrants 
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later stages, technology nsk decreases in the relative cost of the first stage investment 
for both public eqmty and pnvate equity, whereas new entry risk increases in the 
relative cost of the first stage investment and 1s higher for pubhc eqmty as compared to 
private equity. Meanwhile, feedback from financial markets to production market which 
is unique to pubhc equity has a function of revealing the value of serend1pitous 
information provided by mvestors, and such feedback can reduce adverse selection 
problems. 
Maks1movic and Pichler (200 I) argued that 1f the pubhc perception 6 of an industry is 
that the cost of the first stage mvestment is higher than that of later stages, the greater 
relative cost of the first stage m vestment reduces technology nsk. At the same time, the 
feedback effect will mduce a greater reductiOn in the returns reqmred by public equity 
m comparison to pnvate equity. Therefore, pubhc equity will be preferred at an early 
stage. On the other hand, if the public perceptiOn of an mdustry is that the cost of later 
stage development is high and that technology risk is h1gh, private equity w1ll be 
preferred in early stage financmg 
In addition, for a new and emerging industry, 1f technology risk is more sigmficant than 
new entry risk, there w1ll be only a small number of IPOs in th1s industry until 
technology risk has been elimmated Conversely, if new entry risk is more sigmficant 
than technology nsk, there will be a herding phenomenon of IPOs, i.e the first !PO m 
the industry will be rapidly followed by a large number ofthe other sim1lar IPOs. 
2.2.2 Exit, Divestment and Transfer of Control 
Idiosyncratic risks and adverse selection costs 
Ellingsen and Rydqv1st (1997) assumed that firms may be over-invested at a later stage 
and thus Jdwsyncra!ic nsks of firms increase WJth firm age. Large block holders ( e g 
entrepreneurs, ven!Jrre cap1tal) may want to cash out from the firm at a certain lime in 
order to reduce their exposure to nsks, obtain liquidity, or to undertake new and 
6 Pubhc perceptiOn mcludes the perception that whether or not the mdustry IS vmble, the probabthty that a supenor 
technology wtll appear, and the 1mtml costs on R&D that need to be patd by new entrants 
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profitable activihes. Gomg pubhc is the first stage of a longer term divestment plan and 
exit strategy. Selhng out via the stock market is supenor to direct sale, because an 
informative stock pnce established in the after-market for the firm can reduce adverse 
selection problems between buyers and sellers, thus reducmg the asymmetnc 
informatiOn discount and maximizing total proceeds from the sales in subsequent 
seasoned equity offermgs (SEOs) 
Due to the existence of asymmetric informatiOn problems between Issuers and investors 
and moral hazard problems of Issuers, shareholders' exit might be perceived as a bad 
signal by public mvestors· they might ascribe the exit to poor entrepreneurial 
performance or to decreasing mvestment value for venture capital. This Implies high 
adverse selection costs for IPOs of bad firms Ellmgsen and Rydqv1st (1997)'s model 
predicted that It IS more hkely for good firms to go public and to uhlise the market 
device for their shareholders' exit, and that firms that go public should be old as there 
will be a lesser adverse selection problem. 
Wagner (2002) made the rather different assumptiOn that an entrepreneur has a 
motivation to divest at the very beginnmg of a firm's hfe. Two possibilities exist First, 
if investors cannot anticipate the entrepreneur's intentiOn to exit, the benefit of going 
public will always decrease with firm age, because the entrepreneur's own valuatiOn IS 
mcreasmg with firm age. Then the entrepreneur will either choose to go public 
Immediately after the busmess is set up, if the mitial gains from the IPO exceed the 
costs of going pubhc, or will never go public at all. But second, if rational mvestors can 
anticipate the entrepreneur's moral hazard (i e. the divestment plan), the valuation of 
investors m the firm will mcrease with firm age. However, the entrepreneur's own 
valuation will also m crease with firm age (since his discount factor of the valuation will 
decrease with firm age). Therefore, there IS an optimal time for the divestment. The 
entrepreneur will postpone the divestment until the outside investors' valuatiOn exceeds 
the entrepreneur's. At this optimal time for divestment, pubhc mvestors will be 
preferred to private mvestors, because the latter IS less diversified and will ask for a risk 
premium to compensate for firm-specific risk and 1lliquidity However, at an earlier 
stage, pnvate investors will be preferred because they can help the firm to reduce the 
discount factors, e g. by prov1dmg expertise 
16 
Wagner (2002)'s model does not conflict with Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) and it also 
embedded the mfluence of the firm nsks on the choice between private and pubhc 
eqmty. However the assumption that the divestment motive exists smce the beginning 
of the firm's life leads to a different emphasis on the decision to go public: if the 
deciSion to divest by an IPO IS made, the ultimate goal will be a transfer of control. He 
argued that young and small firms and firms neither affiliated with a mature parent nor 
backed by venture capital are less hkely to go public. The reason is that if the firm is not 
sold immediately after the IPO, there is always the possibility of underperformance in 
the aftermarket due to reduced managenal effort, and the entrepreneur will have to bear 
the resultmg loss The only way to avoid such a constraint IS to change control. But for 
these firms, the change of control will mean a loss of entrepreneunal human capital, 
which is not what the entrepreneur wishes to see. In this aspect (the view about an 
eventual change of control), Wagner (2002)'s model also shares some similarity with 
the followmg group of models 
Excessive owner-manager conflicts and the value of control rights 
Like Wagner (2002) and Ellmgsen and Rydqv1st (1997), Zingales (1995) and Mello and 
Parsons (1998) focus on the divestment motive. However in this group of theones, the 
exit plan IS dnven by excess owner-manager conflict, It IS stressed that the IPO IS only 
the first step of a two-stage exit strategy, for which the ultimate aim is a transfer of 
control (the Idea of transfer of control is similar to Wagner, 2002) 
Zmgales (1995) assumed that the higher proportiOn of cash flow rights to total shares 
are sold, the more private benefit of control IS transferred to the buyer. A large 
shareholder's valuation of a firm essentially comes from the pnvate benefit of control 
Directly selling out the firm and bargammg with potential buyers can maximise the 
proceeds from a sale of control rights, whereas going public and sellmg the firm to 
dispersed pubhc shareholders can maximise the proceeds from the sale of cash flow 
nghts. 
When management extracts private benefits from the controlling shareholders, first 
selling a portiOn of the firm's stock to dispersed shareholders can md1rectly strengthen 
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the existmg owners' control status. In addition, publicly observable stock pnce can 
reduce the mformation asymmetries between the seller and potential buyers, wh1ch will 
enhance the seller's bargainmg power for the subsequent sale of controlling blocks 
Therefore, an optimal combination of maJority control and dispersed ownership in the 
!PO can maximise the entrepreneur's total revenue from the eventual sale of control; or 
alternatively, maximise the venture capital's total proceeds from their exit. 
In contrast to Zmgales (1995), Mello and Parsons (1998) proposed that a large 
shareholder's valuation of a firm comes from its expected cash flow and they stressed 
that the efficiency of share allocation mcreases with the efficiency of the information 
revealing process Due to the asymmetric informatiOn problem, there are uncertamhes 
about both the demand of small investors and the value added by large and active 
investors FirSt selling shares to small and dispersed investors in the !PO can help the 
seller to acqmre valuable information for setting favourable terms for subsequent sales 
to value-addmg large mvestors, so that large investors w1ll be attracted to participate m 
the extended sales As a result, the efficiency of allocatmg shares 1s improved. And at 
the same time, the large and active shareholders can provide momtoring and 
management activities, which can 1mprove the effic1ency of corporate control and add 
value to the firm These w1ll maximise the total proceeds gamed from the extended 
sales and ex1t process 
Apart from the explanation of the process by which the total selling proceeds can be 
maxim1sed, there is another key difference between the two models, which 1s the 
issuer's attitude towards the large and active investors In one case, large investors are 
discriminated agamst in the selling process so as to favour small investors and to protect 
the seller's controlling status (Zmgales, 1995). In the other, they are encouraged to jom 
m the firm m the extended sales for the momtonng that they can prov1de (Mello and 
Parsons, 1998). These two accounts clearly ass1gn diametrically oppos1te roles to the 
large mvestors, and a more accurate interpretation may depend on the particular market 
environment. 
Zmgales (1995)' model implies that there are three possibilities for an optimal way to 
transfer control F1rst, if the pnvate benefit of control rights 1s important and the value 
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of cash flow rights is more sensitive to the fluctuatwns in the firm's share pnce than m 
the value of pnvate benefits, gomg public to eventually sell out Will be preferred. 
Second, if the potenttal buyer's pnvate benefit of control is zero, spm-ofi will be 
optlmal. Third, 1f the potential buyer 1s hkely to reduce the value of cash flow rights, 
sellmg the subs1d1ary duectly to a third party would be the best choice 
Besides the Implications of each model, there are two common predictions by theones 
that focus on the divestment motive. Fust, the operating performance of an IPO firm 1s 
expected to decrease after going public due to the divestment plan, which may reduce 
the owner's incentlves and increase the moral hazard problem Second, the IPOs are 
expected to be followed by seasoned equity offenngs (SEOs), as the !PO is only the I" 
stage for 1ts original owner to cash out. In th1s case, the probabihty of SEOs should be 
pos1hvely related to the increase in the firm's share price after the !PO. 
2.2.3 Optimising Ownership Structure 
In additwn to the investment and the divestment based models, there are several other 
theoretical papers on the decision to go public They bmlt their model neither w1thm the 
mvestment nor the divestment settings, but instead highlight the mtention of the !PO 
firms to achieve an optlmal dispersion of ownership structure via the process of gomg 
public While it is not certain whether the intention of opt1mising ownership structure IS 
the ultimate reason for going pubhc, 1t is certamly a very important consideratwn both 
for firms that go pubhc to raise new funds and for those who are mamly divesting 
ex1stmg shares. Therefore, in this sectwn I review theories that are concerned with how 
an !PO declSlon may affect and improve the ownership structure of the company. 
According to this group of theories, gomg public IS for the purpose of optimising 
ownership structure, to Improve the efficiency with which the firm's growth prospects 
can be evaluated. Informatlve stock prices offer valuable market-specific information 
for the firm, reducing poor managerial incentive problems. An optlmal disperswn of 
ownership can overcome excessive monitormg of controlling shareholders by external 
large shareholders on the one hand, and under-momtonng of management on the other, 
7 Spm-offmeans a parent firm dtstnbutes equtty clatms m tts subsidJary dtrectly to shareholders of parent firms 
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thus solvmg the agency confl1cts. 
Market monitoring 
One function of the stock market is the monitoring of a firm's managenal performance, 
as stock pnces can reveal additional informatiOn about a firm's performance which may 
not be reflected m its accounting data Thus market monitoring creates a mechan1sm to 
enhance managenal incentives (Holmstrom and T1role, 1993)8 Tradable shares bring in 
e1ther explicit compensation contracts ( e g stock optwn schemes for management) or 
imphc1t contracts (e.g. the potential threat of management losing thm jobs from a 
takeover) Continuously quoted share prices can provide mcentJves to management and 
curb managenal misbehavwur, especially because a poorly performing firm in the 
market w1ll face the threat of takeover (and the manager w!ll be fired if a takeover 
succeeds) 
The ability of stock pnces to reveal such additional mformation and the efficiency of 
managenal mcentive contracts mcrease with the hqmd1ty of the firm's shares in the 
stock market. A stock with high liquidity 1s covered by a large number of hqmd1ty 
traders. Subsequently, a large number of informed speculators w1th private mformation 
w1ll be attracted to the trading ofthe stock, as it will be easy for them to find a hqmd1ty 
trader to take a position and to make money from the market This makes the stock 
prices mformative and thereby increases the efficiency of its managenal incentive 
contracts. 
The achievable market hqmd1ty of the firm's stock IS influenced by the firm's 
ownership structure. A firm cannot directly contract w1th speculators on the amount of 
mformation that they obtain However, increases in ownership d1sperswn indicate 
increases in the number of shares that w1ll be traded m the market, and hence increase 
hquidity of the stock. Subsequently, the efficiency of the managenal incentives contract 
will be improved 
8 It does not belong to the formal literature ofiPO decJsJon, however 1ts argument about the function of the market 
momtormg made contnbut10n to the hfe cycle theory 
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Yet, to benefit from market monitoring- 1 e. to list on the stock exchange and to trade 
m the market- is costly. In the market, speculators produce the additional information 
and get compensation for their mformation from the losses of liqmd1ty traders and other 
owners of shares, while the liqmdlty traders are compensated by the underpncing of the 
!PO shares 
Therefore, the efficiency of monitonng by speculators increases with the marginal value 
of their informatiOn that will be revealed In equilibrium, there is a trade-off between 
the value of managerial mcentive and the cost of market momtoring which 1s ultimately 
in the form of underpricing. 
W1th respect to the monitoring functwn of the stock, Maug (2001) offered a further 
explanation from the information perspeclive The information consists of firm-specific 
mformation and market -specific informatiOn. Firm-specific informatiOn IS better 
collected by msiders - entrepreneur, VC or the parent firm, whereas market-specific 
mformation 1s better collected by mformed investors m the market Going pubhc can 
assist a firm to gather valuable market-specific information about 1ts mvestment 
projects from mformed public mvestors. Market-specific informatiOn helps a firm to 
dec1de whether or not to carry out an mvestment proJeCt and help 1t to reduce the 
momtonng cost of its block ms1der-shareholders, so that the efficiency m evaluating 1ts 
growth prospects can be Improved. The momtoring costs of public mvestors are 
compensated by underpricmg Therefore, an !PO decision 1s a trade-off between the 
values of market-specific informatiOn against the cost of underpncmg 
In the early stage of a firm's life cycle, or when a firm plans to restructure, firm-specific 
mformation IS more valuable. Insiders have advantages in gathering this kind of 
information and would not w1sh to d1sclose it to the public. Therefore, staymg private 1s 
a better choice. For th1s reason, a young firm is less likely to go public In the later stage 
however, when market-specific mformation becomes more valuable and ms1ders lose 
advantage m collecting such mformation, going public will become a preferred cho1ce. 
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Over-monitoring and under-monitoring problems 
Pagano and Roell (1998) suggested that ownership structure should be designed to 
opt1mally allocate control to entrepreneur, and going public is one way to achieve this 
A firm may choose either pnvate equity financing or public eqmty financing. Each of 
these two is associated With different ownership and control structure, and consequently 
different monitoring problems Pnvate equity financmg is commonly associated with 
concentrated ownership structure A firm may sell only a mmority of shares in order to 
make sure that Its control and concentrated ownership base will not be affected. 
Concentrated ownership structure can avoid a problem of poor managerial incentives 
(1 e under-monitonng), but it may give nse to an over-monitonng problem from large 
external shareholders (e.g. VC). Large external shareholders may destroy entrepreneur's 
pnvate benefit and they do not take into account the rent that they should pay for 
acquiring control from entrepreneur. Therefore, entrepreneur may prefer dispersed 
ownership as it avoids excessive monitonng by large external shareholders Gomg 
pubhc at a certain stage in the life cycle of a firm can help It to optlmise the d1spers10n 
of its ownership structure, provide a solutions to the above agency problem and 
Improve its firm value. 
If a firm chooses public eqmty financing, it can choose either to keep concentrated 
ownership structure or to achieve disperse ownership structure. If It mtends to keep 
concentrated ownership structure, an over-monitoring problem will be the main concern 
An over-momtoring problem arises from the conflict between controlling shareholders 
(typically the founders or theu descendants) and minority block public shareholders 
Controlling shareholders often siphon off corporate earnings or take advantage of 
corporate assets m support of its other investments. On the other hand, mmority block 
shareholders often actively monitor the firm, which m return weakens controlling 
shareholders' private benefits of control They also have incentives to get mvolved in 
takeover activities 1f a firm is badly managed, so as to benefit from capital appreciatiOn 
on their shareholdings from takeover premmm These will put controlling shareholders' 
controlling status m danger. Such over-monitoring costs can be very h1gh to controlling 
shareholders 
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If a firm that chooses public equity financing mtends to achieve dispersed ownership 
structure, a problem of poor managerial mcentives (1 e. under-monitonng problem) is 
the mam 1ssue that it needs to tackle Dispersed shareholders have low mcentlve to 
monitor h1red manager, and hired manager who actually runs the firm will tend to put 
his personal mterests above those of the shareholders, thus reducmg firm value. 
For public equity financing, m additiOn to the above agency costs related to ownership 
structure, there are also direct costs of listing and indirect costs of underpncing. 
Therefore, the deciSIOn to go public m Pagano and Roe!! (1998) IS a trade-off between 
the benefits of overcoming the agency problems and the costs of creatmg liqmd1ty for 
sold shares, the goal of wh1ch 1s to maximise firm value subject to optimal ownership 
dispersiOn However, the consideratiOn of investment or divestment IS irrelevant to the1r 
model. 
Pagano and Roe!! (1998) provided many mteresting implications for a firm's !PO 
dec1sion F1rst, it was predicted that gomg public is attractive to a firm that has high 
capital investment because, when the firm is in need of a large amount of equity capital, 
a h1gher ratiO of external funds to firm value increases the likelihood of over-momtoring, 
resulting in a stronger incentive to go public. 
Second, it was predicted that the mcentive to go public decreases w1th the value of 
momtoring added by mternal block shareholders (e g their expertise and management 
skills), but mcreases with external dispersed shareholders' ab1lity to momtor the firm 
and increases w1th the value of the founders' private benefits of control. In addition, if 
controlling shareholders can pay off internal block shareholders to induce them to 
monitor less, the over-momtoring problem Will be reduced and gomg public will 
become less attractive. 
Third, for the market as a whole, going public is more attractive when the rules of 
disclosure are strict and the accountmg standards for public firms are transparent, 
because this means that the market can offer more effective monitoring of managers 
and hence a lesser problem of poor managenal incentive commg from dispersed public 
ownership structure. Similarly, the mcentlve to go public increases with the degree of 
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legal protection for small shareholders, because under weak legal protection it 1s more 
likely that managers bribe large shareholders to monitor less, which will reduce firm 
value and damage small mvestors' benefits. 
2.3 Market Timing Theory 
In contrast to life cycle theory, the role of share prices IS at the centre of market tlmmg 
theory and 1ts models are built within the setting of firm m vestment. One branch of th1s 
theory 1s established on the assumption that the market is ratwnal Fluctuations m stock 
prices can convey valuable information about the expected payoff to the firms' growth 
opportumties, nsks, expected profitability and expected cash flow (Clementi, 2002; 
Pastor and Verones1, 2005; Benmnga et a/, 2005) T1mmg an IPO to comcide w1th a 
h1gh market pnce (1 e. potentially h1gh market valuatiOn) can facilitate a firm's 
investment decision, overcome borrowmg constraints, and diversify away idwsyncratic 
nsks Therefore, the likelihood to go public mcreases when market valuation is h1gh, 
whereas the likelihood for a publicly listed firm to return to being pnvate increases 
when market valuation 1s low 
Another branch of market tJmmg theory proposed an alternative explanation based on 
misbehaviour of market participants Investors m the market can be irratwnal and a firm 
may time its !PO to utilise the fads in the market (1 e to take advantage of windows of 
opportumty from market mispncmg when stock pncing is irratwnally high). In another 
case, irratwnally h1gh prices can be purposely made by managers, for example usmg 
earnings manipulation, to induce mvestors. 
2.3.1 Rational Market 
Serendipitous information versus costly information 
Subrahmanyam and T1tman (I 999) assumed that entrepreneur is less informed and 
bases h1s pncing of the firm on existing assets excludmg growth opportumties. There 
are two types of investors public investors and private financiers (private financiers are 
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well d1verslfied9). Entrepreneur can acqmre imperfect information about the expected 
payoff on the firm's growth opportunities, e1ther from pnvate financier or from public 
mvestors. Th1s additional informatiOn obtained from investors determines the amount of 
capital that will be mvested Therefore, the firm's mvestment decision is related to the 
type of mvestors. And the prec1sion and the cost of the add1tional information determine 
the firm's effic1ency in allocating capital and the max1mum expected returns on future 
investments. 
In Subrahmanyam and T1tman (1999)'s framework, the evaluation of the addJ!ional 
information is followed by investment decision, this distinguishes the model from 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (I 999) (a life cycle theory), in wh1ch the oppos1te order IS 
used- mvestment dec1sion IS followed by the evaluatiOn of informatiOn costs However, 
as investment 1s a contmuous process in prac!Jce, such a discrepancy m theore!ical 
models may be less important. 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (I 999) proposed that informatiOn consists of costly 
mformatwn (such as information about production efficiency, organisation and 
management etc.) and costless mformation (1.e. serendip1tous informatiOn, such as 
mformation about total demand for the firm's product etc ) Costly mformation 1s 
mostly generated by financial mtermediaries (such as underwnters, analysts and 
auditors), whereas serend1pitous information is generated by public investors. 
Serendipitous mformatwn can provide valuable signals The importance and the 
prec1sion of serend1p1tous informatwn vary accordmg to the nature of a firm. Its 
importance increases with the uncertainties of product demand, and its precision 
mcreases with the diversification of serendipitous mformatwn When some of the 
diversified serend1pitous information is widely agreed across investors (as signalled by 
increased market prices), gomg public becomes more likely However, such an 
argument can hardly be empincally tested, because the market value of a firm before its 
IPO does not exist in prac!Jce. 
Yet, there are some imphcatwns of this model. When serendip1tous information ( e g 
9 There are no non-dtverstficatJOn costs, and thts ts dtfferent from Chemmanur et a! (1999) The smtabthty of these 
two assumptions may depend on the firm m questton 
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uncertam!ies on the demand for a new product or on an expansiOn of production) IS 
valuable for resource allocation and when costly mformation IS diverse and cheap to 
acquire for a firm, the market valuation tends to be high, indicatmg a preferential time 
to go public. For the market as a whole, the benefit of going pubhc mcreases with 
market size (i.e. the number of hsted firms) and with the capitalisatiOn ability of a 
market 
Interaction between production market and stock market 
Clemen!i (2002) argued that the value of going pubhc IS determined by the book value 
of an entrepreneur's accumulated wealth, and that the market timing of an !PO IS 
determmed by the stochastlc process governing the dynamics of productivity, which can 
be viewed as exerc1smg an option. If the total factor productivity of a firm IS low, the 
entrepreneur will only be able to raise a limited amount of money by going public and 
will hardly carry out seasoned eqmty offerings Therefore he will not exercise the 
optiOn. A firm will go public If the expected value of the growth of productivity as 
reflected m the aftermarket pnce IS high enough to offset the fixed costs of Its !PO (the 
underpricing cost is not specified exphc1tly in this model). After the !PO, hab1hties, 
capital expenditure and sales are expected to increase whereas profitability IS expected 
to decrease. 
Pastor and Verones1 (2005) focused on firms that own patented inventwns and need 
funds for productwn, these firms either did not start production or only started at 
limited level. They argued that, for these firms, !PO financing other than debt or pnvate 
equity IS a natural result because public eqmty can diversify and hedge away the 
idiOsyncratic risks The market timing of these lP Os depends on the market valuatiOn of 
the firms. When the expected aggregate profitability or the prior uncertamty nses, or the 
expected market return declmes, the market valuation is expected to reach its maximum, 
and thus reaches the optimal time to go public. Pastor and Veronesi (2005)'s model 
predicted that gomg public after large-scale productiOn is not optimal because the 
entrepreneur IS exposed to idwsyncratic risks which can no longer be hedged away m 
the pubhc market. This theory may help to explain why some young high-tech firms 
choose to go pubhc at an early stage 
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2.3.2 Behavioural Explanations 
Investors m the market can be irrational and the fluctuation of market valuation can be 
dnven by mvestor sentiment It seems that there exists a fads phenomenon m the market, 
m which irrational investors (and analysts) tend to become over-optimistic about !PO 
firms' future growth prospects It is possible that investors' over-optimism is mherent in 
the market and that Issuers can successfully t1me their IPOs to coincide w1th the 
occurrence of the temporary irrational fads and grab relatively low cost of cap1tal 
(LJungqvist, Nanda and Smgh, 2006). The literature about long-run performance of 
IPOs also found evidence that the long-run returns of IPOs tend to be negallve ( e g 
Ritter, 1991), which is consistent w1th th1s argument 
Followmg th1s theory, it 1s expected that if the dec1sion to go pubhc IS driven by 
investment mollve, an !PO firm should be very keen to take advantage of window of 
opportumty (if this exists) for its !PO On the other hand, if divestment 1s the plan, an 
!PO firm should be less hkely to float in a hot market, because the value of the retamed 
shares w1ll decrease subsequently as the fever in the market fades away10, which w1ll 
reduce the total proceeds from selling controllmg blocks later on. 
Teoh, Wang and Rao (1998) found that going pubhc enables CEOs (who hold company 
shares) to exploit their pnvate benefits from increased firm value after the !PO 
Managers dress up the performance of firms in order to create investor over-opt1m1sm 
about firms' future performance. Before gomg public, they overestimate the expected 
future cash flows by 'massaging' earnmgs, or simply cheat investors by overstating 
earnmgs After the !PO, they purchase analysts' research coverage w1th an mtentwn to 
boost firms' share prices However, th1s explanatiOn IS not entuely convincmg 
theoretically or empuically. In certam circumstances, such manager man!pula!lon may 
ex1st, but th1s IS not likely to be the main reason for going pubhc Overall, behavwural 
explanations of !PO dec1sion have provided mteresting alternatives to the conventional 
approach, but they are still not well developed and remain controversial. 
10 Market-to-book ratio can be used as a proxy to measure non-systemic nsks and mvests' sentiment 
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2.4 Empirical Evidence on IPO Motivation and Timing 
The empirical research on the decision to go public is still qmte limited. Different 
studies have found mixed evidence from different markets usmg various samples and 
methodologies. 
2.4.1 Raising Funds for Investment and the Related Timing 
Chemmanur, He and Nandy (2007) studied a sample of US manufacturing firms, and 
claimed that firms facing less information asymmetry and having projects that are 
cheaper for outsiders to evaluate are more likely to go public They found that the 
probability of going public mcreases with firm size, capital investment and industry 
nsks of cash flow, but decreases with informatiOn asymrnetry11 ; the sales and capital 
expenditures of the IPO firms increase both before and after the IPO. These findmgs are 
consistent with the predictions of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) and Clement! 
(2002) 
Based on a sample of 877 US IPOs, Jam and Kini (1999) exammed the determmants of 
transition to one of the three post-IPO states- survival, failure, or bemg acquired They 
documented that higher pre-IPO operatmg performance Increases the probability of 
survival whereas higher firm risks mcrease the likelihood of failure. Firms may go 
public at various stage of their life cycle. Riskier firms are expected to go public to raise 
finance at an earlier stage since otherwise a high nsk premmm would be demanded by 
pnvate equity (Chemrnanur and Fulghien, 1999) However, If these firms have poor 
pre-!PO operatmg performance, they will not be able to rmse sufficient funds from their 
IPOs and the subsequent SEOs In another words, exemsmg the optiOn of gomg public 
will be too costly (Clement!, 2002). Consequently, it is more likely that the IPOs will 
fml m the aftermarket. Although Jam and Kmi's study did not directly address the 
questiOn as to why and when firms go public, it emphasised the importance of timmg to 
the success of an !PO. This sheds light on the determmants of an !PO decision. 
11 Capnal mvestment was measured by capital stock over total employment, mdustry nsk was measured by the 
mdustry median of the five years coefficient of vanatJon on firm sales at 3 digit SIC level, m formation asymmetry 
was measured by the average standard deviation of analyst forecasts and analyst forecast errors for hsted firms m the 
same mdustry, and the ease ofevaluatmg a firm was measured by the number ofpubhc firms from a same mdustry 
hsted m CRSP 
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Fischer (2000) focused on a sample of growth and technology firms floated m the 
Germany Neuer Market and reached Similar conclusions in terms of the impact of the 
investment, risks and the stage of life cycle on !PO decision. In addition, he highlighted 
the mfluence of technology factors (Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001) and market hmmg. 
He showed that the probability of IPOs is positively related to the nsks of the firms' 
projects and the mvestment intensity of the firms 12• F1rms that grow and invest a lot and 
have high proportion of intangible assets and R&D mtensity are more likely to go 
public. They go public when they are in good economic and financial conditions. He 
also pointed out that !PO is more attractive to firms that are already act1ve m a new 
mdustry and are introducing new products and plarming expanswns For this type of 
firm, there are considerable uncertainties about product demand due to the w1demng 
customer base, therefore serendip!tous informatwn IS extremely valuable (consistent 
w1th Subrahmanyam and T1tman, 1999). Moreover, stock pnces can prov1de valuable 
mformation about mvestors' risk preferences and the ability of the market to capitalise 
future cash flows, whiCh 1s important for firms' mvestment decisions Schultz and 
Zaman (2001) also emphasised high-tech factors and found that intemet firms go public 
at an earlier stage than firms from other industnes, and they rush to !PO market In 
additiOn, Fischer also found that controllmg shareholders keep control and even 
consolidate their control after IPOs, which provided supportive evidence for Zingales 
(1995). 
Boehmer and Ljungqv1st (2004) and Burgstaller (2005) also found supportive evidence 
for Subrahmanyam and T1tman (1999), from the German and the Austrian markets 
respectively: firms are more likely to go public when the market and the economic 
conditions13 improve, so that they can get higher valuation for their !PO shares and 
promote the1r investment. Lemer (1994) found similar evidence from venture-backed 
biotechnology firms these firms tend to go public when market valuatwn peaks, 
whereas they choose pnvate venture capital financing when market valuatwn is low. 
On the other hand, Houge and Loughran ( 1999) found different results from the 
12 The rat1o of mtang1ble assets over totallong~term assets IS used as a proxy for the nsk of a firm's project, R&D 
mtens1ty IS used as a proxy for m vestment mtenstty for the h1gh-tech firms 
13 GDP, gross m vestment, gross corporate profits, credtts provided to pnvate firms, share pnce mdex are used to 
measure the economtc conditions 
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banking mdustry in the US: rather than ra1sing funds for mvestment, bankmg IPOs are 
hkely to be driven by the need to meet regulatory capital reqmrements and the intentiOn 
to sell overvalued stock. Furthermore, bankmg IPOs are followed by poor performance 
due to loan growth and mcreased loan losses Since the banking industry is 
distingmshed by a unique capital structure (e g high leverage) and a distmctive 
regulatory environment, these might differentiate the banking IPOs from the IPOs m 
other mdustries. 
From the ltahan market, Pagano, Panetta and Zmgales (1998) revealed that for the 
ltahan firms the likelihood of gomg public IS positively related to firm size and industry 
market-to-book ratiO, the reason for gomg public is to ratse funds to reduce leverage, 
overcome financial constramts and to facilitate future borrowmgs, rather than to fund 
Immediate mvestment. 
2.4.2 Exit, Divestment and Transfer of Control and the Related Timing 
Rosen, Smart and Zutter (2005) studied a satnple of US IPOs of banking and bank 
holding firms and found that the equity-to-asset ratio of !PO banks increases to a level 
s1m1lar to that of pnvate bank and that the IPO banks are more hkely to be acqmred 
This offers support to the proposition that an !PO may be only the first step of an 
eventual sell out. Ang and Brau (2003) added further evidence in this aspect. They 
claimed that the number of owner's shares actually sold in an !PO IS greater than 
disclosed m the original prospectus, and that the issuer tends to conceal1ts mtentions on 
the sale and msider selling They also found that if the information acqmred from road 
shows and other marketing activities results in an mcreased offer price, the number of 
the owner's shares actually sold wtll mcrease 
In addition, Pagano et a! (1998) found that the Itahan IPOs are related to d1vestment by 
controlling shareholders Huyghebaert and V an Hulle (2006) found that m Belgmm the 
IPOs of estabhshed firms tend to be related to d1vestment motives and that adverse 
selectiOn costs play an important role However, the timing 1ssue for the divestment 
related IPOs has largely been overlooked in empmcal studies 
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2.4.3 Optimising Ownership Structure 
Helwege and Packer (2003) examined 178 US large and h1ghly leveraged non-financial 
firms and found that firms w1th inside ownership (1 e solely held by management, or 
solely held by family members, or a mix of the two) seldom make IPO decision, 
whereas firms w1th significant shareholdmgs held by outsiders (VC and private equity 
investors) are more hkely to go public, wh1ch might be due to their ex1t plan. However, 
there is no evidence supporting the argument that the decision to go public arises from 
the original owners' preference to reduce over-momtoring problems As discussed 
earlier, although the consideratiOn of optimal dispersion of ownership and structure IS 
important for both investment and divestment driven IPOs, it is less hkely to be the 
primary driving force of gomg public. 
2.4.4 Irrational Investors and Market Mispricing 
There is some interesting but mixed empirical evidence for the propositiOn that !PO 
firms exploit windows of opportumty Loughran and Ritter (1995) found that stock 
returns are significantly lower in a hot market, md1cating that issuers are likely to t1me 
the fads for thm IPOs Besides, Rajan and Servaes (1997) found that the IPOs w1th low 
analyst forecasts in the aftermarket actually outperform those With h1gh analyst 
forecasts. However, Helwege and Liang (1996) found that there 1s no difference m the 
performance of stocks issued m hot markets and those 1ssued m cold markets 
2.5Summary 
The decision to go pubhc is a ch01ce rather than a natural stage m the growth of a firm 
Some firms may choose to go pubhc at a certain pomt, whereas some others may never 
make an !PO decision Wh1le some IPOs take place at a later stage, others may be 
carried out at a fa1rly early stage in the firms' hfe cycle. 
Gomg public may mvolve the activ1ty of ra1sing new funds for the !PO firm (by 
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offering primary shares14) or selling existing shares by the ongmal shareholders (by 
offering secondary shares 1 5) or a combined of both. Various theoretical models from 
different perspectives explain the reasons why at a certain time public equity financing 
may be preferred to debt or pnvate equity financing (the mvestment motives), and why 
sellmg out v1a an !PO may be supenor to other forms of exit (the divestment motives) 
Firms face the need to fund their growth from time to time durmg their hfe. Agency 
conflicts (manger-shareholder conflicts and bondholder-shareholder conflicts) and 
information asymmetnes associated with external financing affect firms' chmces 
between debt and eqmty capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984; 
St1glitz and Weiss, 1981, Myers, 1977). For early start-ups, using debt financing, bank 
lending IS typically more attractive to creditors than bonds because of efficient 
renegotiation and a closer relatiOnship With the borrowers. As firms mature, the 
informatiOn monopoly of banks increases the costs of borrowmg, while increasmg 
bondholder-shareholder conflicts can also make debt financing very expensive The 
existence of moral hazard m management, bondholder-shareholder conflicts and the 
asymmetnc informatiOn problem between lenders and borrowers may leave the firms 
facmg potential threats of financial constraints. Fmanc1al constramts may arise for 
varwus reasons. hmited cash generation, credit ratiOning, debt overhang, or inability to 
issue pnvate eqmty. F1rms that are financially constramed may prefer external eqmty 
financing to debt financmg, in which case, public equity is one alternative. 
Between private and public eqmty financing, private equity is typically preferable to 
pubhc equity at an early stage because of the h1gh mformation disclosure costs and the 
high adverse selectiOn costs for pubhc eqmty. An !PO at an early stage of a firm's hfe 
involves the disclosure of mformation about financial and operatiOnal conditions, which 
may make the firm lose commercial confidentiality and weaken its competitiveness 
(Maks1movic and P1chler, 1999) Moreover, early start-ups have httle track record and 
therefore high adverse selection costs. Private eqmty suppliers typically have 
specialised expertise and therefore mcur lower information costs. As firms grow, pnvate 
eqmty is likely to become mcreasingly unattractive because of the high risk premium 
14 Pnmary shares refer to the shares newly created m an offenng, by offenng pnmary shares, the IPO firm can ra1se 
fresh cap1tal 
15 Secondary shares refer to the shares that already ex1st and sold by the ongmal shareholders, the proceeds from 
selling secondary shares m an offenng w11l go to the selhng shareholders 
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demanded for a lack of dtversification and hquidity, limtted size of funds available 
conststent with retaining mstder control Public equity may become a cheaper source of 
eqmty capttal compared to pnvate equity. Pubhc firms can benefit from a competitive 
investor market with greater mformation gathermg and diverstfied opinions about 
prospecttve payoffs, all of which wtll enhance thetr bargaining power, improve thetr 
resource allocatwn and lower the financing costs (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999, 
Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999) On the other hand, as firms become more mature, 
substanttal firm-specific informatwn ts accumulated m the pubhc domain, so that the 
costs of mformation productwn (the underpncing costs of the IPOs to stgnal their 
quality m the adverse selectwn theory) are substantially reduced for raising public 
equity. Nevertheless, although pubhc equity is normally benefictal for more mature 
firms, greater capttal mvesttnent, htgher risk profile and technology tnnovation may 
push firms to go public at an earher stage for relatively cheaper capital (Chemmanur 
and Fulghteri, 1999, Makstmovic and Ptchler, 2001). 
A further tmportant aspect of pubhc eqmty ts that it provtdes the firms with 
opportumttes to ratse money progresstvely through later SEOs, even if they dtd not 
raise suffictent capital in theu IPOs. In parttcular, as more information about the !PO 
firms becomes publicly available in the after-market, the costs of information 
productton and adverse selectwn can be reduced and consequently SEOs can attract 
better offer prices. 
Apart from the mvesttnent mottves, dtvestment mottve can be another determmant of 
the dectswn to go public. As a firm grows, some original shareholders may wish to cash 
in theu shareholdmgs and exit from the firm to avmd the exposure to increasing 
idiosyncrallc firm risks (EIImgsen and Rydqvtst, 1997, Wagner 2002) and excessive 
owner-manager confltcts (Zmgales, 1995; Mello and Parsons, 1998) A spectal case is 
that many pnvate firms are backed by pnvate equity (VC, buyout firms or business 
angles). These private investors wtll typtcally wish to exit at some stage to cash m their 
investment An !PO is one obvious route for an exit However, the dtsposal of the 
extstmg shareholdmgs is likely to be vtewed as a bad signal, thereby sellmg out via an 
!PO is more posstble for good firms at a later stage of development but less likely for 
small and young independent firms In the later stage of the firms' growth, 
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market-specific mformatwn from informed mvestors becomes more valuable and 
insiders lose their advantages m gathering such mformation Likewise, informatiOn 
duplicatwn costs for public investors become lower as firm-spec1fic mformation comes 
into the public domain, and this would make the exit eas1er and more profitable. 
More generally, it can be argued that sellmg out by a two-stage process startmg With an 
IPO can maximise the total proceeds from the eventual sale of controlling blocks 
through subsequent SEOs In the first stage of the IPO, the selling shareholders only sell 
a minor proportiOn of their holdmgs, and progressively d1vest their controlling blocks m 
the second-stage sales at SEOs. The established stock prices help to reduces asymmetric 
mformatwn problems between buyers and sellers (Zingales, 1995). The information 
revealed from dispersed small mvestors during the IPO can also help to improve the 
efficiency of allocating shares to larger shareholders during the SEOs (Mello and 
Parsons, 1998). Consequently, the improved offer prices and efficiency of allocating 
shares m SEOs help to mcrease the proceeds cashed in from sellmg the controlling 
blocks. However, a discrepancy ex1sts with regard to the role of large and active 
mvestors in SEOs it still remams an important questwn as to whether they are 
discrimmated agamst to protect the controlling shareholders' control, or alternatively 
are favoured to Join the firm to improve monitoring. The answer to th1s question may 
depend on the corporate governance of each md1vidual firm and the nature of a 
particular financial system 
No matter what motivation lies behind an IPO decision (whether it IS investment or 
divestment related or a combination of both), the potential 1mpact of gomg public on 
the ownership and control structure has to be taken mto account. On the investment side, 
raising eqmty capital potentially affects the firm's ownership and control structure and 
is associated with various agency problems between external financiers, managers and 
entrepreneurs Solvmg the agency problems mvolves the efficient use of corporate 
resource, and direct or m direct monitonng of management. For firms with concentrated 
ownership structure, when they raise eqmty from dispersed public investors, 
mmority-controlling shareholder confl1ct is the mam problem Monitoring from a 
number of minonty block shareholders may put too much pressure on controllmg 
shareholders. Multiple block shareholders may result m costly duplication of effort and 
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cause an over-monitonng problem. Mmority block shareholders also have an incentive 
to get involved m takeover actlVlties, which Jeopardises the controllmg shareholders' 
control status (Pagano and Roe!!, 1998). On the other hand, for firms With dispersed 
ownership structure, manager-shareholder confl1ct is the mam concern when the firm 
accesses public eqmty Unlike a concentrated ownership structure, in which the 
controlling shareholder actively monitors the managers, a dispersed ownership structure 
provides less effective monitoring. However, contmuously quoted stock pnces can 
reveal valuable mformation about managenal performance and a firm's growth 
prospects (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). This helps to create a managenal mcentive 
mechanism, curb managenal m1sbehavwur, and enhance firm value 
On the divestment s1de, when management extracts pnvate benefits from shareholders, 
diffusion of ownership in the first-stage sale would be beneficial Selling mmority 
stakes of the firm's stock to dispersed public mvestors can help the original controlling 
shareholders to retain and strengthen control Th1s md1rectly enhances the selling 
shareholders' bargammg power for the subsequent sale of controlling blocks, and helps 
to max1mise the proceeds from the two-stage selling process (Zingales, 1995). Overall, 
gomg public makes 1t possible m principle to des1gn the dispersion of ownership 
structure and to optlmally allocate control nghts to the entrepreneurs, thus 1mprovmg 
corporate governance (Pagano and Roe!!, 1998) 
T1ming the market is another important component of !PO decisions The costs of 
public equ1ty financmg can be affected by market conditions. Dunng penods when the 
stock market 1s over-optimistic, firms' stocks can be overvalued. F1rms may exploit 
such wmdows of opportunity and take advantage of m1spriced public eqmty (Rltter, 
1991) From a different pomt of v1ew, rational theory argues that firms time their 
offermg at the peak of market valuation (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999; Clementi, 
2002; Pastor and Veronesi, 2005). Fluctuation in stock pnces can reveal valuable 
mformatwn about the expected payoff on firms' growth opportunities T1mmg an !PO to 
coincide With a high stock price can facilitate the firm's investment deciswn a h1gher 
stock price (i e higher market valuation) indicates more mvestment opportunities, 
s1gnalling that the firm should rev1se its investment upwards However, R1tter and 
Welch (2002) argue that the mvestment and financing deciswns of entrepreneurs are 
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largely driven by firm-specific mformation rather than stock market share pnces It 
takes time for entrepreneurs to adjust their private valuatiOn towards market valuation. 
Theories about market t1mmg are based on the investment motive, existing theoretical 
models have not considered how market timmg affects IPO decisions associated with 
the divestment motive. Intuitively, the selling shareholders would seek to dispose their 
holdings at a high market valuation. In a buoyant market, there are more active public 
mvestors and they may assess shareholders' exit more optimistically when influenced 
by optimistic market sentiment This may reduce the adverse selectiOn problem and 
allow the selling shareholders to divest their shareholders more easily. However, 
following the two-stage sales theory, divestment should be a continuous process, and It 
is less obvious how the d1vestmg shareholders should plan the whole exit process (at the 
!PO), t1mmg the market for their later sales and riding the cycle of the performance of 
the stock market so as to maximise the total proceeds. Answers to this question await 
more convmcmg theoretical explanatiOns. 
Another gap m the theoretical literature is that It lacks a unified dynamic framework to 
incorporate both mvestment and divestment motives. This leaves several questions 
under-addressed Why do some firms issue only primary shares, some issue only 
secondary shares, while some others issue a combination of both? Why does !PO 
structure vary across firms? What are the reasons behind the observed cross-country 
difference m !PO structure? As the mvestment and divestment motives may not 
necessanly be mutually exclusive, it is important that the two types of motive and the 
related timmg pattern are examined in a umfying framework in empirical research 
A summary of the theories and their Implications for !PO decision IS shown in Table 
2.1 
The existing empirical research about the decision to go public is still quite hm1ted 
Most of them focused mamly on particular firms or industnes, and either concentrated 
on the investment motives or the divestment motives but not both. The available 
evidence shows that !PO decisions in the US tend to be related to raising financing to 
fund firm growth In contrast, contmental European markets exhibit more diverse 
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motive In the Italian market, 1t was found that firms were likely to use IPOs to 
rebalance their financial structure and to facilitate future borrowmgs rather than to 
finance an immediate investment (Pagano et al., 1998) For other contmental European 
markets, the reasons for going public tend to be relatively closer either to the US case or 
to the Italian case For example, German technology firms seemed to float on the Neuer 
Market to fund rapid growth (Fischer, 2000), whereas Belgmm IPOs seemed to be more 
related to the exit motives than the financing motives (Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 
2006). 
The various evidences revealed qmte different roles and functions of the stock markets 
across countnes and financml systems. To further discover the function of the stock 
market, it is essential to examine systemically the deciswn to go public in other markets, 
wh1le addressmg both the 'why' and the 'when' questwns 
A summary of the empirical evidence 1s prov1ded in Table 2 2. 
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Table 2.1 Theory on IPO Motivation and Timing 
Reasons for IPOs Author(s) Implications Theory Groupin2 
Jensen and 
Mecklmg 
( 1976), Myers Theory of Overcommg financial ( 1977), St1ghtz Fmanc1ally constramed firms are more 
constramts and We1ss hkely to go pubhc Cap1tal 
(1981 ), Myers Structure 
and MaJluf 
(1984) 
Older and mature firms are more hkely to 
Mmtmaltnformatton go pubhc, the firms w1th greater cap1tal 
costs, wh1le av01dmg the mvestment, nskler firms, w11l go pubhc at 
nsk premmm demanded Chemmanur and an earher stage, the average age of !PO 
by pnvate eqmty for a Fulgh1en (1999) firms w11l be younger for a more efficient 
lack of d1vers1ficat10n and developed market, an abnormally h1gh 
market return w11l be followed by hot L1fe Cycle 
ISSUe Theory 
Market feedback and 
serendtpttous mformatton The hkehhood of gomg pubhc mcreases m 
reduce adverse selectwn Maks1mov1c and the relat1ve costs of the first stage 
problems for firms that P1chler (200 I) mvestment m R&D and m developmg new 
- mvest heav1ly m R&D technologies = 
" and new technology e
- Serend1p1tous The hkehhood of gomg pubhc mcreases m "' Subrahmanyam 
" ... mformatwn IS valuable market returns, the benefit of gomg pubhc 
= and T1tman 
...... for the resource mcreases m market stze and m the 
allocatiOn of firms (1999) cap1tahsat10n ab1htv of the market 
The hkehhood of gomg pubhc mcreases m 
market valuatwn, when the expected 
H1gh market valuatiOn Clement1 aggregate profitab1hty or the pnor Market 
promotes the productiOn (2002), Pastor uncertam!Jes nse, 1! will be the opt1mal Tlmmg 
of firms and mcreases and Veronest t1me to go pubhc, after the lPOs, the Theory 
firm value (2005) hab1ht1es, cap1tal expenditure and sales 
w11l mcrease whereas profitab1hty w11l 
decrease 
Expl01tmg wmdows of LJungqvlst, Gomg pubhc 1s hkely when market returns Nandaand 
opportumty Smgh (2004) are abnormally h1gh 
Market momtonng Maug (2001) Young firms are less hkely to go pubhc 
!PO 1s more hkely for firms w1th h1gh 
Solvmg ovcr-momtormg cap1tal mvestment, the likelihood of !PO Pagano and mcreases m the founders' pnvate benefit of 
and under-momtonng Roell (1998) control, the effectiveness of market problems 
'=' momtonng and the degree oflegal <" protectiOn on small shareholders 
"' 
L1fe Cycle 
"' ~ Ellmgsen and Ex1t v1a !PO 1s more likely for good firms, Theory Reducmg exposure to 3 
"' 
Rydqv1st selling firms should be old, selling out VIa 1dwsyncrat1c nsks, low = ~ ( 1997), Wagner !PO IS less hkely for small and young 
adverse selectiOn costs (2002) mdependent firms 
Avmdmg excessive Zmgales (1995), Sellmg out v1a !PO IS hkely 1f pnvate 
owner-manager confltcts, Mello and benefit of control nghts IS Important, protectmg contro11mg Parsons (1998) operatmg performance decreases after the 
status, maxtmizmg sales IPOs, IPOs are followed by SEOs 
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Table 2.2 Empirical Evidence on IPO Motivation and Timing 
Author(s) Market and Sample Evidence I Relevant Theories 
Investment motives and the timing 
The hkehhood of gomg pubhc mcreases m finn s1ze, cap1tal m vestment 
Chemmanur, He and US manufactunng IPOs and mdustry nsks of cash flow, whereas decreases m mfonnatton Chemmanur and Fulgh1en (1999) Nandy (2007) asymmetry, the sales and cap1tal expenditure of the !PO finns mcrease and Clementl (2002) 
both before and after the IPOs 
Germany N euer Market The hkehhood of gomg pub he mcreases 10 mvestment mtens1ty, Maks1mov1c and P1chler (200 I), F1scher (2000) h1gh-tech IPOs mtang1bd1ty and R&D mtenSity, controlling shareholders keep (and Zmgales (1995) 
consolidate) the1r control after IPOs 
Boehmer and The hkehhood of gomg pubhc mcreases when market and economiC LjungqviSt (2004), German IPOs, Austrmn IPOs Subrahmanyam and T1tman (1999) 
Burgstaller (200S) condttlons Improve 
Houge and Loughran US bankmg IPOs Bankmg IPOs are hkely to be dnven by the need to meet regulatory LjungqviSt, Nanda and Smgh (1999) cap1tal requirement and the mtentwn to sell overvalued stocks (2004 ), Rltter ( 1991) 
Pagano, Panetta and The hkehhood of gomg pub he IS positively related to firm s1ze and Itahan IPOs mdustry market-to-book ratiO, the reason to go pub he IS to raiSe funds to Fmanctal constramts Zmgales (1998) 
re-pay debt and to fac1htate future borrowmgs 
Huyghebaert and Van Belg1an IPOs Small growth finns tend to be dnven by financmg mot1ves, they are Chemmanur and Fulgh~en (1999) Hulle (2006) more hkely to 1ssue SEOs 
Divestment motives and the timing 
Rosen, Smart and US IPOs of banks and bank The !PO banks are more hkely to be acqmred Zmgales (1995), Mello and Parsons Zutter (2005) holdmu finns (1998) 
Ang and Brau (2003) US IPOs Issuers tend to conceal mfonnatlon about mSider selhng, mmmg for Zmgales (1995), Mello and Parsons 
ms1der-wealth maxtmtzatton (1998) 
Helwege and Packer US large and h1ghly leverage Fmns w1th Slgmficant shareholdmgs by outSiders are more hkely to go Zmgales (1995), Mello and Parsons 
(2003) non-financ1al lP Os pubhc, finns w1th tnSider ownership seldom make !PO deciSions (1998) 
Pagano, Panetta and Itahan IPOs IPOs are related to sales by controllmg shareholders, d1vestment IS one Zmgales (1995), Mello and Parsons Zmgales (1998) motive of gomg pubhc (1998) 
Huyghebaert and Van Belgmn IPOs The IPOs of established finns tend to be related to divestment motives, Ellmgsen and Rydqv1st (1997) Hulle (2006) adverse selection costs matter 
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The UK market is one of the most Important !PO markets but, surprisingly, there has 
been a lack of research on the !PO decision per se. In contrast to Italy and Belgium, 
both of which are French civil law countries, the UK legal system is based on common 
law La Porta, Lopez-de-Stlanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) argued that legal origin 
shapes the legal rules of a country This consequently influences how well legal rules 
protect outside mvestors. French, German and Scandinavian laws are made by 
legislatiOn and courts normally do not mtervene in investor expropnation providmg that 
the transactwn has a reasonable business purpose. In contrast, legal rules in Enghsh 
common laws are made by judges who have the power to make new rules on new 
situatiOns by applymg general pnnciples Therefore, unfair investor expropnatwn can 
be limited by the expansion of legal rules. In addition to strong judicial power, greater 
protectiOn of private property rights agamst government mterventwn m economic 
activity also makes English common law systems provide the best investor protectwn 
Strong legal protectiOn for outside investors m the UK boosts mvestor confidence and 
promotes a well-developed and liquid capital market, where institutional investors play 
an active and important role. Considering the substantial differences m the legal and 
financial systems between UK and other contmental European markets, it seems 
essential to examme the decision to go public for UK firms, compare whether or not 
!PO firms in the UK perform the same as elsewhere and discover the functions of the 
stock market m the UK. 
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3 The Primary Equity Markets in the UK 
Th1s chapter descnbes the mstitutional characteristics of the UK stock market and its 
primary eqmty markets, looks at the regulatory and documentation requirements of the 
UK pnmary equity markets for IPOs and its !PO offenng and pncmg techmques, 
reviews existing empirical research about UK IPOs and sets out the research focus in 
this study. 
3.1 The UK Stock Market 
The UK stock market IS an Anglo-Saxon market and is one of the largest in the world 
by market capitalisatiOn. The UK financml system is market-oriented. In contrast to the 
bank-based system of continental Europe, in the UK the proportion of companies listed 
on the stock exchange is large And th1s capital market IS known for 1ts high liquidity -
investors are able to sell their secunties quickly and eas1ly m the market place 
The UK legal system is based on common law, i.e. a case-based system It 1s generally 
agreed that the legal system and its ongin strongly affect the corporate governance rules 
of a country and the development of an external capital market La Porta et a! (1997, 
1999) attributed this to differences in investor protectiOn which 1s greater in common 
law systems. The stock market is one Important source for companies to raise additional 
capital and one useful channel for some original shareholders to ex1t by selling shares to 
the public There is, however, a problem with this separahon of ownership and control. 
Public investors who provide funds w1sh to profit from having ownership wh1le 
managers who control the firm are w1lling to exploit the1r private benefit of control at 
the cost of the investors A good legal environment can protect public mvestors (the 
mmority shareholders) from expropnatwn by managers. In add1hon, transparent 
accountmg standards, strict disclosure rules and mformative stock prices enhance 
market monitormg of management. These encourage mvestors to provide money in 
exchange for ownership and boost the development of stock market. An English ongin 
(common law system) provides the best protection for shareholders and creditors, 
generally promoting a developed stock market. French CIVil law countnes provide the 
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least mvestor protection, whereas German and Scandinavian CIVil law countnes lie m 
the middle. 
In th1s liqmd and well-developed market financ1al intermediaries play an active and 
important role in producmg mformation, and the efficiency m revealing informatiOn 
about firms 1s generally high. These all serve to reduce the costs of mformation 
productiOn for public mvestors. Lower informatiOn costs and high efficiency of 
market-specific information may encourage firms to go public at an earlier stage in the1r 
growth (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999, Subrahmanyam and T1tman, 1999) 
The London Stock Exchange is the market place for stock flotation and secunty tradmg. 
A wide range of secunties trade in the market, including UK and international eqmties, 
debt, covered warrants, exchange traded funds (ETFs), exchange traded commodities 
(ETCs), REITs, fixed interest, contracts for difference (CFDs), depositary receipts and 
denvatives The LSE hosts four pnmary markets: the Main Market, the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM), the Professional Securities Market (PSM) and the Specialist 
Fund Market (SFM) The Main Market and AIM are the primary markets for equity new 
issues; PSM is the market for listed debt and depository rece1pt securities, SFM is the 
market for specialised investment entities such as large hedge funds, pnvate equity 
funds etc. The primary eqmty markets (the Main Market and AIM) have some unique 
institutional features which d1stmgmsh them from other developed stock markets 
3.2 The Main Market and AIM 
The LSE enables both domestic and mternational companies to list on one of the two 
pnmary equity markets There are currently more than 2,800 compames 16 listed on the 
markets, rangmg from small young firms to established large companies, w1th a market 
value over 3,500 billion pounds. 
The Mam Market is also referred to as the Official L1st and is mamly targeted at 
established large companies. It hosts some of the largest corporations such as BP, HSBC 
16 The statJstJcs m thts section all come from the London Stock Exchange 
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Holdings, Vodafone Group and GlaxoSmithKline Each of them has a market 
capitalisation as of December 2008 of over 60 billion pounds. In total, the Official List 
has around I ,800 companies with a combmed market capitalisatiOn of around 3,500 
bilhon pounds (as of June 2008) Within the Main Market, there are two specialist 
segments for certain industry sectors techMARK® which was launched in 1999 and 
created for mnova!Ive technology companies, and techMARK mediscience® which was 
launched in 2001 and focused on innovative healthcare companies. 
AIM was established in 1995 and designed for smaller growth firms. On average, the 
compames listed on AIM are much smaller in companson with the Official List For 
mstance, three of the largest companies listed on AIM -Lancashire Holdmgs, Playtech 
and Stbtr Energy all have a market capitahsation of below 900 million pounds (as of 
December 2008). AIM currently has more than I ,060 compames with a total market 
capitalisatiOn of37 billion pounds (as of June 2008). 
The hstmg requirement on AIM IS less strict than the Official List17, and even less stnct 
than AMEX and NASDAQ in tlte US market Since its establishment, AIM has 
attracted 65% of all IPOs in Western Europe, and many foreign compantes have chosen 
to cross-hst on the AIM segment As of June 2008, there have been 1739 !PO deals on 
AIM which ratsed a total of 29 bilhon pounds. This includes 312 IPOs of foreign 
companies from 25 countries including USA, Canada, Australia, Netherland etc. These 
cross-listings ratsed 8 5 billion pounds altogether, whtch accounts for nearly a third of 
the total money raised from the AIM segment. However, the cross-hstmgs on AIM are 
rather small as compared to the ones on the Mam Market. For example, from January 
1998 through June 2008, there were 791 !PO deals on the Main Market which raised 
more than 116 btlhon pounds. 168 of them are foreign firms (from 48 countries around 
the world). In total, they raised nearly 54 billion pounds, which accounts for nearly half 
of the total money raised from the Main Market during this penod. Nevertheless, as one 
of the most successful growth markets in the world, AIM offers valuable access to 
capital for those companies that cannot float on the Official List and It has started to 
become a truly mtematwnal exchange. 
17 Please see section 3 3 for details 
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The LSE provides two levels of admission IPOs and introductions. This allows the 
separation of firm hstmg and issuing eqmty. The common concept of !PO refers to 
listing and sellmg shares (primary shares, secondary shares, or a combined of both) 
simultaneously. In an !PO, the nominated broker(s) (together with the directors) takes 
the responsibility of the pncmg and the marketmg of the !PO shares In contrast, an 
'introductiOn' refers to a new hstmg on the stock exchange. In an mtroduction, no 
pnmary or secondary shares are issued. IntroductiOns typically result from the 
following cases a company which move Its hstmg from the AIM to the Official List; a 
foreign company which lists on the LSE but does not rmse funds. 
In the introductiOn stage, an introduction prospectus is reqmred However, If a firm has 
already gone through the mtroduction stage (i.e. It is already listed), the mcremental 
requirements for an offenng are minimal. After the introduction, when the firm wishes 
to issue equities, the introduction prospectus then needs to be updated and filed With the 
terms of the offermg Dernen and Kecskes (2007) argued that such two-stage offerings 
reduce the uncertamties on the !PO pncmg and allow the firms to time the market more 
efficiently. 
The !PO volume of the LSE exhibits great volatility as market conditions go up and 
down. This is a common feature of almost all !PO markets around the world Yet, 
among all the European !PO markets, the LSE generally has the largest !PO volume. 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994, updated 200618) compared !PO volume cross 
countnes For example, there were 93 IPOs in Belgmm dunng the period 1984-2004, 
181 IPOs in Italy durmg 1985-2001, 332 IPOs m Sweden dunng 1980-1998, 545 IPOs 
m Germany during 1978-2001, whereas 3,122 IPOs m the UK during 1959-2001 The 
legal system in the UK offers better protection for minonty shareholders, which may 
have encouraged investment in the IPOs. 
The LSE IS home to both young, small and mature !PO Issuers. However, as compared 
with other European markets, the !PO issuers of the UK market are much younger and 
smaller. For instance, Ellul and Pagano (2006) reported an average firm age19 of 7.12 
18 http //bear cba ufl edu/ntter/IntematlonalTable2006%20(2) pdf 
19 F1nn age was defined as the number of years between the firm's 1mtml mcorporatton and the time of the IPO 
44 
and firm s1ze20 of 51.22 million pounds for 3 3 7 JP Os earned out between June 1998 
and December 2000 on the LSE In contrast, Pagano et a/ (I 998) documented a much 
older average firm age of 33.43 and much larger average firm s1ze of257.20 billion lire 
(roughly 117 million pounds) for 68 IPOs listed on the Milan stock exchange between 
1982 and 1992. Similarly, Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) documented an average 
firm age of 39 44 and firm SIZe of 281 60 m111ion Euros (about 247 32 million pounds) 
for 95 IPOs floated on the three mam exchanges of Belgium between 1984 and 2000. 
Issuers at different growth stage may go public for different reasons Young issuers at 
an earlier growth phase are expected to raise cap1tal from the market to fund 
mvestments, whereas mature 1ssuers are likely to go public for reasons other than to 
finance growth The differences in !PO volume and !PO firm age and size of the UK 
market suggest that the factors that affect an !PO decision in the UK may d1ffer from 
other European markets 
3.3 The Regulatory and Documentary Requirements 
3.3.1 For the Main Market 
The companies that intend to list on the Mam Market are subJect to regulatiOn by two 
regulatory bodies21 the UK L1stmg Authonty (UKLA) which is part of the Fmancial 
Serv1ces Authonty (FSA), and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) which has its own 
rules and regulatwn regardmg a company's smtability for listmg. The FSA has 
overnding authonty over the LSE. Firms that wish to float on the Official L1st must first 
apply to the UKLA for 1ts secunhes to be 'admitted to the Officml List' and then to the 
LSE for 1ts secuntles to be 'admitted to tradmg' 
The laws govemmg new issues include the Fmanczal Servzces and Markets Act 2000 
(FSMA), the Publzc Offers of Securztzes Regulatzons 1995 (POS Regulatzons) and the 
Compames Act 1989. The sectwn 'Official Listing' m the FSMA clearly defines the 
competent authonty of new issues of secunties; rules on listing and delisting secuntles, 
listing parhculars, prospectuses and disclosure, sponsors, advertismg and other general 
2° Firm s1ze was defined as the sales durmg the year precedmg the IPO 
21 Before 2001, the LSE acts as the sole regulator of new ISsues 
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provisions The POS Regulatzons set out the defimtion of a public placement which 
reqmres prospectuses and full disclosure, and the defimtion of a private placement 
which does not reqmre statutory disclosure 
In additwn to the three mam governing laws, the publicly listed companies also have to 
comply with the Lzstzng Rules (current verswn May 2007 at the time of wntmg), the 
Prospectus Rules and the Dzsclosure and Transparency Rules, which are issued by the 
UKLA, and the London Stock Exchange Admzsszon and Dzsc/osure Standards (current 
version November 2007) which are 1ssued by the LSE 
The Lzsting Rules was traditiOnally issued by the LSE, but 1s now published by the FSA, 
and IS part of the FSA Handbook. It dictates mmimum reqmrements for the admission 
of secunties to listing, the contents, approval and publicatiOn of listing particulars; 
listing principles, sponsors; and the ongoing obligatwns of issuers after admission (such 
as the disclosure of pnce sensitive mformation, communications on new share offers, 
rights 1ssues, potential or actual takeover b1ds for the company etc ). The London Stock 
Exchange Admzsszon and Disclosure Standards sets out the rules and responsibilities m 
relation to a company's admiSSion to trading and the ongoing disclosure obhgatwns 
According to the Lzsting Rules, all companies incorporated in the UK and listed on the 
Main Market are required to state in their annual reports on how they have applied the 
main pnnciples of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance22 ; whereas overseas 
compames listed on the Mam Market are required to disclose any significant way in 
which theu corporate governance practices d1 ffer from those set out in the Code. 
The mam document that is required by the UKLA before an !PO takes place IS the 
prospectus The preparation of a prospectus IS the most important stage in a listmg 
process; and a prospectus must contain all the necessary information for potential 
mvestors to assess the company's shares and for the UKLA to assess the smtab1lity of 
the company to be admitted to the Main Market A UK prospectus must mclude 
22 The Combmed Code on Corporate Governance (current verston June 2008 at the ttme of wntmg) sets out 
standards of good practices m relatiOn to 1ssues such as board composttton and development, remuneratiOn, relations 
wtth shareholders, accountabthty and audtt The hsted compames need to etther confirm that they have comphed 
wtth the Code's prov1stons or, where they have not, to prov1de an explanatiOn 
46 
mformation about the persons responsible for the document, placmg statistics, company 
background and business, accountants' reports on the issuer's pnor three years' 
financial results, descnptwn of share capital and any changes in the prior three years, 
management and block shareholders (have more than 3% shareholdings), and the recent 
development and prospects of the issuer. The placing statistics mclude information on 
the book price and placmg pnce of the IPO shares, number of new shares being placed 
by company, number of existing shares bemg placed by vendors and number of shares 
outstanding before and after the IPO. In circumstances where a prospectus is not 
reqmred ( e g. a company IS seekmg admission of new securities to the Official List but 
no pubhc offering is made), listmg particulars are required by the UKLA. Listing 
particulars contam detailed information about the securities and the issuer 
The followmg key eligibility criteria must be met for an admiSSion to the Official List: 
• Complzance w1th the Exchange's AdmiSSIOn and Disclosure Standards, 
• Appomtment of a sponsor, 
• Complwnce w1th the L1stmg Prmc1ples, 
• Prospectus approved by the UKLA, 
• Mm1mum market cap1tallsatwn of £700k, 
• Free transferability of secuntzes, 
• A m1mmum of25% of shares mpublzc hands, 
• Havmg at leas/three years' aud1ted h1stoncal financial mformatwn, 
• At least 75% of the ent1ty's busmess must be supported by a revenue earnmg 
track record for the three year penod, 
• Control over the ma;onty of the ent1ty 's assets for the three year perwd, 
• Clear workmg cap1tal statement (sujjic1ent workmg cap1tal for at least 12 
months from the date of the prospectus) 
3.3.2 For AIM 
AIM is an exchange-regulated market. The companies that mtend to list on AIM are not 
bound by the L1stmg Rules of the UKLA but must ab1de by AIM's own set of rules, the 
AIM Rules. The admission reqmrements for AIM and the ongoing obligations after 
admission are less stnngent than those for the Mam Market; and the Combmed Code on 
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Corporate Governance is not mandatory for AIM compames. Nevertheless, companies 
seekmg an AIM listing must comply w1th relevant leg1slatwn such as the POS 
Regulatwns, m addition to the AIM Rules. 
There are no restnctions on the type of company that can apply to be admitted to AIM. 
The companies can be start-ups or established firms However, this does not mean that all 
small firms are able to be admitted, considering the substantial costs mvolved in a 
successful AIM flotation. The costs can vary significantly from around £300k to 
£1,000k m adviser's fees In addition, there are also broker fees of between 2% and 5% 
of all money rmsed. On average the total cost of floatmg on AIM was £480k, according 
to the statistics m 2002. 
Unhke the shares traded on the Main Market, the shares traded on AIM are unquoted for 
tax purposes As a result, there are certain tax incentives making mvestments m AIM 
companies attractive to both individual and institutwnal mvestors However, as 
AIM-listed companies typically have high risk profiles, AIM's investor base is largely 
composed of sophisticated mstitutional mvestors who mamtam close relations with 
companies (Mendoza, 2008). 
The admisswn cnteria for the AIM are relatively less strict 
• No mmzmum szze of company, 
• No mznzmum proportwn of shares to be zn publzc hands, 
• No tradzng record requzrement, 
• No przor shareholder approval for the ma;orzty oftransactwns, 
• No restrzctwns on the transferabzlzty of the company's shares, 
• No requzrement to be zncorporated zn the UK 
The following cntena must be met for an admission to the AIM: 
• An applzcant must appoznt a nomznated advzser (NOMAD) and an AIM company 
must retazn a nomznated advzser at all times, 
• An applzcant must provzde the Exchange, at least ten buszness days before the 
expected date of admzsszon to AIM, wzth the requzred znformation, 
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• An apphcant must produce an admrsswn document drsc/osmg the reqwred 
mformatron This document must be avmlable pubhcly, free of charge, for at 
least one month from the admrsswn of the apphcant's secuntres to AIM, 
• At least three busmess days before the expected date of admrsswn, an apphcant 
must pay the AIM fee and submrt to the Exchange a completed app/icatronform 
and an electromc versron of rts admrsswn document These must be 
accompamed by the nommated advrser 's dec/aratwn, 
• Where an apphcant's mam actlVlty rs a busmess whrch has not been 
mdependent and earnmg revenue for at least two years, rt must ensure that all 
related par/res and applicable employees as at the date of admrsswn agree not 
to drspose of any mterest m rts secuntres for one year from the admrsswn of lfs 
secuntres, 
• Where the apphcant is an mvestmg company, a condrtion of rts admrsswn rs that 
lf rmses a mrmmum of £3 mrlhon m cash vra an eqwty fundrmsmg on, or 
immedrately before admissron, 
• The Exchange may make the admrsswn of an apphcant subject to specral 
condrtwns, 
• The AIM company must also meet requrrements of prmcrples of drsclosure, 
drsc/osure of pnce senslfrve informatwn, drsc/osure of corporate transactwns, 
drsc/osure of mrscel/aneous informatwn, half-yearly reports, annual accounts 
and other ongomg obhgatwn as specified m the AIM Rules 
In essence, AIM's regulatory model has ansen from a trade-off between compliance 
costs and mvestor protection; it IS based on a comply-or-explain optiOn and the 
NOMADs play a key role as gatekeepers, advisers and regulators of the AIM companies. 
On one hand, these enable smaller firms with growth potential to access a large pool of 
capital at relatively low costs as compared to the Official List On the other hand, AIM 
listed companies inevitably face potential constraints of weak corporate governance and 
poor standards of disclosure. It has been argued that as more foreign companies choose 
to cross-hst on the AIM and more retail investors are attracted to the market, to develop 
the AIM segment to a deeper and more hqmd market it IS necessary to tighten its rules 
accordmgly - for instance, on the regulation of NOMADs and on disclosure rules 
(Mendoza, 2008). 
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3.4 The IPO Offering and Pricing Techniques 
There are generally two offering techniques by which a UK or a foreign company can 
float on the Official List or AIM: pubhc offers and placings 
In public offers, shares are sold directly to the public. Public offers consist oftwo types 
Offer for Sale, m which old shares are sold by the existing shareholders, and Offer for 
SubscriptiOn, m which new shares are created and sold by the issumg company. Public 
offers generally use fixed pncing techniques. In the fixed pnce method, the offer price 
is set before takmg purchase orders and IS normally set through negotiation between 
brokers and issuers Therefore, the offer 1s priced without knowmg actual mvestors' 
valuation and demands. 
Such an offenng and pncmg process IS associated w1th a Wmner's Curse problem 
(Rock, 1986) There are better informed and less informed investors competing with 
each other m the market Less informed investors m cur higher nsks If the offer price IS 
less than the expected value of the !PO stock, better informed mvestors will obtain most 
of the shares offered, whereas if the IPO stock is over-priced, less informed investors 
will get all the shares they request To attract less mformed mvestors and compensate 
for the risks that they take, the issuer who is uncertain about the market demand would 
have to underprice the IPO stock 
Another offenng technique is placings. In placmgs, shares are sold to specific investors 
through brokers or other intermediaries rather than directly to the pubhc. The mvestors 
are often institutiOnal investors. However, on smaller Issues, shares are sometime sold 
to retml mvestors as well. Before the 1990s, most placings used fixed pricing technique 
However, smce the 1990s, bookbmldmg has become the predominant pricmg method 
In a bookbmldmg process, the leadmg underwriter or sponsor IS responsible for road 
shows and other marketmg activities to decide the target mvestors And potential 
investors have to place an order through a stock broker who is partic1patmg m the 
offering. As a result, the underwr1ter is able to discover potential investors' valuatwns 
prior to setting the offer pnce and allocating IPO shares, and adjust offermg terms m 
favour of the offermg This enables the underwriter to discrimmate ainong investors and 
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allocate IPO shares to mvestors who report htgher values. 
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) argued that the offer pnce set by the bookbuilding 
method is more informative and better reflects the true value of the IPO. Consequently, 
the less informed investors are less hkely to receive overpriced IPO stocks. This 
ehminates the winner's curse problem caused by the fixed pricmg method and reduces 
underpricmg By allocating larger amounts of IPO shares to investors who set higher 
pnces, the issuer also receive increased proceeds from the offenng. 
Apart from the flextbthty to adJUSt the offer price, the bookbutlding method allows the 
issuer to adjust the number of shares offered. Benveniste and Busaba (1997) pomted out 
that when investor demand is strong, issumg more shares reduces underpncmg required 
for each share. Benvemste and Spindt ( 1989) suggested that repeat dealings between the 
underwnters and institution mvestors over dtfferent IPOs gtve the underwrtter the 
power to exclude certain investors ( e g those who provtde low pncmg while 
demanding high underpricing) from future hot IPOs. This enables the underwriter to 
demand lower underpncing for the current !PO Sherman (2001) argued that such a 
threat also apphes to regular retail mvestors and thts can further reduce underpncmg. 
Smce 1996, placings and bookbuilding have become the preferred IPO method in the 
UK, and underwriters have been playmg an important role in IPO allocatton as 
intermediaries Consequently, the winner's curse problem that arose from the pro-rata 
allocatton may have been alleviated and the factors that affect underpricing may have 
changed 
3.5 Empirical Research on IPO Activities in the UK 
Earlier studies of UK IPOs focused on the IPO underpncmg issue For example, Levis 
(1993) found that the wtnner's curse hypothests can only partly explain the degree of 
underpricing of UK IPOs. This suggested that testmg other underpncmg hypotheses is 
necessary In addition, Levts's study was based on early years from 1980 to 1988 when 
the offer for sale (a pubhc offer method) and fixed pncmg were the preferred !PO 
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methods However, since the late 1990s, placing and bookbmlding pricmg has become 
the predommant IPO technique In additiOn, since the establishment of the AIM 
segment in 1995 many smaller and growth companies have been encouraged to join in 
the stock market. The new AIM regulatory model and the different risk profile of these 
new Issuers may also have affected !PO activities in the UK. The changed !PO 
subscnption and allocation method, alongside the different market partiCipants and the 
changmg market constramts and institutiOnal features make It essential to re-examine 
the UK !PO activities in recent penods 
Another interesting study also based on an early sample from 1986 to 1989 IS that of 
Brennan and Franks (1997). They studied the underpncmg and the separation of 
corporate control and ownership of UK IPOs. They found that m the seven years after 
the IPOs, non-director shareholders were reduced substantially. However, there were 
few changes of director shareholdings. In the ten years after the IPOs, although the 
acqmsitiOn activities of the IPO firms were frequent, there were very few hostile 
takeovers Furthermore, the degree of underpricing was negatively related to the 
post-IPO size of block shareholders They therefore suggested that !PO activities 
facilitated the separatiOn of corporate control and ownership and optim1sed ownership 
dispersion, while protecting the private benefit of control of insiders Underpricmg was 
used as a means to induce oversubscription, to ration share allocation and to favour 
dispersed outside-investors so as to retain effective control of managers. However, 
cntics argued that protecting the pnvate benefits of control may not be the only reason 
why dispersed outside ownership is favoured - underpricing may also be used to 
encourage monitoring and mmimise agency costs (Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). 
Hence the ownership and control based arguments need to be justified in the UK 
context 
Reber, Berry and Toms (2005) studied the Impact of shareholding structure, money 
raised, advisers' reputatiOn, and managenal experience on the market value of a sample 
of 172 UK IPOs floated dunng 1992-1996 However they mcluded only IPOs on the 
Official List. They found that the extent to which existing owners keep their stakes 
positively affected the value of the IPOs in the aftermarket A larger amount of money 
raised could be viewed as an md1cator of growth opportunities and was associated with 
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high market value The expenence of the board had significant impact on the !PO 
performance whereas advisers' reputation appeared to be irrelevant. 
However, there is an apparent lack of research on the motivatiOn and the related timmg 
for going pubhc of UK firms This amounts to an important gap in the empmcal 
literature In this thesis, I address this basic questiOn. why and when do the UK firms 
choose to go public? I focus on the recent period and take the AIM segment mto 
account I also examine IPO underpricing in relation to the reasons for going pubhc, 
and investigate the post-IPO performance (mcluding both financial performance and 
performance of stock prices in the aftermarket in the short-run). These will help to draw 
a more complete view of the !PO activities and the function of the stock market m the 
UK. 
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4 Data 
To Implement the analyses, I need a panel of accountmg and ownership data for the IPO 
firms before, at and after listing, and those of the control group of firms that stayed 
private over the matchmg penods. In add1t10n, I need a cross-sectwnal dataset of the 
IPO structure23, data for market conditions24 over the sample periods, and descnpt1ve 
data mcludmg firm age, whether or not the IPO was a carve-oue5, the industry 
group26of the firm, and the market segment where an IPO was listed. Fmally, to 
mvestigate underpncmg in relatwn to IPO dec1s10n, I need the offer pnce of the sample 
IPOs and their daily closmg pnces in the aftermarket over the IPO wmdows. 
I collected the data from four mam sources: Thomson Fmanc1al 's SDC Platmum Global 
New Issues27 database, Bureau van Dljk's FAME28database, IPO prospectuses obtained 
from Compan1es House (the national reg1strar for UK compames) and Thomson 
Financial's Datastream. 
In SDC Platmum Global New Issues, I searched for UK non-financial firms listed on 
the London Stock Exchange (including both Official L1st and AIM segments) from Jan 
1998 through Dec 2003. The SDC Global New Issues database reported 835 IPOs over 
these s1x years I excluded financial firms, non-UK registered firms and firms w1th a 
foreign parent company, leaving 406 non-financial UK IPOs29• Of these, 223 firms were 
excluded because the necessary accounting data were mcomplete This leaves 183 
non-financial UK firms which held IPOs during 1998-2003. The list of the IPOs was 
23 These mclude the number of pnmary shares and secondary shares offered m the IPOs, and the number of total 
shares outstandmg tmmedtately followmg the IPOs 
24 These mclude market return (m relatiOn to the theones), IPO volume (measured by the number of IPOs) for each 
sample year (for descnpt10n only), and a year dummy 
25 A carve-out ts a sale of the subs1d1ary's stock m an IPO, v. h1ch constst of e1ther secondary shares owned by the 
~arent, pnmary shares m the subs1d1ary or both 
6 Maks1movtc and P1chler (2001) suggested that technology nsks have a dtstmct Impact on an IPO dectston 
Therefore, an mdustry dummy was added, tt equals one tfthe IPO firm belongs to ICT mdustry 
27 The SDC Platmum Global New Issues database provides detatled mformatton of all new tssues m the global 
markets 
28 The FAME database provides data of compames' financial statements, ownersh1p structure etc for the largest 2 6 
m1lhon UK and Insh compames 
29 The 406 non-financial IPOs of the UK registered firms (excludmg firms with a foreign parent company) constst of 
319 pnmary share offenngs (1 e only pnmary shares are offered m an IPO), 84 combmed offermgs (1 e both pnmary 
and secondary shares are offered m an IPO), and 3 secondary share offermgs (only secondary shares are offered m an 
!PO) 
54 
also cross-checked w1th a list drawn from the LSE website30 
A hst of private firms was drawn from FAME The control group of private firms 
included firms staying private from 1996 to 2007, from all industries (except financial 
industry) that had IPOs during 1998-2003. Each pnvate firm should have at least one 
financial year between 1998 and 2003 in wh1ch total assets exceeded £500,000. If not, 1t 
would be unlikely to be able to afford an IPO. Private firms with foreign parent 
companies, or with account type 'partml/full exempt10n' or 'dormant' or 'small 
company' or w1th substantial m1ssing data were all excluded. Th1s yielded 2315 
non-financml private firms 
The accounting and ownership data of the !PO and non-IPO firms were obtamed from 
FAME and the !PO prospectuses. Data in FAME can be traced back to 1996, so the 
sample period was limited to 1996-2007. All listed compan1es must publicly disclose 
their financml statements in a timely manner, so all accounting data for the post-IPO 
periods were collected from FAME. For the pre-IPO periods, a substantial number of 
!PO firms did not have data m FAME. In these cases, I collected pre-IPO data duectly 
from accountants' reports m their !PO prospectuses. 
To descnbe ownership concentration, block shareholders were defined as those w1th at 
least a 3% shareholdmg Block holders were spht into those who were directors and 
those who were not, so as to d1stmguish between managerial and non-managerial 
ownership. F1rm age at the time of!PO was drawn from !PO prospectuses Two types of 
age were defined· first, the age since the firm started 1ts busmess ('firm age'); second, 
the time between mcorporat10n and the IPO ('mcorporat10n age') Often, firms do not 
incorporate when they start up, but wait until their busmess grows more mature. 
Because at this point in time, they need to set out clearly the legal benefits for the 
owners, to protect personal assets and to facilitate potentml future transactions (such as 
sale of stock, transfer of ownership) In some cases, incorporatiOn takes place as the 
Immediate (and necessary') precursor to the planned !PO. Thus, the incorporation age 
does not measure the real age of firms. 
30 The LSE webstte provtdes complete statistiCS of new 1ssues from Jan 1995 for AIM whereas from Jan 1998 for the 
Official LISt 
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FT E indices were obtained from Datastream and used to calcu late the market returns. 
Together with lPO volume, these were used to describe market conditions. During the 
sample period, the UK market experienced something like an IPO cycle with generally 
rising volume until late 2000, followed by a quieter period. Jt would also appear that 
there was a broad ly pos itive re lationship between share prices and IPO volumes in this 
period (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Figure 4.1 FTSE Indices 04/1996-03/2006 
Index 
Month C.:: FTSE All Share Index - FTSE AIM Share Index 
Figure 4.2 IPO Volume 01/1998-12/2003 
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The data on !PO structure were obtained from SDC Platmum Global New Issues There 
were cross-checked with the information disclosed in !PO prospectus. I also collected 
informatiOn about SEO firms and deals, offer prices and the type and number of shares 
offered in the SEOs from SOC. After-market trading prices were downloaded from 
Datastrearn. All other descnptive data were collected from FAME and SOC. 
The characteristics of the different datasets are described m more details m the 
respective empirical chapters (chapter 5 to chapter 8). 
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5 Staying Private or Going Public? 
An Empmcal Analysis of the IPOs L1sted on the Mam Market and AIM 
5.1 Introduction 
In this first empirical chapter, I address the general questwn as to why firms choose to 
go public rather than stay private. I apply a panel prob1t approach to examine the ex 
ante determmants of the decisiOn to go public, and apply a fixed effects model to look 
into the ex post consequences of the JPOs. Pagano et al (1998) argued that If IPO 
decisiOn makers have rational expectattons, the ex ante and the ex post analyses should 
provide consistent results. Therefore, I investigate both ex ante and ex post firm 
charactensttcs 
In the sample of Italian firms, Pagano et al (1998) found that the likelihood of gomg 
public was positively related to firm size and industry market-to-book ratio and that, 
after the IPOs, profitability, investment, leverage and the costs of bank credit were 
reduced. It thus appeared that Itahan firms were hkely to use IPOs to rebalance theu 
financial structure and to facilitate future borrowings rather than to finance an 
immediate mvestment. They also found that some firms utilised the IPO as a channel to 
gradually sell out of the companies 
The UK stock market IS distinct from Italy by its high liquidity and market efficiency, 
acttve mstitutional mvestors and strong legal protection for smaller investors. Where 
market efficiency and legal protectiOn are high, the costs of informatwn productiOn are 
reduced As a result, firms should be encouraged to go public at an earlier stage 
(Chemmanur and Fulgh1eri, 1999) In addition, the high capitalisation ability of a stock 
market generally mcreases the value and preciSion of the serend1pitous informatiOn 
generated by public mvestors. This would encourage more firms to raise capital from 
the stock market. Furthermore, in a market where legal protection for shareholders is 
strong, minonty-controlling shareholder conflicts are relatively less of a concern. On 
the other hand, manager-shareholder conflict might be better resolved by market 
momtonng (Holmstrom and T1role (1993), Maug (2001)). Because of all these 
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characteristics of the UK stock market, It is expected to see a different picture for !PO 
activities m the UK 
The analyses m th1s chapter are based on a panel data of 183 non-financial UK firms 
that listed on the London Stock Exchange durmg 1998-2003 and 2315 non-financial 
firms that stayed private over the penod 1996-2007. The sample mcludes both IPOs 
listed on the Main Market and those floated on AIM. AIM 1s often criticised for its 
loose regulatiOn and high nsks To distinguish the role of AIM from the Official List, I 
mvestigate the ex post consequences of the IPOs separately for those on the Official 
L1st and those on AIM. 
I analyse both the ex ante determmants and the ex post consequences of the IPOs 
respectively m the whole sample, and m subsamples of independent firms and 
carve-outs. Pagano et al (1998) found that carve-outs seemed to go public for different 
reasons from independent firms. Independent firms were hkely to raise finance from the 
stock market to reduce leverage whereas carve-outs were likely to utlhse windows of 
opportumty to maximise the proceeds from selling shares Carve-outs also seemed to 
d1vest a greater percentage of shareholdings. Therefore, it is necessary to examme the 
behaviour of the mdependent firms and the carve-outs separately 
The rest of the chapter is orgamsed as follows: sectwn 5 2 constructs the hypotheses 
and describes the sample, section 5.3 analyses the determinants of the !PO deciswn; 
section 5 4 compares post-IPO and pre-IPO operating performance, sectwn 5.5 provides 
concludmg remarks. 
5.2 Hypotheses and Sample 
5.2.1 Hypotheses 
Financial Constraints 
Firms need to fund the1r investments so as to grow When internal capital is insufficient, 
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they wzll have to seek external finance, either debt or equity In debt market, there are 
asymmetric mformation problems between borrowers and creditors. the borrower has 
private informatiOn about the firm whereas creditors cannot fully observe the nsks of 
the firm's mvestment and managenal effort; creditors face potential nsks that the 
borrower may misbehave and pursue Its pnvate benefit The existence of such moral 
hazard problems for debt financmg may give nse to credit ratwmng (Stightz and Weiss, 
1981) and a debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977), whzch may prevent firms from 
realising their mvestment opportunities. Weak profitability implies that internally 
generated cash is likely to be insufficient to support mtenszve mvestments. Fzrms wzth 
large investments, weak profitability and high leverage are more hkely to suffer from 
borrowing constramts In this case, equity financing such as public eqmty can be an 
attractive alternative to debt financing 
Hypothesis I The lzkelzhood of an !PO IS posztzvely correlated w1th leverage and 
znvestment and negatively correlated wzth profitabllzty31 
Cheaper Capital 
The chozce between pnvate and pubhc equity in part, depends on a trade-off between 
nsk premmms for a lack of dzverszfication and costs of informatiOn productiOn 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999) Razsing capital from a large number of public 
investors enhances the firm's bargaming power, and liquidzty created for the firm's 
eqmty allows its shareholders to diversify their portfolios. These reduce risk premmms 
that would otherwise be required by pnvate equity mvestors However, each public 
mvestor needs to evaluate the !PO firm at a cost. Overall, there are sizeable duplications 
of the costs on information productiOn and ultimately it is the firm that needs to pay for 
the total costs mcurred. Wben sufficient information about the firms has accumulated m 
the public domam and there is less uncertainty, mformational costs are greatly reduced 
and hence public eqmty can be cheaper than private eqmty. Therefore, m general, firms 
go public after start-up stage. For firms wzth great capital mvestment, pnvate equity 
mvestors tend to increase the expected rate of return for mvesting a larger fraction of 
their wealth m a given firm. On the other hand, when raising large aznounts of capital 
for mvestment from pubhc investors, It IS more expensive for a bad firm to pretend to 
31 Profit IS the prmctpallong-term source ofmtemal capttal for firms The ab1hty of firms to generate cash mtemally 
IS often measured by profitabthty 
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be a good one, and hence it is less likely that distorted informatwn about the true value 
of the firm is mcluded m offer price Therefore, public equity can be cheaper than 
private equity for young firms w1th great capital investment 
Hypothesis 2 F1rms wllh greater capital mvestment are likely to go public at an 
earlier stage 
The relative costs of public equity can also be affected by market conditions. Durmg 
penods when the stock market 1s over-optimistic, firms' stocks can be overvalued 
F1rms may exploit such windows of opportunity and take advantage of m1spriced public 
equ1ty (Ritter, 1991) From a different point of view, Subrahmanyam and T1tman (1999), 
Clementi (2002) and Pastor and Veronesi (2005) argued that firms time theu offering to 
coincide w1th the peak of market valuation Fluctuation m stock prices can reveal 
valuable mformatwn about the expected payoff on firms' growth opportunities T1mmg 
an !PO to coincide w1th a h1gh stock price can facilitate the firm's mvestment deciswn 
HypotheSIS 3 The likelihood of an !PO IS h1gher m a bull market 
Sflarelwlder Exit and Maximizing the Selling Proceeds 
Rather than gomg public to raise finance, some firms may utilise !PO as a channel for 
thm shareholders to cash out Ellingsen and Rydqv1st (1997) argued that d1vest1nent 
may arise from the ongmal shareholders' willingness to diversify personal portfolios 
and reduce exposure to risks Divesting vm an !PO is supenor to a direct sale, because 
mformative stock pnces established in the after-market can reduce the mformatwn 
discount demanded in a direct sale, and increase total proceeds from the subsequent 
SEOs. However, the exit might be perceived as a bad signal by public mvestors. 
Outsider-investors might ascnbe the sale to poor entrepreneunal performance or to 
decreasing investment value, which may lead to a failure of the !PO. Firms at a late 
stage of life cycle and firms w1th sound financmls have lesser adverse selectwn 
problems. Therefore, they are more likely to utilise the market dev1ce to sell out. 
Hypothesis 4 The likelihood of an !PO IS poslllvely correlated wllh firm age and 
firm s1ze and the financzal condlfzons of firms 
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Corporate Governance 
Raising eqmty capital potentially affects a firm's ownership and control structure For 
firms with concentrated ownership structure, when they raise equity from dispersed 
public investors, minority-controllmg shareholder conflict is the mam problem. Costly 
duplication of momtonng from mmonty block shareholders may cause an 
over-momtoring problem Mmority block shareholders also have an mcentive to engage 
in takeover activities, which Jeopardises controllmg shareholders' controlling status 
(Pagano and Roe!!, 1998). On the other hand, for firms with dispersed ownership 
structure, manager-shareholder conflict IS the main concern when a firm accesses public 
equity A dispersed ownership structure provides less effective monitonng However, 
continuously quoted stock prices can reveal valuable mformat10n about managerial 
performance and a firm's growth prospects (Holmstrom and Tiro le, 1993). This helps to 
create a managenal incentive mechanism and to curb managerial misbehav10urs, and 
enhancmg firm value. In this aspect, firms with a more dispersed ownership structure 
are more likely to benefit from momtoring capital m the stock market. 
It is possible that some existmg shareholders utilise an IPO to divest their shareholdings. 
If this is the case, when management extracts private benefits from shareholders, 
diffusion of ownership in the first-stage sale (i e an IPO) can be beneficial (Zmgales, 
1995). Selling minority stakes of a firm's stock to dispersed public mvestors can help Its 
original controlling shareholders to retain and strengthen control, mdirectly enhancing 
selling shareholders' bargainmg power for the subsequent sale of controlling blocks and 
maxim1smg the proceeds cashed in from a two-stage selling process. 
Overall, whether an IPO is mvestment or divestment dnven (or is driven by both), it is 
expected that: 
Hypothesis 5 The lzkelzhood of an !PO decreases m ownership concentration 
5.2.2 Sample and Summary Statistics 
The analyses are based on a panel data of 183 non-financial UK firms that listed on the 
Mam Market or AIM during 1998-2003 and 2315 non-financial UK firms that stayed 
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pnvate over the period 1996-2007 For the !PO firms, there are at least two years' data 
for the pre-IPO wmdow and at least three years for the post-IPO window For the 
non-IPO firms, the year coverage is adjusted to match that of the !PO firms Each 
non-IPO firm has at least one financial year between 1998 and 2003 in whtch total 
assets exceeded £500k Accordmg to the statistics of the LSE m 2002, the average total 
dtrect cost of listing on AIM was £480k. To float on the Official Ltst, it is generally 
even more costly The direct listing costs include underwritmg fees, registratiOn fees 
and many other on-gomg admmistrative expenses and fees such as audttmg fees, stock 
exchange fees etc. These substantial fixed costs suggest that small firms are not likely to 
carry out a costly flotatiOn (Pagano et a/, 1998) Therefore, the sample of non-IPO 
firms was limited to these medium and large firms 
Ftrms registered outside the UK or those With a foreign parent company were excluded, 
so as to concentrate on UK firms listed on the domestic market without considenng 
cross-listings. Cross-listmgs can be driven by mstituttonal factors such as lower listmg 
costs and better legal protectiOn, which are beyond the hypotheses tested m thts chapter. 
Fmancial firms were excluded because they are subject to dtfferent regulations from 
non-financial firms and hence may be dnven to go public by the need to meet 
regulatory requirements. The details of the data sources and sample selection cnterion 
were reported in chapter 4 
Table 5.1 contains some descnptive statistics for my sample Panel A-1 shows the 
industrial dtstnbutton32 of the !PO and pnvate firms. The largest number of IPOs IS 
found m real estate, rentmg and busmess activities and manufacturing industry, which 
also have a large number of medium and large pnvate firms. On the other hand, there 
were only few !PO deals in the construction industry and the wholesale and retail trades, 
although these industries too have a large number of medium and large pnvate firms 
On average, !PO firms constitute 8 0% of the private firms m my sample. Dtvtdmg the 
sample according to whether a firm IS mdependent or held by a UK parent firm (Panel 
A-2), it can be seen that the percentage of mdependent firms that went public is more 
than three times as high as the number of the firms wtth a Bntish parent, suggesting 
much greater interests of independent firms in an !PO 
32 For the mdustry classificatiOn, I follow the UK SIC standard (2003) 
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Among the IPOs floated on the LSE dunng 1998-2003 (Panel B-1 ), there were 319 
primary-only tssues, 97 of which are included m my sample, 84 combined Issues, all of 
which are included, and only 3 secondary-only Issues, 2 of which are included This IS 
quite different from e g. the Belgian IPOs in Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006), where 
secondary-only issues account for over a third of all the IPOs whereas pnmary-only 
issues make up only around a fourth. It appears that in comparison with Belgium, !PO 
activities m the UK are more related to financing than to transfer of ownership Panel 
B-2 reports the distnbution of the sample IPOs over time, which shows that the sample 
coverage of the IPOs can reasonably reflect the !PO clusters over time. 
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Table 5.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A-1. Industrial Distribution 
Number ofiPO Number of Private 
Industry Firms Firms 
Mmmg and Quarrying 7 20 
Manufactunng 37 262 
ConstructiOn 4 477 
Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of 
Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles and Personal 16 396 
and Household Goods 
Hotels and Restaurants 9 101 
Transport, Storage and Cornmumcat10n 11 95 
Fmanc1al Intermediation 
Real Estate, Renting and Busmess 74 842 Activities 
EducatiOn 3 12 
Health and Social Work 3 23 
Other Commumty, Social and Personal 19 87 Service Activities 
Total 183 2315 
Panel A-2. Distribution of Ownership Status 
Ownership Status 
Number ofiPO 
Firms 
Number ofPnvate 
Firms 
Independent 
British Ultimate HLDS 
143 
40 
Panel B-1. Number ofiPOs by Type ofiPO Structure 
Primary-only Secondary-only 
IPO Structure Issues Issues 
Number of IPOs m Sample 97 2 
(319) (3) 
Panel B-2. Number of IPOs by Year 
Year of Listing 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Number of IPOs m Sample 24 19 70 34 
(58) (30) (184) (71) 
1229 
1086 
Combined 
Issues 
84 
(84) 
2002 2003 
19 17 
(48) (47) 
Panel A-1 reports the number of sample !PO firms and pnvate firms across different mdustnes Panel A-2 
reports the number of sample !PO firms and pnvate firms across the two types of ownership status 
mdependent compames and Bnt1sh ultimate holdmg compames Panel B-1 reports the number of sample 
!PO firms divided accordmg to the three types of !PO structure, the number of alllPOs that took place IS 
presented m brackets beneath Panel B-2 reports the number of sample !PO firms across each sample year, 
the number of alllPOs that took place over the sample penod IS presented m brackets 
The sample contams 17,360 firm-years. The mean of total assets and sales for the entire 
sample are respectively £9.03m and £9 18m Compared to private firms, the !PO firms 
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on average are slightly smaller but have particularly h1gher growth rate; they also have 
a lower return on assets. Weaker profitability yet h1gher growth suggests that the !PO 
firms are likely to be expenencing faster expansiOn, and that they are more likely to 
confront financial constraints than the pnvate firms and hence are in greater need of 
external financing Compared to the Italian !PO firms (Pagano et al, 1998) and the 
Belgmn !PO firms (Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006), the UK !PO firms on average 
are much smaller, less levered and have weaker internal cash generation, i e are m an 
earlier stage ofthe life cycle 
There are few differences between independent pnvate firms and private firms w1th a 
British parent. By contrast, for the !PO subsample, the independent firms are on average 
smaller, w1th weaker internal cash generation (ROA) and much higher growth rates 
Th1s 1mplies that the independent IPOs may be m an earlier stage of growth and are 
more likely to be financmlly constrained than carve-outs33 We may also expect that 
their motives for going public m1ght differ. 
Finally, IPOs listed on AIM are evidently smaller than those listed on the Main Market, 
w1th weaker mternal cash generatiOn, lower net worth but higher growth rate AIM was 
des1gned for younger growth firms. The different profile in profitability, growth rate and 
net worth confirm that the firms that choose to float on AIM are mdeed at an earlier 
stage of life cycle and require external finance to grow busmess. 
33 A carve~out refers to a sale of the substdtary's stock m an JPO 
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Table 52 Sample Summary Statistics 
Vanables 
Total Assets 
Sales 
Leverage 
ROA 
CAP EX 
Inventory 
Cash m Hand 
AcqmsJtJon 
Growth_Asset 
Growth_Sales 
Net Worth 
Mean Std Dev Mm Max Obs 
Whole Sample 
903 153 000 1665 17342 
918 231 
029 052 
004 060 
-005 012 
016 019 
012 016 
-001 013 
028 169 
031 198 
723 266 
000 1578 
000 2304 
-22 35 27 26 
-314 341 
000 098 
000 I 00 
-517 952 
-100 5871 
-100 6450 
000 1565 
16515 
15049 
17062 
15201 
14276 
16154 
17360 
14811 
13299 
17347 
Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
Panel A The Whole Sample 
Independent F1rms 
894 141 000 1520 
891 
0 25 
001 
-0 04 
017 
012 
-0 01 
031 
034 
7 36 
263 
034 
052 
011 
019 
017 
013 
I 81 
231 
2 37 
000 
000 
-22 35 
-1 13 
000 
000 
-4 23 
-I 00 
-I 00 
000 
14 54 
903 
278 
341 
097 
I 00 
9 52 
58 08 
6450 
1375 
Panel B The Pnvate F1rms 
----------~~~~~~~------~~ Ent1re Pnvate F1rms Subsample Independent Pnvate Fmns 
Obs 
10397 
10248 
9685 
10344 
10093 
9445 
10037 
10396 
9016 
8231 
10396 
Total Assets 
Sales 
Leverage 
ROA 
905 149 000 1665 15713 897 132 000 1520 9092 
CAPEX 
Inventory 
Cash m Hand 
AcquJSltmn 
Growth_Asset 
Growth_Sales 
Net Worth 
928 222 000 1578 
029 052 000 2304 
007 049 -1234 2726 
-004 011 -314 321 
017 019 000 098 
011 015 000 100 
-001 009 -517 307 
019 121 -100 5871 
0 22 I 45 -I 00 61 97 
722 260 000 1565 
14886 
13422 
15435 
13575 
12648 
14526 
15733 
13369 
11944 
15718 
903 
026 
0 05 
-0 04 
018 
0 11 
000 
0 17 
021 
7 36 
257 
029 
023 
010 
019 
015 
006 
098 
159 
224 
000 
000 
-9 40 
-095 
0 00 
000 
-I 30 
-I 00 
-I 00 
000 
14 37 
903 
149 
145 
097 
I 00 
I 26 
4846 
6197 
13 75 
Panel C The !PO Fmns 
---------;E'"n7tl-re-;l"ro"""F,-onn-s ""s"""'uh-s-am-p-;1-e --,-----,-ln'-d,-eoendent IPO Fmns 
Total Assets 
Sales 
Leverage 
ROA 
8 88 
8 30 
023 
-0 24 
188 000 1468 1629 872 191 000 1468 
CAP EX 
Inventory 
Cash m Hand 
2 88 
0 55 
000 1454 
0 00 8 55 
1629 
1627 
I 16 -22 35 2 78 1627 
-006 017 
005 011 
0 21 0 24 
-218 341 
0 00 0 91 
000 I 00 
Acqu1S1t10n -0 03 0 32 -4 43 9 52 
1626 
1628 
1628 
1627 
1442 
1355 
1629 
Grov.:th_Asset I 13 3 86 -I 00 58 08 
Growth_Sales 1 07 4 38 -I 00 64 50 
Net Worth 7 35 3 19 000 1374 
Total Assets 
Sales 
Leverage 
ROA 
CAP EX 
Inventory 
807 286 000 1454 
022 059 000 855 
-031 128 -2235 278 
-006 017 
005 012 
0 23 0 25 
-1 13 
000 
000 
-002 032 -423 
127 424 -098 
119 480 -100 
7 34 3 11 000 
341 
091 
I 00 
9 52 
58 08 
64 50 
13 74 
IPOs L1sted on AIM 
8 35 
7 65 
0 23 
-0 33 
-0 06 
005 
173 000 1311 
280 000 1454 
058 000 855 
134 -2235 278 
019 -218 341 
012 000 091 
8943 
8381 
9041 
8790 
8141 
8733 
9093 
7857 
7143 
9091 
1305 
1305 
1304 
1303 
1303 
1304 
1304 
1303 
1159 
1088 
1305 
1151 
1151 
1150 
1149 
1148 
1150 
Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
Fmns w1th BntJsh Ult1mate HLDS 
Obs 
917 168 000 1665 6945 
9 63 
034 
008 
-0 05 
015 
012 
-0 01 
023 
025 
703 
I 58 
074 
070 
014 
020 
0 15 
0 13 
I 48 
I 26 
3 04 
000 
000 
-12 34 
-3 14 
000 
000 
-5 17 
-I 00 
-I 00 
000 
15 78 
2304 
27 26 
321 
098 
I 00 
3 07 
58 71 
55 86 
15 65 
6267 
5364 
6718 
5108 
4831 
6117 
6964 
5795 
5068 
6951 
Pnvate Fmns w1th Bnt1sh lJlt1mate HLDS 
915 168 000 1665 6621 
965 
034 
008 
-0 05 
016 
012 
-001 
022 
023 
7 02 
9 53 
922 
029 
001 
-0 07 
006 
011 
-0 07 
0 55 
0 57 
7 36 
1016 
985 
023 
-003 
-0 07 
006 
I 48 
076 
072 
014 
020 
0 15 
011 
I 48 
122 
3 02 
000 
000 
-12 34 
-3 14 
000 
000 
-5 17 
-I 00 
-I 00 
000 
15 78 
2304 
27 26 
3 21 
098 
I 00 
3 07 
58 71 
55 86 
15 65 
Carve-Out F1rms 
160 408 1310 
2 76 
039 
0 33 
016 
0 08 
0 15 
030 
I 37 
I 80 
349 
000 
000 
-2 52 
-2 18 
000 
000 
-4 43 
-I 00 
-0 99 
000 
13 97 
3 70 
0 73 
029 
040 
0 80 
0 52 
11 51 
24 35 
12 33 
IPOs hsted on the Mam Market 
158 366 1468 
2 43 
048 
047 
012 
010 
000 
000 
-5 33 
-1 13 
000 
13 97 
5 50 
072 
047 
041 
5943 
5041 
6394 
4785 
4507 
5793 
6640 
5512 
4801 
6627 
324 
324 
323 
324 
323 
324 
324 
324 
283 
267 
324 
478 
478 
477 
478 
478 
478 
CashmHand 022 026 000 100 1150 017 018 000 093 478 
AcquisltJOn -0 02 0 32 -1 59 9 52 1149 -0 06 0 31 -4 43 0 52 478 
Growth_Assets I 24 3 92 -0 98 46 42 1016 0 87 3 70 -1 00 58 08 426 
Growth_Sa1es I 23 4 72 -I 00 64 50 944 0 71 3 45 -0 99 52 25 411 
NetWorth 693 299 000 1284 1151 835 342 000 1374 478 --:P:-a-n"""'ei:-A,.-re_p_o_rts_s_um_m_ary_s_t_at-os"'"to-c-s""fo_r_:_th,.:e~fu"u"'s'-am-p71e_oJ.v_e:..r:.;th;-e-p_e:_n.:.o'-od-:1996-2007 Panel B reports summary statiStics for the UK non-financtal 
firms that remamed pnvate between 1996 and 2007 Panel C reports summary statistiCS for UK non-financial firms that went pubhc m the 
domestic market between 1998 and 2003 The pnvate firm subsample mcludes all mdustnes (except financml mdustnes) that had IPOs dunng 
1998-2003 havmg at least one financml year between 199& and 2003 m which the1r total assets was over £500,000 Pnvate finns w1th account 
type 'partial/full exemptmn' or 'dormant' or 'small company' and With m1ssmg data are excluded Another five observatwns arc deleted due to 
outl1er The 'mdependent' subsample refers to finns Without a parent company The 'Bnt1sh Ultimate HLDS' subsample refers to firms w1th a 
Bntish ultimate holdmg company Total Assets 1s the log value of total assets Sales IS the log value of turnover Leverage 1s total debt over 
total assets ROA IS EBITDA (eammgs before mtercst, taxes, deprec1at1on and amortization) over total assets CAPEX IS the net cash flow 
from capital expenditure, sale of plant and equ1pment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty Instrument over total assets Inventory IS stock and 
work m progress over total assets Cash m Hand IS cash and cash equivalent over total assets Acqms1t1on IS the net cash flow from acquiSition 
and d1sposal over total assets Growth _Assets tS the rate of growth of total assets Growth_Sales IS the rate of growth of turnover Net Worth IS 
the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated at zero 
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5.3 Ex ante Determinants of Going Public 
5.3.1 The Model 
To test the theoretical predictions on IPO decisions, I estimate a panel probtt model of 
the probability of gomg public, following Pagano et a! (1998). The likelihood to go 
public for firm 1 m year t IS gtven by. 
(5.1) 
The dependent variable y,t for firm i in year t is equal to unity 1f firm 1 IS listed m year 
t, otherwise if firm i stayed private it equals zero. F(·) is a standard normal cumulative 
distnbution function ( cdf) x;t 1s a set of firm and industry charactenstics (for firm 1 m 
year t) that affect the IPO deciswn. w; IS a set of calendar year dununy variables u, 
IS the firm-specific effects In any year t, the sample mcludes all the pnvate firms that 
satisfy the listing requirements in that year. After a firm goes public, 1t was dropped 
from the sample 
' x,t mclude leverage (LEV), capital mvestment (CAPEX), profitability (ROA), firm 
size (SIZE) and ownership concentration (OWCON). Leverage is measured by total 
interest bearing debt over total assets As a broader definition of leverage, th1s 
measurement has been extenstvely used m the empmcal capital structure literature 
Profitability is measured by mternal cash generation - earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) over total assets. Profitability together with 
leverage mdicates the financial condttions of a firm Capital mvestment is measured by 
net cash flow from capital expendtture, sale of plant and eqmpment and returns 
(includmg sale) of equity instrument scaled by total assets As a proxy for mtenstty of 
capttal investment, a negative CAPEX indtcates capital outflow whereas a positive one 
mdicates capital inflow Therefore, the lower the value of CAPEX, the larger the capital 
mvestJnent Firm size is measured by the log value of turnover Because the data of firm 
age are unavatlable for pnvate firms, I use firm size as a proxy for the stage of a firm's 
growth. Ownershtp concentratwn is measured by an mdtcator vanable It equals 0 tf 
none of the shareholders has more than 25% shareholdings, equals 0 25 if one or more 
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shareholders have more than 25% but less than 50% shareholdmgs, equals 0 5 if one 
shareholder has a total of more than 50% shareholdmgs (1 e indirectly holds more than 
50% owners !up), and equals 1 if one shareholder has a direct ownership of over 50% 
Market conditwns 1s measured by calendar year dummy varmbles w; (YEAR) 
Pagano et a/ (1998) argued that there might be a negative correlatwn between the R&D 
mtens1ty of an industry and the probab1hty of an IPO. Pubhc firms are subject to 
compulsory disclosure of h1ghly sensitive R&D mformation and exposed to close 
scrutmy from tax authonties These create an expensive cost of loss of confidentiality 
for an industry w1th h1gh R&D intens1ty, making an !PO less attractive. However, this 
varmble was not included m Pagano et a/ (1998)'s study due to a lack of data They 
also argued that firms facmg higher interest rates and more concentrated credit sources 
are more hkely to go pubhc, to gam greater bargaming power with banks However, 
their results showed that bank rate and concentration of borrowing were not Significant 
Due to a lack of R&D data, bank rate and concentration of borrowmg of firms, these 
var1ables carmot be tested in th1s study 
Pagano et a/ (1998) also included the median ratiO of the market-to-book value of 
eqmty of pubhc firms m the same industry This var1able was used as a proxy for future 
mvestment opportunity. On the other hand, they argued that th1s var1able may also 
reflect overvaluation by mational investors when the market 1s too over-optimistiC. It 
appears that these two explanatwns can hardly be disentangled from this smgle variable. 
For th1s reason, th1s variable was not mcluded m th1s study. But mstead, I use CAPEX 
to measure current investment while using year dummies to capture seasonal market 
conditions. 
Therefore, the model of the probab!lity of gomg pubhc IS wntten as. 
Pr[lPO,, = 1] = F({31LEV,, + {32CAPEX, + fhROA 11 +{34SIZE,, + {350WCON,, + y,YEAR,) 
(52) 
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Table 5.3 Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Theory Si!!n Abbr Definition 
Leverage Financial constramts + LEV (total debt)/(total assets) 
(net cash flow from capital 
Capital Fmancml constramts, expenditure, sale of plant 
mvestment Cheaper capital - CAP EX and equipment and returns 
of eqmty mstrurnent)/(total 
assets) 
Profitability Financial constramts - ROA EBITDA/(total assets) 
Firm SIZe Cheaper cap1tal - SIZE ln(sales) Shareholder ex1t + 
-0 1f any smgle 
shareholding<25%, 
=0 25 if at least one 
Ownership Corporate governance OWCON shareholdmg2:25% (<50%) 
concentration 
-
=0 5 if at least one mdirect 
shareholdmg2:50% 
=1 if at least one direct 
shareholdmg?50% 
5.3.2 Methodology 
Firms' IPO decisiOn may in part depend on some unobservable which may need to be 
added to a standard panel prob1t model. The unobservable can be assumed to be 
time-mvanant firm effects (u,) and 1t reflects the heterogene1ties that are specific to 
firm z and stay constant over time I. If u, is treated as a random variable With 
u, -IID(O, aJ) and independent of the time varymg regressors x;t and the year 
dummy regressors w;, random effects estimator is appropriate A random effects pro bit 
model can be estimated by max1mum hkehhood estimatwn34 (MLE) and computed 
using the Gauss1an quadrature procedure (Butler and Moffitt 1982). Alternative to 
random effects probit model, one can also use a logit specification, in which case F(·) 
1s the logistic cdf. However, in empirical studies prob1t specificatiOn appears to be more 
popular for random effects bmary model. 
If the unobservable time-invariant firm effects are assumed to be fixed parameters to be 
estimated, fixed effects estimator should be used. Here u, is a dUIDmy var1able that 
34 The random effects MLE of {3, e and aJ maxtmJSes the log-likelihood L~=1 lnf (Y, IX,, W,{J, e, aJ), where 
f(Y,IX., w,p,e,aJ) =I f(Y,IX,, W,aJ,p,e) ~exp<;";)'du, 
v2rra., a" 
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equals I If an observatiOn belongs to firm 1, equals 0 otherwise. For fixed effects bmary 
model, there is an incidental parameters problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948, Lancaster, 
2000) The standard MLE of the incidental parameters u, is inconsistent as N --> eo, 
because only Tobservations are used to estimate each parameter u,. The inconsistency 
of the MLE of u, IS then transmitted into the mconsistency of the MLE of fJ and e. 
The mcidental parameters problem however, IS not present in lmear panel models, since 
fJ and e are estimated consistently by first elimmatmg u, using the withm 
transformation and the MLE of fJ and e and u, are asymptotically mdependent 
(Hsmo, 2003). Chamberlam (1980) and Hsiao (2003) demonstrated this mcidental 
parameters problem Greene (2004) also showed that the fixed effects MLE IS biased. 
For the fixed effects prob1t model, there is no solution to the mcidental parameters 
problem Therefore, unhke the random effects binary models, fixed effects estimatiOn IS 
only possible for the log1t specificatiOn Chamber lam ( 1980) suggested usmg the 
conditional MLE for the fixed effects log1t model Explanations of the conditional MLE 
can also be found in Baltagi (2005) 
To detect whether fixed effects are present, one can conduct a Hausman test based on 
the difference between the conditiOnal MLE and the standard log1t MLE Ignoring the 
firm effects The null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are set as follows. 
H 0 : There are no firm effects 
H1 . There are fixed firm effects. 
Under the null hypothesis, the conditiOnal MLE IS consistent but inefficient, whereas 
the standard logit MLE 1s consistent and efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, the 
conditional MLE is consistent, whereas the standard logit MLE is inconsistent 
Therefore, both the standard log1t model and the fixed effects log1t model need to be 
estimated, and their common margmal effects estimates35 need to be compared m the 
Hausman test statistics36 (H - x2 ). If the margmal effects estimates of the standard 
logit MLE are s1gmficantly different from theu conditional MLE counterparts, the null 
hypothesis is reJected while the alternative hypothesis is accepted In this case, the fixed 
effects logit model should be used 
35 In lmear models, companson ts based on the common coefficient estimates 
36 Ho Dtfference m coefficients IS not systematic 
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If no fixed effects are detected, one can then use e1ther a random effects bmary model 
or a pooled binary model37 (logit or prob1t) For a pooled binary model, random effects 
are averaged out. A pooled binary model can be estimated by quasi-maximum 
hkehhood estimation vm a Generalised Estimating Equat10ns (GEE) approach (Lmng 
and Zeger, 1986) 
For equatiOn 5.2, I first conducted a Hausman test to check fixed effects As no fixed 
effects were detected - a Hausman test cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are 
no firm effects (Prob>x2=0.2312), a random effects probit spec1ficat10n was adopted. In 
add1tion to random effects estimates, I also computed pooled GEE estimates. The 
results for both are reported 
5.3.3 The Results 
Table 5 4 and Table 5 5 respectively report the results from the random effects prob1t 
model and the pooled prob1t model Both models were estimated separately for the 
entire sample, the independent-firm subsample, and for the carve-outs subsample. The 
results from the two models are quite similar both qualitatively and quantitatively. For 
the random effects model, a likehhood-rat10 test of the null hypothesis p=O cannot be 
rejected for both the entire sample and the subsamples. p is the fractiOn of the total 
vanance due to the variance of the random firm effects u,. As the inexistence of the 
random firm effects cannot be rejected, the pooled probit model is more appropnate. 
Therefore, I focus my analys1s on the results from the pooled prob1t model 
Consistent w1th the 'cheaper capital' hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), 1t is found that the 
smaller the firm (SIZE) and the larger the cap1tal investment (CAPEX), the h1gher 
probability of an !PO. Return on assets (ROA) 1s sigmficantly and negatively s1gned, 
mdicatmg that the !PO firms are more constrained by lim1ted internal cash generatiOn 
than the firms that choose to stay pnvate Leverage (LEV) is pos1tively signed but not 
statistically significant Overall, this suggests that the UK firms that choose to go pubhc 
are hkely to be the smaller ones in needs of external capital to support their capital 
mvestment and to promote growth. Th1s is quite different from the result for Italy, 
37 for thts case, the pooled bmary models would have the spectficatJOn that IS Pr[y1t ;:::; 1] = F(x;tf3 + w;e) 
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where !PO firms seem to be the mature firms w1th h1gher internal cash generatwn 
(seeking public equity to re-balance theu financial structure after a penod of expanswn). 
Such results support the view that, as an Anglo-Saxon model, the well-developed and 
informative stock market in the UK reduces the informatwnal costs of public eqmty 
capital, especially for small, capital intens1ve, growth firms. Therefore, relatively 
cheaper public equity becomes an attractive alternative to debt financing and pnvate 
equity for financially constramed firms 
More dispersed ownership (OWCON) sigmficantly mcreases the likelihood of going 
public, implymg that to utilise the momtoring function of the stock market may be 
another reason behind the decision to go public (this supports Hypothesis 5) Dispersed 
ownership is generally associated manager-shareholder conflicts and under-momtoring 
problem. However, the changes in stock prices reveal information about managenal 
performance, wh1ch in a way serve to reward or punish management ( e g via manager 
remuneration scheme) In this aspect, an mformative stock price is more effective than 
financial indicators which might be subject to managenal manipulation Therefore, 
firms with dispersed ownership structure can benefit from monitoring by the market 
In additwn, a hotter market IS correlated w1th increased !PO activity (reflected by the 
year dumm1es Year 1998, Year 1999 and Year 2000) On the other hand, as the stock 
market reversed from the end of year 2000, especially during 2003 when the market 
stayed cold, the probability of gomg public was significantly reduced (as reflected by 
the year dummy Year 2003). The year dmnmy Year 2002 is negatively signed yet not 
s1gmficant, reflectmg a lagged response of !PO actlVlties to a market that went down 
This 1s because that the stock market tends to be very responsive to positive mformatwn 
whereas slow to negative informatiOn. Overall, the results of the year dumm1es are 
consistent with Hypothesis 3 and with the evidence on clusters in IPOs found in most 
markets. 
However, Hypothesis 4 is not supported, indicatmg that the divestment motive IS not the 
dominant reason for gomg public for the UK firms. 
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Now I turn to the results for the subsamples. The results for independent firms are 
similar to those for the entire sample. However, it IS shown a different picture for the 
carve-outs in that sales, return on assets and capital expenditure are not statistically 
sigmficant, on the other hand, leverage s1gmficantly mcreases the hkehhood of 
carve-outs This Implies that, unlike the IPOs of the independent firms, cheaper public 
capital Is not a maJor concern for the carve-outs. This IS because subsidiaries in general 
can benefit from the reputatiOn capital of their parents and hence have fewer 
mformational problems. It seems that the parent firms tend to carve-out those 
subsidiaries which are highly indebted and over which they have less control. By doing 
this, the parent firms (the ultimate declSlon maker of the subs1dmries) can improve their 
financing positiOn while utilising the market monitonng function to create more 
effective managenal compensatiOn contracts for the carve-outs. 
The earlier statistiCS showed that the independent firms are more involved m IPO 
activities than the firms with a British parent. This, combmed with the results from the 
panel probit model, suggests that the dominant motive to go pubhc m the UK is raising 
cheaper capital to fund inveshnent rather than corporate restructuring 
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Table 5.4 Determinants of the IPO Decision (Random Effects Pro bit Model) 
Van abies All Sample JPOs Independent JPOs Carve-Outs 
Intercept 
-0 8449*** 
-1 1707*** I 2218* 
(0 1390) (0.1569) (0 4811) 
LEV 00589 0 0302 0.1123 
(0 0479) (0 0794) (00716) 
CAP EX 
-0.7124*** -1.5793*** -0 2165 
(0 1551) (0 2673) (03551) 
ROA 
-0 1967** -0 2380*** 0 1145 
(0 0599) (0 0670) (0 2793) 
SIZE -0 0840*** -0 0770*** -0 0525 
(00113) (0 0124) (0 0439) 
OWCON -I 2097*** -0 8509*** -4 1216*** 
(0 0999) (01151) (0 3405) 
Year 1998 0 6618*** 0 5655*** I 0198*** 
(0.1091) (0 1264) (0 2909) 
Year 1999 0 5040*** 0.5548*** 0 3968 
(0.1145) (0 1271) (0 3555) 
Year 2000 0.5831*** 0 5527*** 0 9313** 
(0 1106) (0 1254) (0 3099) 
Year2002 -0 0700 -0 0051 -0 7492 
(0 1498) (0 1591) (0 1271) 
Year 2003 -0 4636* -0 5424* 0 0647 
(0.2081) (0 2433) (0 5905) 
Number of Observations 9487 5840 3647 
Number of Ftrms 2498 1372 1126 
Wald test all coeffictents;Q (Cht-sq) 317.35*** 214 59*** 160 87*** 
Log hkehhood -707 6095 -538 8367 -110.1320 
LR test p;O (Prob~Chtbar-sq) 0 497 0 497 0 499 
The effects of the variables !tsted above on the probabtltty of gomg pubhc are esttmated by a 
random effects probtt model Pr[y,, = 1] = F(x;,{J + w;e + u,). The dependent vanable for firm 
1 in year I equals I tf firm 1 ts hsted in year I, otherwtse tt equals 0. The observatiOns for the !PO 
firms m the post-IPO period are dropped from the sample The observations for pnvate firms are 
restncted to the penod 1996-2003 The esttmatwn method ts MLE. Standard errors are reported m 
parentheses The probtt model is esttmated separately usmg the enttre sample, wtth mdependent 
firms only, and wtth Bnttsh ulttmate holdmg firms only LEV ts total debt over total assets CAPEX 
ts the net cash flow from capttal expendtture, sale of plant and equtpment and returns (mcludmg 
sale) of equtty mstrument over total assets ROA ts EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest, taxes, 
deprectatwn and amorttzation) over total assets SIZE ts the log value of turnover OWCON ts an 
mdicator van able tt equals 0 tf none of the shareholders has more than 25% shareholdmgs, equals 
0 25 If one or more shareholders have more than 25% but less than 50% shareholdmgs, equals 0 5 tf 
one shareholder has a total of more than 50% shareholdmgs (i e. mdtrectly holds more than 50% 
ownership), and equals I tf one shareholder has a dtrect ownershtp of over 50% Year 1998, Year 
1999, Year 2000, Year 2002 and Year 2003 are year dummtes; the year dummy Year 2001 ts 
dropped # p<O I,* p<O 05; •• p<O 01, *** p<O 001 
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Table 5.5 Determinants of the IPO Decision (Pooled Pro bit Model) 
Varzables All Sample IPOs Independent IPOs Carve-Outs 
Intercept 
-0 8487*** 
-1 1772*** I 2171*** 
(0 1262) (0 1394) (0 3464) 
LEV 00592 0 0307 0 1072* 
(0 0406) (0 1033) (0 0434) 
CAP EX 
-07154# -I 5906*** -0 2181 
(0 4124) (0 2713) (0 1759) 
ROA 
-0 1980* -0 2398* 0 1133 
(0 0818) (0 1035) (0 3775) 
SIZE 
-0 0842*** -0 0771*** -0 0564 
(0 0094) (0 0094) (0 0444) 
OWCON 
-1 2073*** -0 8491*** -4 0580*** 
(0 0866) (0 0966) (0 4346) 
Year 1998 0 6646*** 0 5691*** I 0083* 
(0 1147) (0 1343) (0 4434) 
Year 1999 0 5060*** 0 5580*** 0 3935 
(0 1179) (0 1314) (0 4520) 
Year 2000 0 5841*** 0 5541*** 0 9162* 
(0 1133) (0 1278) (0 4496) 
Year 2002 -0 0734 -0 0091 -0 5263 
(0 1563) (0 1638) (03921) 
Year 2003 -04717* -0 5555* 0 0486 
(0 2025) (0 2363) (0 5100) 
Number of ObservatiOns 9487 5840 3647 
Number of Fzrms 2498 1372 1126 
Dzagnostics 
Wald test all coefficzents=O (Chz-sq) 348 27*** 260 51*** 496 37*** 
The effects of the vanables listed above on the probabzhty of gomg pubhc are estimated by a pooled 
probzt model· Pr[y,, = 1] = F(x;,/3 + w;e) The dependent vanable for firm z m year t equals I zf 
firm z is hsted m year t; otherwzse It equals 0 The observatiOns for !PO firms m the post-!PO penod 
are dropped from the sample The observatiOns for pnvate firms are restncted to the penod 
1996-2003 The estzmatzon method is GEE approach Semz-robust standard errors are reported m 
parentheses The probzt model is estzmated separately usmg the entzre sample, wzth mdependent 
firms only, and with Bntzsh ultzmate holdmg firms only. LEV zs total debt over total assets CAP EX 
IS the net cash flow from capztal expenditure, sale of plant and equipment and returns (mcludmg 
sale) of equzty mstrument over total assets ROA zs EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortizatiOn) over total assets SIZE zs the log value of turnover OWCON is an 
mdzcator van able It equals 0 zf none of the shareholders has more than 25% shareholdmgs, equals 
0 25 zf one or more shareholders have more than 25% but less than 50% shareholdmgs, equals 0 5 If 
one shareholder has a total of more than 50% shareholdmgs (1 e mdzrectly holds more than 50% 
ownership), and equals I zf one shareholder has a dzrect ownership of over 50%. Year 1998, Year 
1999, Year 2000, Year 2002 and Year 2003 are year dummies, the year dummy Year 2001 zs 
dropped # p<O I;* p<O 05; ** p<O 01, *** p<O 001. 
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5.4 Ex Post Consequences of Going Public 
5.4.1 The Model 
Together with investtgatmg the determinants of an !PO, it IS necessary to examme the 
consequences of going pubhc to further clarify the reasons of the IPO decision One 
way of domg this is to compare the !PO firms' operatmg performance between the 
pre-IPO and post-IPO penod, because seekmg equity capital for investment or dtvesting 
shareholdings by origmal shareholders should be reflected in the changes of operatmg 
performance over the IPO wmdows. I look mto such changes m a hnear panel-data 
fixed effects model· 
Before/P0,1 is a dummy that equals I if an observation for IPO firm 1 m year I is 
before the !PO. After/P0,1 IS a dummy that equals I if an observation for !PO firm 1 
m year I is after the IP038 Therefore, I use each !PO firm's performance in the !PO year 
as a control for Itself before and after the !PO u, and v1 are respectively 
firm-specific and year-specific effects. The regressand y,t mcludes eleven 
performance variables that measure the changes m firm size, leverage, internal cash 
generation, mvestment-related cash flow and current assets, growth rate and firm value 
All the performance variables use the same model specification 
Firm size ts proxied by SIZE and TA. SIZE is the log value of turnover, and TA IS the 
log value of total assets. The log value of tl!mover IS used as the mam measure of firm 
size Leverage (LEV) is measured by total debt over total assets. Internal cash 
generation (ROA) is measure by EBITDA over total assets. Investment-related cash 
flow IS measured by capital investment (CAPEX) and acqms1t10n mtenstty (ACQ). 
CAPEX is net cash flow from capital expenditure, sale of plant and equipment and 
returns (including sale) of equity instrument scaled by total assets ACQ IS net cash flow 
from acquisitiOn and dtsposal scaled by total assets Investlnent-related current assets 
are measured by mventory (INVEN) and cash m hand (CASH). INVEN ts stock and 
38 These do not mclude the IPO year 
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work in progress scaled by total assets. CASH is cash and cash eqmvalent scaled by 
total assets Growth rate is measured by growth m sales (GSIZE) and growth in total 
assets (GTA) GSIZE IS the rate of growth of turnover, GTA IS the rate of growth of 
total assets. Fum value IS measured by net worth of firms (NWTH) which IS the log 
value of shareholders' funds 
Table 5.6 Definitions of Performance Variables 
Performance Variable Abbr Definition 
Firm size SIZE In( sales) 
TA In( total assets) 
Leverage LEV (total debt)/(total assets) 
Profitability ROA EBITDA/(total assets) 
Capital (net cash flow from capital expenditure, CAP EX sale of plant and equipment and returns Investment-related m vestment 
of equity mstrument)i(total assets) 
cash flow 
Acqmsition ACQ (net cash flow from acqms1t10n and 
mtens1ty disposal)/(total assets) 
Investment -related Invent()_ry IN VEN (stock and work m_jll'ogress){{total assets}_ 
current assets Cash in CASH (cash and cash eqmvalent)/(total assets) hand 
Growth m GSIZE ( salest-salest-I )/salest-I 
sales Growth rate Growth in GTA ( totalassetst -totalassetst-l )/totalassetst-l 
total assets 
Net worth of firms NWTH In( shareholders' funds) 
5.4.2 Methodology 
I used a two-way error component fixed effects model to evaluate the post-IPO 
operating and financial performance The two-way error component disturbances can be 
wntten as 
(5.4) 
where u, and Vt capture the unobservable heterogeneities that affect the performance 
vanables m question (I.e. the regressend) More explicitly, u, is a dummy variable that 
equals I if an observation belongs to firm 1, equals 0 otherwise. It reflects the 
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heterogeneities that are specific to firm z and stay constant over time t, 1 e the 
unobservable !Ime-mvariant firm effects. Vt is a dummy variable that equals I if an 
observation belongs to year t, equals 0 otherwise. It reflects the heterogenei!Ies that are 
specific to year t and stay constant across firm i, i.e. the unobservable firm-mvariant 
calendar year effects (a set of year dummies m this model). E1t is the stochas!tc 
disturbance wtth E1t-IID(O, o}) The regressors were assumed mdependent of the 
random vartable E1t. 
The two-way error component fixed effects model was chosen based on the following 
diagnostics· (I) whether or not the firm effects u, and/or the time effects vt are/ts 
significant, and (2) whether or not u, and/or vt are!ts correlated with the regressors. 
Testmg (I) is to test: 
(1.1) the joint significance of the !tme-mvanant firm effects u,, i e the joint test that all 
the coefficients of u, are zero (F-sta!Istics), and 
(I 2) the Joint significance of the firm-invartant calendar year effects Vt, 1 e the JOint 
test that all the coefficients of the year dummies are zero (F-stal!stics) 
If(! I) is reJected, there is variation of the regressors across firms withm each year, and 
hence a pooled model would be inappropnate If (I 2) is reJected, there is vartation of 
the regressors over calendar years wtthin each firm, and therefore a one-way error 
component fixed effects model Ignoring the lime effects would suffer from omitted 
variable bias. 
Testmg (2) is to exam me the appropriateness of the random effects modei39 This can be 
done usmg a Hausman test based on the difference between the fixed effects es!tmator 
(FE) and the random effects es!tmator (RE). The null hypothesis and the alternative 
hypothesis are set as follows 
H0 There are no fixed effects (i e. the orthogonality assumptiOn of the RE - the 
39 If a two-way error component random effects model IS used to evaluate the post-IPO operatmg and financial 
performance, the two-way error component disturbances would be wntten as 
81t = U 1 + Vt + Eu , 
where u1, vt and E1t are all assumed to be random vanables u,-IID(O,cra). Vt-IID(O,aJ) and E1t-IID(O,o}) 
are assumed to be mdependent of each other The regressors are assumed to be mdependent of the random 
vanables u" Vt and E1t for alll and t (Baltagt, 2005) 
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regressors are mdependent of u,, Vt and E,t- is valid). 
H1: There are fixed firm effects. 
Under the null hypothesis, the FE IS consistent but inefficient, whereas the RE 1s 
consistent and efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, the FE is consistent, whereas 
the RE is mconsistent 
Therefore, both the FE and the RE need to be estimated, and the common coefficient 
estimates need to be compared in the Hausman test statistics (H - x2). If both the FE 
and the RE generate consistent coefficient estimates, they will not d1ffer significantly, 
and the RE estimator can be used. However, if the orthogonality assumptiOn of the RE 
is viOlated, the estimates of the RE will be significantly different from their FE 
counterparts, Implying that the null hypothesis should be reJected In th1s case, the FE 
estimator should be used. 
Rather than statistical tests, applied researchers in practice tend to use the nature of the 
data as a guidehne to choose between the FE and the RE. Baltag1 (2005) argued that if 
the data exhaustively represent the populatiOn under investigatiOn, FE is preferred to 
RE, on the other hand, if the sample is drawn randomly from a large population, RE IS 
preferred 
If the linear random effects model is appropnate, statistic inference can be based on 
pooled OLS estimator, although feasible GLS estimators are more efficient (Baltagi, 
2005) 
If the hnear fixed effects model IS the true model, it can be estimated by the within 
estimator (Baltagi, 2005). In the presence of the fixed effects, the w1thm estimator IS 
consistent Alternatively, the fixed effects model can also be consistently estimated by 
the first differences estimator. However, the first differences estimator is less efficient 
than the within estimator for T > 2. In contrast, the pooled OLS estimator is 
inconsistent, and suffers from om1sswn bias since the firm effects and the time effects 
are Ignored The between estimator, which only uses the cross-sectiOnal variatiOn wh1le 
ignoring the individual-specific vanat10n, Is also mcons1stent. 
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The !Imitation of the fixed effects estimators is that the w1thm transformation ehmmates 
the tJme-mvanant and the firm-invariant regressors Consequently, the coefficients of 
these two types of regressors cannot be identified 
5.4.3 The Results 
Table 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5 10 and 5.11 present the estimates of the fixed effects model 
respectively for the entue sample, the mdependent !PO subsample, the carve-outs 
subsample, the IPOs hsted on AIM and those hsted on the Mam Market In each table, 
the F-stat1shcs test the s1gmficance of the fixed effects (mcludmg the jomt significance 
of the firm effects and the joint sigmficance of the lime effects) and the Hausman test 
examines the appropriateness of a random effects model. When an RE model cannot be 
rejected, only the estimates of an FE model are reported, as the FE estimates would still 
be consistent (though mefficient) 
For the independent IPOs (Table 5 7), the firms become larger immediately after their 
IPOs (m terms of both total assets and sales) In particular, their sales durmg the 
followmg years after the IPOs appear to be s1gmficantly larger in comparison with the 
pre-IPO and the at-IPO level. CAPEX after !PO IS negatively s1gned, mdicatmg that 
capital mvestment tends to mcrease after an !PO. These results suggest that mdependent 
!PO firms benefit from the new eqmty capital ra1sed from the stock market which 
promotes their mvestlnent m business and growth CASH before !PO IS significant and 
negative whereas CASH after !PO 1s positively signed (ins1gmficant), confirming that 
cash injectiOn from !PO financing mdeed helps firms relieve financial constraints. LEV 
IS negative but not significant If we cons1der this result together w1th the results of 
CASH and CAPEX, they appear to tell a consistent story That is, the cap1tal ra1sed 
from the IPOs was used to alleviate borrowmg constraints and fund investlnent rather 
than merely for deleverage. 
Profitability (ROA) and the rate of growth of total assets (GTA) however, both exh1b1t a 
significant decrease after !PO. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) argued that firms may 
time their IPOs to coincide w1th unusually high profitab1hty. Clementi (2002) also 
predicted that firms are expected to go public at the peak oftheu growth as the value of 
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exercismg the option of IPO IS at the highest. After the IPO, profitability IS expected to 
decrease The negative ROA and GTA may be a reflectiOn of these views Overall, the 
ex post results are consistent with the earlier conclusion from the ex ante analysis. 
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Table 5.7 Effects of the IPO Decision for the Independent IPO Subsample 
Varzables 
SIZE 
TA 
LEV 
ROA 
CAPEX 
ACQ 
INVEN 
CASH 
GSIZE 
GTA 
NWTH 
Before !PO 
-0 4899* 
(0 2013) 
-0 9151*** 
(0 1133) 
0 1566 
(0 1058) 
-0.0316 
(0 0997) 
-0 0687# 
(0.0393) 
00138 
(00192) 
0 0053 
(0 0060) 
-0 1192*** 
(0 0298) 
-0.3925 
(0 6796) 
-3 4855*** 
(0 6875) 
-2 0291*** 
(0 3298) 
After !PO 
0 4994** 
(0 1898) 
0 1521 
(0 1072) 
-0 0313 
(0 0467) 
-05916* 
(0 2536) 
-0 0260 
(0 0246) 
0 0443 
(00410) 
-0 0027 
(0 0109) 
0 0017 
(0 0258) 
0 1435 
(05961) 
-3 3353*** 
(0 8036) 
0 0624 
(0 2631) 
F-test· all 
coeffictents=O 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0193 
0 3467 
0 0000 
0 2294 
0 0059 
0 0008 
0 0405 
0 0000 
0 0000 
Fzrm 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0000 
00207 
0 0000 
0 4229 
00000 
0 0000 
00000 
00137 
00000 
Tzme 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0002 
0 0000 
0.2816 
0 3038 
0 0003 
0 1898 
0 0180 
0 0083 
0 0735 
0 0001 
0 0012 
FE vs RE 
(Hausman 
test) 
0 0000 
0 0000 
I 0000 
0 0000 
0 0002 
0 9800 
0 2186 
0 0120 
0 0015 
0 0063 
0 7570 
Obs Firms 
1305 143 
1305 143 
1304 143 
1305 143 
1303 143 
1303 143 
1304 143 
1304 143 
1099 141 
1159 143 
1305 143 
The effects of the deczswn to go pubhc on the vanables hsted above are estimated by a fixed effects model 
y,, = a, + {31 Before/PO,, + {32 After/PO, + u, + v, + ,,, u, and v, are respectively firm-speczfic and 
year-specific effects Before/PD., is a dummy equals I zf an observation for !PO firm 1 m year t zs before 
the !PO. AfteriPO,, zs a dummy equals I zf an observatiOn for !PO firm 1 m year t zs after the !PO. 
Therefore I use each firm m the !PO year as a control for Itself before and after the !PO Heteroskedastzczty 
robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The fixed effects model is estzmated usmg the mdependent 
IPOs subsample SIZE zs the log value of turnover, whzch zs used as the mam measure of firm szze TA zs the 
log value of total assets LEV zs total debt over total assets ROA zs EBITDA ( eammgs before mterest, taxes, 
depreciatiOn and amortzzatzon) over total assets. CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capztal expendzture, sale of 
plant and equzpment and returns (mcluding sale) of equity mstrument over total assets ACQ zs the net cash 
flow from acqmsztion and dzsposal over total assets INVEN zs stock and work m progress over total assets 
CASH zs cash and cash equzvalent over total assets GSIZE zs the rate of growth of turnover GTA IS the rate 
of growth of total assets NWTH zs the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated 
at zero # p<O I, • p<O 05; •• p<O 01, ••• p<O 001 
The carve-outs also increase their total assets and sales after an IPO (Table 5.8) 
However, there seems to be no change m capital investment, acquisition or inventory 
On the other hand, leverage appears to be reduced after an IPO These results further 
support the view that carve-outs are not mamly driven by financing for investment, 
rather that thezr parent firms are likely to divest highly mdebted subsidiaries v1a IPOs 
and to re balance the financial structure of the carve-outs. Evidently, after the IPO the 
firm value of a carve-out IS significantly improved and profitability is increased. This 
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might come from market monitoring which act to enhance the corporate governance of 
the carve-outs. In addition, the increased publicity may also have helped to create 
reputatwn capital for the carve-outs. 
Table 5.8 Effects of the IPO Decision for the Carve-out Subsample 
Var1ables 
SIZE 
TA 
LEV 
ROA 
CAP EX 
ACQ 
INVEN 
CASH 
GSIZE 
GTA 
NWTH 
Before JPO 
-0 6374* 
(0 2543) 
-0 3671# 
(0 2110) 
00440 
(0 0882) 
0 0089 
(0 0462) 
1.1288 
(I 1698) 
0 0223 
(0 0542) 
0 0103 
(0 0215) 
-0 0955* 
(0 0380) 
-0 5772 
(0 7919) 
-0 8222* 
(0.3374) 
-06212 
(0 9526) 
After IPO 
0 5253* 
(0 2455) 
0 4920* 
(0 1950) 
-0 0796 
(0 0497) 
0 0581 
(00417) 
0 8792 
(0 8840) 
00323 
(0 0565) 
-0 0002 
(0 0077) 
-0 0099 
(0 0430) 
-0 4234 
(0 6001) 
-0 6608 
(0 5129) 
1.7415** 
(0 4665) 
F-test· all 
coeffictents=O 
0 0000 
0.0000 
0 0073 
0 0416 
0 9408 
0 3707 
0 5212 
0 0449 
0 0009 
0 0001 
0 0001 
F1rm 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
00000 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 7859 
02299 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 3492 
0 2933 
00000 
T1me 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0310 
0 0000 
0 0110 
0 0249 
0 8982 
0 3104 
0 4078 
00399 
0 0065 
0 0001 
0 3653 
FE vs RE 
(Hausman 
test) 
0 3675 
0 0140 
0 3478 
0 0952 
09995 
0 8734 
I 0000 
I 0000 
0 0649 
0 0334 
0 9801 
Obs 
324 
324 
323 
324 
324 
324 
324 
324 
272 
283 
324 
F~rms 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
39 
40 
40 
The effects of the decision to go pubhc on the van abies hsted above are estimated by a fixed effects model· 
y,, =a,+ {31Before/PO,, + {32After/PO, + u, + v, + E,,. u, and v, are respecllvely firm-specific and 
year-spec1fic effects Before/ PO, is a dummy equals I 1f an observatiOn for IPO firm 1 m year I IS before 
the IPO After/PO, is a dummy equals I if an observatiOn for IPO firm 1 m year I IS after the IPO. 
Therefore I use each firm in the IPO year as a control for Itself before and after the IPO Heteroskedast1c1ty 
robust standard errors are reported m parentheses. The fixed effects model IS esllmated usmg the carve-out 
subsample. SIZE IS the log value of turnover, wh1ch IS used as the main measure of firm s1ze TA IS the log 
value of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA is EBITDA (earnmgs before interest, taxes, 
deprecl3tl0n and amort1zallon) over total assets CAPEX is the net cash flow from cap1tal expend1ture, sale of 
plant and eqmpment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty mstrument over total assets ACQ IS the net cash 
flow from acquis1t10n and d1sposal over total assets. INVEN IS stock and work m progress over total assets. 
CASH 1s cash and cash equ1valent over total assets GSIZE is the rate of growth of turnover. GTA is the rate 
of growth of total assets NWTH 1s the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated 
at zero # p<0.1; * p<O 05, ** p<O 01, *** p<O 001 
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I do not find that AIM plays a negative role in supporting the firms' growth. Companng 
the performance of AIM-listed companies to that of the Mam-Market-hsted compan1es 
(Table 5.9 and Table 5.1 0), the latter shows a s1gnificant and greater increase m firm 
value (net worth) However, the sales of AIM companies appear to grow better 
Otherwise, there is no other significant difference in performance 
Table 5.9 Effects of the IPO Decision for the lP Os Listed on AIM 
Vanables 
SIZE 
TA 
LEV 
ROA 
CAPEX 
ACQ 
IN VEN 
CASH 
GSIZE 
GTA 
NWTH 
Before IPO 
-0 5620* 
(0 2190) 
-0 9337*** 
(0 1177) 
0 1841# 
(0.1076) 
-0 0154 
(0 1098) 
0 3980 
(0 4792) 
00441# 
(0 0235) 
0 0061 
(0 0066) 
-0 1392*** 
(0 0315) 
-0 6485 
(0 6309) 
-3 2274*** 
(0 6567) 
-1 9965*** 
(0 3473) 
After !PO 
0 5407* 
(02136) 
0 1361 
(0 1061) 
-0.0138 
(0 0324) 
-0 6458* 
(03114) 
0 2445 
(0 2716) 
0 0707 
(0 0528) 
0 0012 
(0 0122) 
0 0104 
(0 0265) 
0 3598 
(0 6419) 
-2 9598*** 
(0 6653) 
03114 
(0 2313) 
F-test all 
coefficients=O 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0046 
0 5469 
0 0042 
0 5252 
0 0379 
0 0000 
0 0054 
0 0000 
0 0000 
F1rm 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
00000 
0 0000 
0 0794 
0 8226 
0 7563 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0001 
0 0199 
0 0000 
Time 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
00137 
0 0000 
0 0907 
0 4262 
0 0594 
0 8147 
0 0587 
0 0010 
0 0255 
0 0006 
0 0024 
FEvs RE 
(Hausman 
test) 
0 8209 
0 6727 
I 0000 
0 0000 
I 0000 
09726 
0 0000 
0 0175 
00000 
0 9598 
02208 
Obs 
1151 
1151 
1150 
1151 
1149 
1149 
1150 
1150 
958 
1016 
1151 
Firms 
132 
132 
132 
132 
132 
132 
132 
132 
130 
132 
132 
The effects of the decision to go pubhc on the variables hsted above are estimated by a fixed effects model. 
y,, =a,+ {31BeforeiPO,, + {32After/PO,, + u, + v, + <,, u, and v, are respectively !inn-specific and 
year-specific effects Before! PO,, IS a dummy equals I If an observation for !PO firm 1 m year I is before 
the !PO. After! PO, is a dummy equals I If an observation for !PO firm 1 m year I IS after the !PO 
Therefore I use each firm m the !PO year as a control for Itself before and after the !PO HeteroskedastiCity 
robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The fixed effects model is estimated usmg the subsample of 
the IPOs that listed on AIM SIZE is the log value of turnover, which is used as the mam measure of firm size 
TA IS the log value of total assets. LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA (earnmgs before 
mterest, taxes, depreciatiOn and amortization) over total assets. CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capital 
expenditure, sale of plant and equipment and returns (mcludmg sale) of equity mstrument over total assets 
ACQ IS the net cash flow from acqms1t1on and disposal over total assets INVEN IS stock and work m 
progress over total assets. CASH IS cash and cash eqmvalent over total assets GSIZE IS the rate of growth of 
turnover GTA IS the rate of growth of total assets NWTH IS the log value of shareholders' funds, and values 
below zero are truncated at zero # p<O I,* p<O 05, ** p<O 01, *** p<O 001. 
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Table 5.10 Effects of the IPO Decision for the IPOs Listed on the Official List 
Vanables 
SIZE 
TA 
LEV 
ROA 
CAP EX 
ACQ 
IN VEN 
CASH 
GSIZE 
GTA 
NWTH 
Before IPO 
-0 3393 
(0 2223) 
-0 5262* 
(0.2344) 
0 0378 
(0 0937) 
-0 1201# 
(0 0688) 
-0 0050 
(0 0144) 
-0 0456 
(0 0335) 
00130 
(0 0165) 
-0 0596 
(0 0365) 
0 2481 
(1.1864) 
-2 1715* 
(I 0121) 
-16571* 
(0 6764) 
After IPO 
0 4763* 
(0 2008) 
0 4553* 
(0 1851) 
-0 1371 
(0 0895) 
-0 0988 
(0 0760) 
-0 0092 
(0 0144) 
-00177 
(0 0242) 
-0 0162 
(0 0101) 
0 0106 
(0 0424) 
-0 6351 
(0 6624) 
-2 3938 
(I 7193) 
I 1097* 
(0 5536) 
F-test· all 
coefficJents=O 
0 0000 
00000 
0 0342 
0 0456 
0 0000 
0 1214 
0 0259 
0 1007 
0 0189 
0 0131 
0 0000 
Ftrm 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
00000 
0 0000 
0 0000 
00000 
0.0486 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0559 
0.1034 
0 0000 
Time 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 2759 
0 0452 
0 0001 
0 1009 
0 2565 
0 2069 
0 0135 
0 0093 
0 0055 
FE vs RE 
(Hausman 
test) 
0 9999 
0 9555 
I 0000 
0 9449 
0 0861 
I 0000 
0 4604 
0 0548 
0 0003 
0 2748 
I 0000 
Obs Ftrms 
478 51 
478 51 
477 51 
478 51 
478 51 
478 51 
478 51 
478 51 
413 50 
426 51 
478 51 
The effects of the deciSion to go pubhc on the vanables hsted above are estimated by a fixed effects model 
y,, =a,+ {31 BeforelPO,, + {32AfterlPO" + u, + v, + E,, u, and v, are respecttvely firm-spectfic and 
year-spectfic effects. BeforelPO,, ts a dummy equals I tf an observation for !PO firm z m year t is before 
the !PO AfterlPO,, ts a dummy equals I tf an observatiOn for IPO firm 1 m year t ts after the IPO 
Therefore I use each firm m the IPO year as a control for Itself before and after the IPO Heteroskedasttctty 
robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The fixed effects model is esttmated usmg the subsample of 
IPOs that hsted on the Offictal Ltst SIZE ts the log value of turnover, whtch ts used as the rnam measure of 
firm stze TA ts the log value of total assets LEV ts total debt over total assets. ROA ts EBITDA (earnmgs 
before mterest, taxes, depreciatiOn and amortizatiOn) over total assets CAPEX ts the net cash flow from 
capttal expendtture, sale of plant and equtpment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty mstrument over total 
assets ACQ ts the net cash flow from acqutsttton and dtsposal over total assets INVEN ts stock and work m 
progress over total assets CASH ts cash and cash equtvalent over total assets GSIZE ts the rate of growth of 
turnover GTA ts the rate of growth of total assets NWTH ts the log value of shareholders' funds, and values 
below zero are truncated at zero # p<O I , • p<O 0 5; * * p<O 0 I ; • • * p<O 00 I 
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Overall (Table 5 11 ), after the offerings the !PO firms significantly grow larger, total 
shareholder value is sigmficantly mcreased (firm value is enhanced) 
Table 5.11 Effects of the !PO Decision for the Entire Sample IPOs 
Vanables 
SIZE 
TA 
LEV 
ROA 
CAPEX 
ACQ 
IN YEN 
CASH 
GSIZE 
GTA 
NWTH 
Before lPO 
-0 5423** 
(0 1691) 
-0 8264*** 
(0 1013) 
0 1367 
(0 0847) 
-0 0280 
(0 0777) 
0 2421 
(0 3044) 
0 0208 
(0 0184) 
0 0071 
(0 0067) 
-0 1156*** 
(0 0246) 
-0 3997 
(0 5531) 
-2 8553*** 
(0 5397) 
-I 7797*** 
(0 3275) 
After lPO 
0 5414** 
(0 1564) 
0 2203* 
(0 0934) 
-0 0483 
(0 0361) 
-0 4471* 
(0 1976) 
0 1722 
(0 1935) 
0 0426 
(0 0342) 
-0 0021 
(0 0086) 
0 0015 
(0 0223) 
0 0117 
(0 4847) 
-2 8324*** 
(0 6478) 
0.4558* 
(0 2339) 
F-test all 
coeffic1ents=O 
0 0000 
0 0000 
0 0002 
0 3105 
0 0000 
0 2229 
0 0046 
0 0001 
00133 
0 0000 
00000 
Firm 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0000 
00000 
0 0000 
0.0076 
0 8027 
0 3109 
0 0000 
00000 
0.0000 
00068 
0 0000 
Tzme 
Effects 
(F-stats) 
0 0046 
0 0000 
0 0592 
0 2289 
0 0001 
0 3144 
0 0094 
0 0019 
0.0205 
0 0000 
0 0002 
FEvs RE 
(Hausman 
test) 
00000 
00000 
I 0000 
0 0138 
09999 
09863 
0 0340 
0 0016 
0 0002 
0 0011 
0 0208 
Obs 
1629 
1629 
1627 
1629 
1627 
1627 
1628 
1628 
1371 
1442 
1629 
183 
183 
183 
183 
183 
183 
183 
183 
180 
183 
183 
The effects of the deczszon to go pubhc on the van abies hsted above are estimated by a fixed effects model· 
y,, =a,+ {31 BeforelPO,, + {32AfterlPO" + u, + v, + <,,. u, and v, are respectively finn-speczfic and 
year-speczfic effects Before! PO" is a dummy equals I zf an observatiOn for !PO finn 1 m year t IS before 
the !PO AfterlPO" IS a dummy equals I zf an observation for !PO firm 1 m year t IS after the IPO 
Therefore I use each finn in the IPO year as a control for Itself before and after the IPO Heteroskedast1czty 
robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The fixed effects model IS estimated usmg the entire sample 
ofiPOs SIZE zs the log value of turnover, whzch is used as the mam measure of firm szze TA IS the log value 
of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest, taxes, 
deprec1at10n and amortization) over total assets CAPEX IS the net cash flow from cap1tal expenditure, sale of 
plant and equzpment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty instrument over total assets ACQ IS the net cash 
flow from acqmsztwn and disposal over total assets INVEN 1s stock and work m progress over total assets 
CASH zs cash and cash equzvalent over total assets GSIZE is the rate of growth of turnover. GTA is the rate 
of growth of total assets NWTH IS the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated 
at zero # p<O I,* p<O 05; ** p<O 01; *** p<O 001 
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5.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have used panel data for 183 UK IPO firms and 2315 UK private firms 
over twelve years from 1996 to 2007, to investigate the reasons for gomg public in the 
UK. I focused on UK registered non-financial private firms (the parent firms, 1f they 
ex1st, also need to be registered m the UK) and non-financial IPOs hsted on the 
domestic market I studied the determmants of the hkelihood of going pubhc and 
compared the pre- and post- !PO operating performance of the !PO firms. 
The findings prov1de support for many theoretical arguments. Financial constraints, 
cheaper costs of public equity, consideration of enhancing corporate governance are all 
Important factors dnving an !PO decision m the UK. 
For th1s UK sample, the IPOs of independent firms are mainly driven by the need for 
capital to fund mveshnent due to their hmited abihty to generate internal cash These 
firms appear to be smaller, have a more dispersed ownership structure and be in an 
earher stage of growth. These are quite d1fferent from the ev1dence from Italy (Pagano 
et a!, 1998), where it was found that larger and mature firms are more hkely to go 
public w1th a main purpose of reducing high level of leverage and re-balancmg 
financ1al structure 
In contrast to independent firms, the !PO decision of the subs1d1aries in the UK 1s 
mainly dnven by corporate re-structunng and d1vestment motives. The parent firms 
tend to d1vest highly mdebted and less controlled subsid1aries via !PO Th1s 1s 
consistent w1th the results from the Italian firms. 
Overall, for the UK market, smaller and growth firms are more likely to go pubhc, and 
raising funds for investment is the dominant motive. The mformattve stock market 
reduces financmg costs, and provides an access to a large pool of funds especially for 
young firms in need of cap1tal for inveshnent and expans10n. Th1s is qmte d1fferent 
from the ava1lable ev1dence from other contmental European markets, where mature 
firms are more likely to ra1se funds from the stock market, whereas young and growth 
firms are less keen to seek public equity due to h1gh informatiOn costs. 
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In addition, it is found that corporate governance is an important consideration behmd 
the IPO decision. Firms w1th more dispersed ownership structure show greater interests 
m an IPO Th1s can be explained by the legal foundations and efficiency of the UK 
market. Stronger mvestor protection and informative stock pnces may have induced 
these firms' preference for a market momtonng mechan1sm. 
The UK stock market, mcludmg both the Official L1st and the AIM segment, seems to 
perform a quite positive role in supportmg firm development, especially for financially 
constrained smaller growth firms. IPO firms continue to increase their sales after 
floatation, and firm value is significantly improved. 
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6 Going Public: Why? ... and When? 
Ev1dence from How Compames Structure the JP Os m the UK 
6.1 Introduction 
The decision to go public mcludes two components one is the motive that IS why firms 
go public; the other one is the timing that is when firms go public The timmg element 
mcludes two dJmenswns: at what stage m the life of a firm and in what kmd of market 
conditions will it choose to go public? The motive and the timmg elements are closely 
connected (Ritter and Welch, 2002) and should be paid equal attentwn in empmcal 
research. 
There has been a huge volume of research on the IPO process and the immediate 
post-IPO experience, concentrating m particular on the underpricing phenomenon 
(Rock, 1986) Jenkinson and LJungqvJst (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist 
(2006) surveyed different aspects of th1s literature, but as these reviewers explam, much 
less research has been reported on the IPO decision per se, e1ther on the 'why' or the 
~when' 
Most of the empirical stud1es on IPO decision use datasets mcludmg public and pnvate 
firms. An alternative approach is to examine the IPOs of existing public firms An !PO 
may consist of primary shares, secondary shares, or a m1xture of both. Primary shares 
are newly created and therefore ra1se new money for the company, whereas secondary 
shares are those already existmg that are sold by current shareholders and, pnma facie, 
permit these shareholders an ex1t route In an interesting recent contnbution, 
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) studied the determmants of the s1ze of the primary 
and secondary portions m a sample of 95 Belgian IPOs and they concluded that the type 
of shares offered in these IPOs directly reveals mformat10n about the motivatiOn for the 
IPO. This suggests that 1t may be useful to investigate the determmants of the primary 
and secondary portwns of IPOs in other markets to test more fully the validity of this 
hypothesis 
90 
In this chapter, I mvestigate cross-sectional data from a sample of 20440 UK IPOs 
floated on the LSE over the SIX years 1998 to 2003. For these companies, I study the 
determmants of the structure of their JP Os and mvestigate the determining factors from 
the point of v1ew of both the motives and the timing: 'why' and 'when' I first examme 
the determmmg factors of the cho1ce of !PO structure - primary share offenng, 
secondary share offering or combined offering, and then examine the determinants of 
the size of the pnmary and secondary portions 
The rest of this chapter is orgamsed as follows section 6 2 presents the theoretical 
predictions, sectiOn 6.3 descnbes the sample, sectiOn 6 4 examines the determmants of 
the choice of !PO structure; section 6.5 analyses the determinants of the s1ze of the 
primary and secondary portiOns; sectwn 6 6 provides some concluding remarks. 
6.2 Theoretical Predictions 
In the theoretical literature it is common to distinguish two types of mot1ve - to raise 
eqmty capital for mvestment or, for onginal shareholders to divest or to ex1t. The two 
types of !PO motive and the related t1ming patterns can be tested by examinmg the 
determmants of !PO structure, since the type( s) of shares and the1r issue s1ze( s) convey 
informatiOn about the decision to go pubhc. Primary shares are the shares newly created 
at the !PO and hence the issue size of primary share41 1s mainly driven by the demand 
for fresh capital (e g. initial financmg, reinvestment, expansions). Secondary shares are 
the existing shares divested at !PO and hence the issue size of secondary share42 is 
dnven by the motive of divestmg and ex1t. In the followmg, I derive the theoretical 
predictions on the factors (includmg both the motives and the timmg elements) that 
determine the 1ssue size of primary share and secondary share, and attempt the questiOn 
why some !PO firms only issue pnmary shares m their mitial offerings while some 
others also mclude secondary shares A summary of the theoretical predictions is 
presented in Table 6.1. 
4° Further to the 183 IPO firms used m chapter 5, I was able to add another 21 IPO firms that registered m the UK 
yet have a foretgn parent company for the cross-secttonal dataset 
41 It JS measured by the ratio of the number ofpnmary shares to the number of total shares outstandmg followmg the 
!PO 
42 It ts measured by the ratiO ofthe number of secondary shares to the number of total shares outstandmg followmg the 
!PO 
91 
6.2.1 Investment Financing in Relation to Primary Shares 
Financial Constraints 
Fmancial constramts may arise for vanous reasons, such as debt overhang, limited cash 
generation and credit constraints. Highly levered firms may have fully used their 
borrowmg capacity and the debt overhang problem IS more hkely to occur Regular debt 
interest payments can be a burden for firms that generate uneven cash inflows - the 
lower the mterest coverage (EBIT over interest), the larger IS the debt burden and the 
greater IS the bankruptcy nsk. Firms that rely heavily on bank borrowmg may also be 
ratiOned, suggestmg the need to seek wider sources of financing. These financial 
constramts may prevent pnvate firms from realising all their investment opportumties 
and hence reduce firm value. In this case, the firm can benefit from a wider source of 
pubhc equity by offering pnmary shares In line with this ImplicatiOn, the pecking order 
theory of Myers and MaJluf (1984) suggested that firms use external equity as 'last 
resort' financmg 
Higher level of leverage, heavier debt burden and more reliance on bank borrowmgs 
md1cate more severe financial constramt problems, and hence are expected to be 
correlated with a larger number of primary shares that need to be raised On the other 
hand, the weaker the internal cash generation, the larger the number of pnmary shares 
Leverage is often measured by total debt over total assets (LEV). Debt burden can be 
measured by the inverse of interest coverage, which is interest expense over EBIT 
(INCOV). Reliance on bank borrowing can be measured by bank loan over total debt 
(DTMIX). Internal cash generatiOn is often measured by EBITDA over total assets 
(ROA). Therefore, the size of the primary share is expected to be positively related to 
LEV, IN COV and DTMlX, whereas negatively related to ROA 
Corporate Governance and Market Monitoring 
When firms access external capital - whether debt or eqmty financing, this typically 
gives rise to agency problems between financiers and managers (entrepreneurs) 
Solving the agency problems involves the efficient use of corporate resources, and 
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direct or mdirect monitoring of management. Costs of control and momtoring depend 
less on whether the firm is pnvately or pubhcly owned, and more on the actual 
governance of each firm. 
For firms financed by public equity, there are two main types of agency conflict One is 
the conflict between msider manager-shareholders and outsider large public mvestors 
Outsider block shareholders may put too much pressure on management ( e g hostile 
takeover) and the presence of multiple outs1der block shareholders may result m costly 
duplication of momtoring (causing the over-momtoring problem). The other is the 
conflict between non-shareholder managers' pnvate benefits and dispersed public 
mvestors' interests. However, the stock market has the important functiOn of revealing 
valuable informatiOn about firms' managerial performance and growth prospects vm 
continuously quoted stock pnces (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993). Th1s works as an 
important managerial mcentive mechanism, alleviating the under-monitoring problem. 
it is therefore expected that management would wish to keep (or even strengthen) their 
control by allocatmg shares to dispersed public mvestors. The larger the shareholdings 
of management before the !PO, the less likely 1t is that the managerial control IS 
subsequently diluted, and hence a larger number of pnmary shares can be offered to the 
public. The degree of managerial concentratiOn can be measured by the percentage of 
stock that duectors own at !PO (DH). Therefore, the s1ze of the pnmary share IS likely 
to be positively correlated w1th DH 
Timing- Tile Stage in Life Cycle of Firms 
Diversification, bargammg power vs costs of mformatwn productwn, adverse selectwn 
Ra1sing financmg from public investors creates liqmdity for the firm, allowmg its 
shareholders to divefS!fy their portfolios and enhancing the entrepreneur's bargaming 
power against a large numbers of outside public mvestors. However, the advantage of 
avoidmg an excessive risk prem1mn for public equity comes with a cost imposed by 
asymmetric mformation problems. Each public mvestor needs to evaluate an !PO firm 
at a cost, 1mplying sizeable duplications of the costs of informatiOn production that 
ultimately the firm must pay (m the form of underpricmg) InformatiOn costs decrease 
93 
with the avmlable mformation about the firm accumulated m the public domain, but 
mcrease with difficulties in evaluation (Chemmanur and Fulghien, 1999). Therefore, 
there exists a negative relation between mformation costs and firm age and size. 
The costs of information production associated with the mformatwnal asymmetries in 
the market can equally well be interpreted by adverse selectiOn theory. Some investors 
are less informed about the value of the !PO firm, this creates a standard 'lemons' 
problem. To avoid a failure in Its offering, the firm may underpnce the !PO to signal its 
quality. Young and small firms have little track record and therefore especially high 
adverse selection costs and possible high underpricing costs 
However, the correlation between the size of the primary share offered and firm age and 
size is uncertain On the one hand, higher costs of information production and adverse 
selection for younger and smaller firms are likely to mduce a smaller size of primary 
share, and firms at an earlier stage may delay its profitable mvestment until a seasoned 
equity offering (when asymmetnc information problems are reduced). On the other 
hand, If the costs of forgomg investment opportunities are substantially high (m 
particular If this will cause increasing costs of seasoned equity offerings), these firms 
may still Issue a large number of primary shares in theu !PO. An accurate measurement 
for firm age IS the log value of time from startmg business until !PO year (AGE) Firm 
size can be measured either by the log value of sales (SIZE), or the log value of total 
assets (TA). 
Timing- Market Timing and Windows Opportunities 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) distmguished between firm-specific information 
which is generated from day-to-day operations and better collected by the msiders 
(managers, financial intermedianes ), and market -specific information which is better 
collected by outside mformed public investors and conveyed by stock pnces 
Fluctuations in stock prices can reveal valuable mformation about the expected payoff 
from growth opportunities, risks, expected profitability and expected cash flow 
(Ciementi, 2002, Pastor and Veronesi, 2005; Benninga et al , 2005) Timmg an IPO to 
coincide with a high market price (I e potentially high market valuation) can facilitate 
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the firm's mvestment decisiOn, overcome borrowmg constramts and diversify away 
IdiOsyncratic nsks. A higher market price indicates more investment opportunities, 
allowing the firm to revise its investment upwards From this point of view, a larger size 
of pnmary shares is expected to be offered when market pnce 1s high. In addition, when 
market pnce is high, the mtrinsic value of a project becomes larger relative to the 
potential adverse selection costs. This is also likely to induce a larger size of pnmary 
shares so as to take advantage of wmdows of opportunity. 
Market price at IPO can be measured by annual market return m the 12 month 
precedmg the IPO (MKTR'I) Followmg the rational theory of market timing, MKTRT 
IS expected to be positively related to the size of pnmary share 
However, R1tter and Welch (2002) pointed out that the investment and financing 
decisiOns of entrepreneurs are more driven by firm-specific mformation rather than by 
the stock market It takes time for entrepreneurs to adjust their pnvate valuatiOn towards 
the market valuation. GIVen this semi-rational theory, the relation between MKTRT and 
the size of primary share is not o bv1ous. 
6.2.2 Divestment and Exit in Relation to Secondary Shares 
Excessive Owner-Manager Conflicts and Value of Control Rights 
As firms grow, conflicts between managers and some block holders (1f the block 
holders are outside management) can become increasingly acute, dnving the block 
holders to exit from the firm (Zmgales, 1995; Mello and Parsons, 1998). Directly 
selling the firm out and bargaining with potential buyers can maximise the proceeds 
from the sale of control rights However, going public and selling out to dispersed 
shareholders can maximise the revenue from the sale of cash flow rights, as publicly 
observable stock prices reduce mformation asymmetries and enhance momtoring of 
management. This is especially beneficial for the sellmg shareholders 1f management 
extracts pnvate benefits from shareholders As a consequence, first selhng a small 
portiOn of shares to dispersed shareholders md1rectly strengthens the owner's 
bargaming power for a subsequent sale of the controllmg block (Zingales, 1995) 
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Zmgales' model (1995) implies that the greater proportion of cash flow nghts to total 
shares sold, the more pnvate benefit of control is transferred to buyers Th1s may 
prevent the manager-shareholders from extracting theu private benefits. As such a 
threat to the managers mcreases in managenal concentration, managerial concentration 
at IPO (OH) is expected to be negatively related to the size of secondary share offered 
Timing- The Stage in Life Cycle of Firms 
ldwsyncratzc rzsks and adverse selectwn costs 
Ellingsen and Rydqvist (1997) argued that firms may be over-mvested and that 
Idiosyncratic nsks increase with firm age. Some large block holders (e.g. entrepreneurs, 
venture capital) may want to cash out from the firm by a certain time m order to avmd 
potential over-investment and increasmg idiosyncratic risks, and to undertake new and 
profitable activities. 
Due to asymmetric information and moral hazard problems, the exit of shareholders 
might be perceived as a bad signal by pubhc investors, who m1ght ascnbe the exit to 
poor entrepreneunal performance or decreasmg mvestment value for venture capital 
This Implies high adverse selection costs of IPOs for bad firms For this reason, It is 
hkely that only the shareholders of good firms are able to exit vm going pubhc. The 
better the signal a firm can send to the market, the larger the shareholdings that ongmal 
shareholders can divest via the IPO. Firms at a later stage suffer less from adverse 
selection problems, and thus shareholders may be able to sell more at IPO 
Therefore, the size of the secondary share offered in an IPO IS expected to be positively 
correlated with the firm's operatiOnal performance and financial conditions- positively 
correlated with ROA whereas negatively correlated with LEV, DTMIX and INCOV 
The size of the secondary share may also be positively correlated with firm age (AGE) 
and firm size (SIZE and TA) 
Timing- Market Timing and Windows of Opportunity 
As far as I am aware, there IS no formal theory that models the impact of wmdows of 
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opportumty on a firm's divestment or exit strategy However, dunng a period of h1gh 
market return, pubhc investors may assess shareholders' exit more optimistically 
because they are affected by optimistic market sentiment. This may allow selhng 
shareholders to sell secondary shares more easily, owmg to lower adverse selectiOn 
costs 
6.2.3 Investment and Divestment in a Unified Framework 
The ex1stmg theoretical literature about the decision to go public IS bmlt either on an 
mvestment assumption or a divestment assumption. Due to the complexity of IPO 
decisiOn, there IS no smgle theoretical model that mcorporates both motives within a 
unified and dynamic framework. This leaves one important question under-addressed 
why some firms issue only primary shares, while others also add secondary shares m 
their IPOs 
Tirole (2005) distingmshes two types of corporate momtoring mechanism: first, active 
monitoring by eqmty holders such as venture capital or other large shareholders, or by 
debt holders such as banks; or second, passive momtoring by changes m stock pnces. 
Active momtors make use of theu formal control (votmg rights) or real control 
(mfluence on the board with respect to a given policy) and provide strategic mformatwn 
about firm structure, competitiOn strategy and personnel decisiOns, so as to mcrease the 
value of assets in place. By contrast, while passive momtoring performed by stock 
prices does not have value, a hqmd and well-developed stock market has the function of 
rewarding or punishing management VIa changmg stock prices, thus improvmg 
managerial performance and mdirectly mcreasing firm value. 
Dunng 1ts life, a firm may resort to the stock market to raise funds for its remvestment 
and expansion, because at a certam time financmg from the stock market is associated 
with lower adverse selectiOn and mformation production costs, better bargaming power 
and lower required nsk premiums, value indirectly added by market monitoring and 
favourable market valuation. On the other hand, dunng the cycle of financmg and 
investment, some active monitors (large shareholders) may Wish to sell some of their 
shares to diversify their portfolios or to exit from the firm to move on to other projects. 
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These active momtors are able to exit from the1r mvestment before a final outcome is 
realised- the momtonng cap1tal in the market provides the active monitors With an exit 
mechanism, because their performance can be evaluated by the market. However, this 
does not mean that active momtors can ex1t at any time they want The ex1t mechanism 
functwns well for them only if there are sufficient remvestment opportumties with h1gh 
mtrins1c value for the firm, there is substantial favourable mformation about the firm 
accumulated in the pubhc domam, and there are adequate potential public mvestors (i.e 
the passive momtoring providers) 
In relatiOn to this argument, firms who add secondary shares m their IPOs are expected 
to be more mature (older and larger), m better financ1al shape and have better growth 
prospects than those who only offer primary shares. In additwn, IPOs that mclude 
secondary shares are expected to conduct the offenngs at higher stock prices, because 
there is more momtoring capital (public mvestors) in a more optimistiC market. 
A summary ofthe theoretical predictions IS presented m table 6.1 
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Table 6.1 Summary of the Theoretical Predictions 
Theoncs Stze of Pnmary Shares Theones Stze of Secondary Shares 
Investment and Exoanswn Sum Variables Dtvestment and Extt Stgn Variables 
Jensen and Mecklmg 
+ Leverage (LEV) - Leverage (LE V) 
(1976), Myers (1977), + Bank borrowing -
Bank borrowmg 
Fmanc1al constramts Sllghtz and We1ss 
(DTMIX) (DTMlX) 
(1981), Myers and + Debt burden (INCOV) 
-
Debt burden (INCOV) 
Internal cash Elhngsen and Internal cash 
Majluf (1984) - generatiOn (ROA) Idwsyncrat1c nsks and RydqVISt + generatiOn (ROA) 
DiversificatiOn and 
adverse selectiOn costs (1997) 
bargaming power vs Chemmanur and + Firm age (AGE) 
costs of m formatiOn ? Firm age (AGE) 
productiOn and Fulgh1en (1999) ? Firm size (SIZE, TA) 
+ Firm SIZe (SIZE, TA) 
adverse selectiOn 
Jensen and Mecklmg Excesstve Zmgales 
Agency problems (1976), Jensen (1986), 
vs market Holmstrom and Tirole + 
Managenal owner· manager (1995), Mello 
-
Managenal 
monitonng (1993), Pagano and 
concentration (DH) conflicts and value of and Parsons concentratiOn (DH) 
Roell (1998) 
control rights (1998) 
Subrahmanyam and 
T1tman (1999), Market return 
Market timmg and 
Clemenll (2002), + (MKTRT) Market t1mmg and 
wmdowof 
Pastor and Verones1 wmdowof NIA ? 
Market return 
opportunity 
(2005), Bennmga et opportunity (MKTRT) 
a/ (2005) 
R1tter and Welch ? Market return 
(2002) (MKTRT) 
Size of Pnmary (Secondary) Shares IS measured by the ratio of the number of pnmary shares (secondary shares) to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO 
LEV 1s total debt over total assets DTMIX IS bank loan over total debt !NCO V IS mterest expense over EBIT (earnmgs before mterest and tax), and values below 
zero are truncated at zero ROA IS EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest, tax, depreciation and amor!Izatwn) over total assets AGE IS the log value of firm age which IS 
the age smce the firms started busmess until the !PO year Two measurements for firm size are (I) SIZE which IS log value of sales, and (2) TA which IS log value of 
total assets DH IS the percentage of shareholdmgs that directors (with ownership exceedmg 3%) own at !PO MKTRT IS the annual market return m the 12 months 
precedmg the !PO, calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index 
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6.3 Sample and Summary Statistics 
The analyses are based on 204 non-financial UK IPOs hsted on the LSE durmg 1998 
through 2003. I use a cross-sectional dataset of these IPOs at the lime oftheu offenng. 
The sources of the data were mtroduced m chapter 4 
Table 6 2 reports summary statistics on the IPO structure, financial charactenstics, 
ownership structure and the growth opportunities of the whole sample of IPO firms at 
the time of the1r flotation The mean (median) size of primary shares 1ssued relative to 
the post-IPO shares outstandmg is 27 73% (23 78%), whereas the proportwn of 
secondary shares 1s much smaller at 5 46% (0%). In sharp contrast, Huyghebaert and 
Van Hulle (2006) reported that for the Belgian IPOs, the sizes of primary and secondary 
shares are nearly equal on average. Pnma facze 1t may seem that, in compar1son w1th 
the Belgian firms, IPO activities m the UK are more related to financmg than to transfer 
of ownership. Furthermore, pnmary and secondary shares combined average 33 21% of 
total shares outstanding after the offenng for the UK IPOs, suggestmg that the original 
owners retain controlJmmed~ately after the IPO. 
The average firm age at IPO 1s 13.24 years, much greater than the mean incorporation 
age (2. 7 4 years) suggesting that mdeed many firms m corporate for the purpose of a 
flotatwn The key financial indicators vary quite widely across firms, reflectmg 
differences in size, operatmg performance and financial structure at the IPO Compared 
with some other European IPOs (Pagano et al 1998, Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006), 
UK firms at IPO are younger, smaller, and rely much less on debt financmg (especially 
less on bank borrowmg) 
Ownership is relatively concentrated both before and after IPO, although total 
blockholders' shareholdmgs fall from 72 8% to 55.12% after IPO However, ownership 
is much less concentrated on average m the UK than in other European IPOs. For 
example, m the UK, 4.78 blockholders own 55 12% of the shares on average after IPO, 
whereas in Belgium 1.99 blockholders own 64.94% of the shares after IPO 
(Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006) Directors own a large portwn ofblockholders' total 
shareholdmgs and, although the number and stake of duectors are reduced after IPO, 
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their holdings relative to the blockholders' total are nearly unchanged This pattern is 
consistent with a 'managenal ownership and control' structure for the UK !PO firms m 
general. 
Table 6.2 IPO Structure, Financial and Ownership Characteristics at the IPOs (n=204) 
Van able Mean Median Std Dev. Mm Max 
/PO STRUCTURE 
Pnmary Funds (£'000) 11791 75 4700 23074 58 0 168750 
Secondary Funds (£'000) 6188 08 0 21898 06 0 225000 
!PO Funds (£'000) 17985 34 5183 10 41285 37 200 393750 
Pnmary Stze 0 2773 02378 0.1888 0 I 0000 
Secondary Stze 0 0546 0 0.1020 0 0 8165 
!PO Stze 0 3321 0 2954 0 1902 0 0183 I 0000 
Pnmary ProportiOn 0 8423 0 2390 0 
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
FtrmAge 13 24 7 27.14 0 08 264 
Incorporation Age 2 74 0 67 4 17 0 19 67 
Total Assets (£'000) 1186516 2779 27149.48 12 51 205763 
Total Sales (£'000) 13607 06 2868 32154 92 0 229635 
ROA -0 2480 00530 I 2495 -14 1970 I 2653 
LEV 0 3623 0.1497 0 8305 0 9 2381 
DTMIX 0 3638 0 2330 0 3849 0 I 
DTMIX ST 0 2229 0 0303 0 3167 0 I 
DTMIX LT 0.1541 0 0 3203 0 2 9098 
IN COV 0.2292 0 0 6550 0 6.9677 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Blockholders Before !PO 4 21 4 3 04 0 14 
Blockholders After !PO 4.78 5 2.77 0 13 
Dtrectors Before !PO 2 38 2 I 53 0 7 
Dtrectors After !PO 2.16 2 1.35 0 7 
CONCI (%) 0 7280 0 8200 02805 0 
CONC2(%) 0 5512 0 5780 0 2274 0 
DHI (%) 0 5063 0 5331 0 3131 0 I 
DH2(%) 0.3417 0 3374 0.2267 0 0 9615 
GROWTH OPPOTUNITIES 
PYRE 9 7955 9 7964 I 7162 0 14 9975 
Pnmary (Secondary) Funds ts the filing offer pnce ttmes the number ofpnmary (secondary) shares !PO Funds ts 
the filing offer pnce times the number oftotal!PO shares Pnmary Size (Secondary Stze) ts the ratio of the number 
ofpnmary shares (secondary shares) to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO !PO Size ts the ratio of 
the number of total IPO shares to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO Pnmary ProportiOn ts the ratiO 
of the number of pnmary shares to the number of total !PO shares Ftrm Age ts the age smce the firm started 
bus mess Incorporation Age ts the age smce the firm mcorporated ROA ts EBITDA ( eammgs before mterest, tax, 
deprectatton and amorttzatwn) over total assets LEV ts total debt over total assets DTMIX ts bank debt over total 
debt DTMIX_ST (DTMIX_LT) ts short-term (long-term) bank loan over total debt INCOV IS mterest expense 
over EBIT (eammgs before mterest and tax), and values below zero are truncated at zero Blockholders (Dtrectors) 
Before (After) IPO ts the number of blockholders (dtrectors) whose ownershtp exceeds 3% before (after) IPO 
CONCI (CONC2) ts the percentage ofshareholdmgs that blockholders own before (after) !PO DHI (DH2) ts the 
percentage ofshareholdmgs that dtrectors (with ownershtp exceedmg 3%) own before (after) IPO PYRE ts the log 
present value of expected residual eammgs, calculated as log value of the difference between the market value of 
equ1ty and the book value of equtty, where values below zero are truncated at zero 
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The theones Imply that offenng pnmary shares IS hkely to be associated with financial 
constramts, finns who add secondary shares in theu IPOs are likely to be more mature, 
in a better financial shape and have higher growth opportumues than those who only 
offer primary shares. To draw a distinction among finns that only issue primary shares, 
those that only Issue secondary shares and those that Issue a combination, I further 
dlVlde the sample IPOs into three sub-samples according to the type of shares offered, 
and compare the profile of the !PO finns Table 6.3 reports the means and p-values of 
the W1lcoxon rank sum test for the pair-wise sub-samples. 
As shown in Table 6.3, more than half of the sample finns issued pnmary shares only, 
Just 2 finns issued secondary shares only while the remammg 88 finns Issued a mixture 
of primary and secondary shares 43 • In contrast, in Belgium from 1984 to 2000 
(Huyghebaert and Van Hulle, 2006), primary share offenngs44 make up only one 
quarter of all IPOs, whereas secondary share offerings account for over a third. 
Together with the differences m the size of primary share and secondary share offered, 
the popularity of pnmary share offerings (financmg related) m UK as opposed to 
secondary share offenngs (transfer of ownership) may reflect differences in the 
institutional and legal environment between UK and the contmental European countries, 
as argued by La Porta et a! (1997). 
Funds collected are not significantly different between combined offenngs and 
secondary share offermgs, although combmed offerings collect both larger pnmary 
funds and total funds than primary share offermgs. This may suggest that finns 
conducting primary share offermgs have less ability to uhhse the market device. 
Interestingly, total shares offered relative to total shares outstandmg after the !PO do not 
differ sigmficantly across groups. This may mdicate an 'optimal !PO s1ze' for !PO finns, 
due to an optimal dispersion of ownership base 
Evidently, finns that issue primary shares only are sigmficantly younger and smaller 
41 There were 438 non-financial UK IPOs hsted on the LSE from 01/01/1998 to 01/01/2004, conSlstmg of 337 
pnmary share offenngs, 96 combmed offermgs, and 5 secondary share offermgs 
44 Pnmary share offenng refers to an tssue m whtch only pnmary shares (1 e new shares) are offered Secondary 
share offenng refers to an Jssue m whtch only secondary shares (1 e extstmg shares) are offered Combmed otfenng 
refers to an tssue m wh1ch both pnmary and secondary shares are offered 
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than the other two groups while firms that conduct combined offerings have 
sigmficantly htgher growth opportunities (PVRE) than firms offering primary shares 
only In addttlon, as compared to the combined offerings, primary share offerings have 
weaker profitability (ROA) yet better abtlity to meet interest payments on outstandmg 
debt (IN CO V) This may suggest dtfferent causes of financial constramts for the two 
groups - weaker internal cash generation for younger and smaller firms in contrast to 
the need to alleviate debt interest payments for older and larger firms. Secondary share 
offerings show much higher profitabthty and much less leverage, compared with the 
other two groups 45 • The very low leverage level tmplies that rmsmg finance is not the 
reason of floatatwn for the firms that only sell extsting shares in thetr IPOs On the 
other hand, divesting and exit by the extstmg shareholders can be the real motives 
These firms are in late stage of theu life cycle and are hkely to have established 
busmess Sellmg out by the msiders (1 e the existmg shareholders) can be a bad news 
However, strong profitabthty may be mterpreted by the market as a positive stgnal, 
whtch may promote the sales This is also consistent wtth the hypothesis that offermg 
pnmary shares ts associated wtth financial constraints. 
45 The ms1gmficant p-value m1ght be caused by small sample Size for the secondary-share-offermg group (n=2) This 
hmJtatiOn can hardly be avmded as m total there are only five secondary share offermgs dunng the sample penod 
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Table 6.3 Summary Statistics for the Sub-samples Sorted according to the Choice ofiPO Structure 
Pnmary Share Offermg Combmed Offermg Secondary 
(PSO) (CO) ~hare Offermg 
(SSO) 
Variable 
n=ll4 n=88 n=2 
W1lcoxon W1lcoxon W1lcoxon 
Mean RST RST Mean RST Mean 
(PSO-CO) (PSO-SSO) (CO-S SO) 
/PO STRUCTURE 
Pnmary Funds (£'000) 6318 15 0 0000 0 0156 19150 55 0 0160 0 
Secondary Funds (£'000) 0 0 0000 0 0000 14186 37 0 8054 6983 41 
!PO Funds (£'000) 6318 15 0 0000 0 5385 33349 71 0 1469 6983 41 
Pnmary S1ze 0 3219 0 0004 0 0156 0 2258 0 0160 0 
Secondary S1ze 0 0 0000 0 0000 0 1181 0 0248 0 3683 
IPO Size 0 3219 0.1500 0.3845 0 3445 0 3961 0 3683 
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
F1rmAge 902 0 0001 0 0387 17.01 0.0705 81 5 
lncorpora!ton Age 2 01 0 0055 0 3496 3 55 0 4933 8 63 
Total Assets (£'000) 3920 01 0 0000 00200 21587 91 0 3757 17963 5 
Total Sales (£'000) 4183 35 0 0000 0 0664 24608 10 04548 43942 
ROA -0 4411 0 0000 0 1654 -0 0186 0 5432 0 2033 
LEV 0 4040 0 5155 0.1629 0 3186 0 0883 0 0111 
DTMIX 0 3759 0 8371 0 7977 0 3490 0 8223 0 3561 
DTMIX ST 0 2474 07131 0 7953 0.1893 0 7621 0 3561 
DTMIX_LT 0 1285 0 1374 0 3821 0 1894 0 2716 0 
IN COV 0 1767 0 0000 0 8376 0 3004 0 2506 0 0048 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Blockholders before IPO 3 99 0 1356 0.3702 4 54 0 2150 2 
Blockholders after IPO 4 95 0 7225 0 9915 4 56 0 9777 45 
Directors before IPO 2 27 0 1975 0 4821 2 51 0 5849 3 
Directors after !PO 218 0.9425 0 5915 2 14 0 6310 I 5 
CONCI (%) 0 7422 0 3151 0 7436 0 7107 I 0000 0 7011 
CONC2 (%) 0.5723 0.1051 0 6844 0.5219 0 6030 0 6475 
DHI (%) 0 5164 0 6794 04547 0 4977 0 4193 0 3315 
DH2(%) 0 3464 0 8708 0 7644 0 3367 0 8159 0 2917 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES 
PVRE 92076 0 0000 0 5310 10 6370 0 0742 4 9311 
Pnmary (Secondary) Funds IS the fihng offer pnce t1mes the number ofpnmary (secondary) shares !PO Funds 1s the filmg 
offer pnce t1mes the number of total !PO shares Pnmary Stze (Secondary Stze) ts the ratio of the number ofpnmary shares 
(secondary shares) to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO !PO Stze ts the ratto of the number of total !PO 
shares to the number of total shares outstandmg after IPO Pnmary ProportiOn ts the ratto of the number ofpnmary shares to 
the number of total IPO shares Fmn Age ts the age smce the firm started bus mess IncorporatiOn Age ts the age smce the 
firm mcorporated ROA ts EBITDA (eammgs before mterest, tax, deprectatJOn and amorttzat10n) over total assets LEV ts 
total debt over total assets DTMIX ts bank debt over total debt DTMIX_ST (DTMIX_LT) ts short-tenn (long-term) bank 
loan over total debt INCOV ts mterest expense over EBIT (earnmgs before mterest and tax), and values below zero are 
truncated at zero Blockholders (Dtrectors) Before (After) !PO ts the number of blockholders (dtrectors) whose ownershtp 
exceeds 3% before (after) !PO CONCI (CONC2) ts the percentage of shareholdmgs that blockholders own before (after) 
!PO DHI (DH2) IS the percentage of shareholdmgs that dtrectors (wtth ownershtp exceedmg 3%) own before (after) !PO 
PYRE ts the log present value of expected rest dual eammgs, calculated as log value of the dtfference between the market 
value of eqUity and the book value of equtty, where values below zero are truncated at zero For the pnmary share offermg 
subsample, followmg the mean, they are the p-values of the Wtlcoxon rank sum tests for (I) the pnmary share offermg and 
the combmed offermg subsamples, and (2) the pnmary share offenng and the secondary share offenng subsamples For the 
combtned offermg subsample, followmg the mean, they are the p-values of the WIIcoxon rank sum tests for the combmed 
offermg and the secondary share offenng subsarnples 
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6.4 Determinants of the Choice ofiPO Structure 
6.4.1 The Model and Methodology 
When an IPO decisiOn IS made, the Issuer first chooses the type of share to be offered, 
and then decide the size of the different types of share. Therefore, I first investigate the 
determinmg factors that dnve a firm's choice of IPO structure. On the basiS of the 
discusswn m section 6 2 3, It is expected that older and larger firms, with higher growth 
opportunities and m better financial shape, are more likely to add secondary shares to 
their offermgs in order to meet the liqUidation needs of some shareholders, and that the 
offerings are likely to be conducted at a higher market return I now test the validity of 
these predictions 
The choice of !PO structure is among three options: pnmary share offering, secondary 
share offering and combined offering The three options are not ordered from 'less' to 
'more', but are disjomt and cover all possible choices In this case, the MNL model -
multmomial logit model (Luce 1959) offers an Ideal approach to accessmg the 
determmants of the choice of!PO structure 
The utility function for firm 1 to choose !PO structure; (1=1, 2, 3) is given by: 
(6 1) 
Firm 1 will choose IPO structure 1 on! y if It offers the highest level of utility of all the 
three types of !PO structure. Let Chorce, represent a random vanable whose value 
indicates the chmce of firm i, the probability that firm i will choose !PO structure m 
(m=1, 2, 3) is given by. 
Pr(Chorce, =m)= Pr(U,m > U,1 ) , forr1, 2, 3 and 1 *m (6 2) 
Therefore, 
Pr(Chorce, =m)= Pr(£,1 - <,m < U,m- U,1 ) , for;=1, 2, 3 and 1 *-m (6 3) 
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According to McFadden (1973), if the error terms ~:,1 are assumed to be 1 1 d with 
Weibull distribution46 F(~:,1 ) = exp[exp( -ElJ )J, then 
(6 4) 
Here, Cho!ce, =m (m= I, 2, 3) for each !PO firm 1 (1=!, .. , 204) is defined as 
Cho!ce, = 1 if firm 1 chooses a pnmary share offering, Cho!ce, = 2 if firm 1 chooses 
a secondary share offering, and Cho!ce, = 3 1f firm i chooses a combined offering I 
use combined offenng as the control group and normalise Cholce, = 3 to have a zero 
coefficient. Thus I measure the relative mfluence of a set of regressors X on primary 
share offerings or secondary share offerings w1th respect to a common base group of 
combined offerings. 
Therefore, the probability for the choice m of the firm 1 in the MNL model1s given by. 
and 
P [eh l exp ex: /Jm) r O!Ce1 = m = "'' ( n ) l+LJ=l exp xiPJ , for m=!, 2 (6 5) 
1 
Pr[Cho!ce, =m] = 1 "'' ( n) , for m=3 (6 6) +t..J=l exp xi~J 
Consequently, the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of Cho!ce, = 1 or 
Cho!ce, = 2 to that of the base outcome Cho!ce, = 3 IS: 
(
Pr(Cho!ce ,=m)) _ ' _ ...,N _ 
In Pr(Chotce,=3) - x,Pm- ,l..r=1PmrX,, , m-1, 2 (6 7) 
where N denotes the number of explanatory variables. The coefficients Pr estimate the 
effects of the explanatory variables x, on the log-ratio of the probability bemg in the 
target group m (m=l, 2) relative to the base group m=3 A positive (negative) coefficient 
implies an increase of the probability ratio as x increases (decreases). 
46 Yellott (1977) demonstrated that for any number of alternatives which satisfy Luce's ( 1959) chmce rule, WeJbull 
d1stnbut10n IS the only distnbutJon that ytelds logistiC form 
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I include ten explanatory variables (N=lO): AGE (x1) and TA (x2 ) measure the stage in 
the life cycle, LEV (x3) and ROA (x4 ) measure financial conditwns, DHI (x5 ) and DH2 
(x6) measure managerial control, PVRE (x7) measures growth opportunities, and 
MKTRT (x8) captures market timmg e1Tects. In addition, two dummies are added: 
INDM (x9 ) captures industry difference (impact of technology) and ACQDM (x10) 
distinguishes acquisition financing from general financing purposes. 
Table 6.4 Definitions of Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory Abbr Definition 
Variable 
Firm age AGE ln(age since the firm started business until !PO) 
Total assets (firm size) TA ln(total assets) 
Leverage LEV (total debt)/( total assets) 
Profitability ROA EBITDA/(total assets) 
Managerial control DHl percentage of shareholdings that directors own before IPO (ownership>3%) before !PO 
Managerial control DH2 percentage of shareholdings that directors own 
after !PO (ownership>3%) immediately after !PO 
Growth opportum!les PVRE ln(present value of expected residual eammgs) 
Market return MKTRT the annual market return m 12 months precedmg the !PO 
Industry dummy INDM equals I If the !PO firm belongs to ICT mdustry, 
equals 0 otherwise 
Acqmsitwn dummy ACQDM Equals I If the IPO is related to acqms1tion financing, equals 0 otherwise 
The MNL model is usually estimated by maximum likelihood. Greene (2000) suggested 
several measures for the goodness-of-fit of the model. The basic cntenon IS the 
maximised value of the log-likelihood function Subsequently, the statistical test on the 
hypothesis that all the slopes in the model are zero (i.e. companng the full model with 
an mtercept only model) should be reported (x2) Veall and Zimmerman (1996) 
surveyed pseudo-R 2 measures, and argued that McFadden (1973) 47 's measure is 
worthwhile The higher the pseudo-R2value, the better is the fit of the model (Greene, 
47 2 1-lnL 1n pseudo- R = - 1 - (McFadden, 1973), where L1, denotes the mruom1sed log-hkehhood value for the fitted nL0 
model, L0 denotes the maximised log-hkehhood value for the tntercept-only model 
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2000). In general, 1t is necessary to report both diagnostics- x2 and pseudo-R2• 
For convenience of mterpretation, the relative risk ratios (RRRs) are usually computed 
in additiOn to the estimated coefficients. RRRs are the exponentiated coefficients 
obtained by takmg exponential of equatiOn 6.7. The RRR of explanatory variable Xr 
measures the change of the probability of bemg in group m (m =I, 2) relative to the 
probability of being m the base group for a one umt change m the determming variables 
Xr, given that the other variables are held constant The calculation of the RRR of x, 
for a one unit change from value a to value (a+ I) is shown as follows: 
?r(Cho1ce ,=mlx,=a+l) I 
/Pr(Cho1ce ,=3lx,=a+l) 
RRRmr = --;P"'r'"(C"'h-o"'lc-e,---m"Tix-,---a')!.,--------., m=l, 2 
/Pr(Chotce 1=3lxr=a) 
(6.8) 
Because the RRRs are the exponential transformation of the estimated coefficients, the 
RRR is equal to unity 1f the coefficient equals zero, greater than unity if the coefficient 
is positive and less than unity 1f the coefficient JS negative. The RRR indicates the 
directwn of the change in the probability ratio as the x change, and g1ves a direct 
estimate of the sensitivity of the probability ratio to the change in the x the closer to 
one the RRR, the less sensitive IS the probability ratw to the change. 
The marginal effects on the probabilities of the different outcomes of a unit change in 
the value of the explanatory variables are not straightforward in the MNL model. They 
cannot be mferred either from the s1gns of the Pr or from the RRRs This 1s because, m 
the MNL model, a change in the value of an explanatory varmble for firm 1 affects the 
firm's probability of every possible chmce (m =I, 2, 3) and whether Pr(Chorce, =m) 
m creases or decreases depends on what happens to the probabilities of the other choices 
Thus, the margmal effect can change sign dependmg on where the explanatory variable 
is being evaluated. An alternative strategy is to compare the predicted probabilities 
before and after a unit change in one explanatory variable with the values of the other 
variables being unchanged48• This method IS especially useful for evaluating the impact 
48 One way to keep the value of the other van abies unchanged while changes to the value of a van able are bemg 
analysed 1s to set the values of the other varmbles to the1r mean values 
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of a change in a dummy variable on the probability of the choices 
6.4.2 The Results 
The estimated coefficients and RRR of the MNL model are reported in Table 6.5 Panel 
A. Inside the parentheses under the parameters are the robust standard errors of the 
estimated coefficients and RRRs. The margmal effects are also computed for the MNL 
and reported in Panel B The results are generally very satisfactory The estimates show 
that the stage of a firms' hfe cycle (AGE, TA), Leverage (LEY), growth opportumties 
(PYRE), market timmg (MKTRT), ICT mdustry (INDM), and acquisition financmg 
(ACQDM) all have distinctive effects on the choice ofiPO structure. 
In response to a ceterzs parzbus increase in firm age or firm size, the probability ratio of 
a primary share offering decreases whereas that of a secondary share offering increases. 
The estimated RRRs of AGE and TA confirm that the probability ratio of a primary 
share offenng and that of a secondary share offenng are sensitive to a change in AGE or 
TA. A small increase in the value of AGE (TA) is related to 11 68% (9 91 %) decrease m 
the probability of a primary share offenng whereas 11.68% (9.91 %) mcrease m the 
probability of a combmed offenng for the 'average firm' (i e. a firm with average values 
for all the other variables). Overall, these relatiOns suggest that much younger and 
smaller IPO firms are hkely to Issue pnmary shares only whereas the oldest and largest 
firms tend to Issue secondary shares only rather than combined shares. 
PYRE and MKTRT are both negatively signed for primary share offering, sigmficant at 
0.1% level for MKTRT yet at only I 0% level for PYRE. These suggest that higher 
growth prospects would mcrease the probability that firms will include secondary 
shares, and that a combmed offering is hkely to be conducted at a relatively higher 
market return The marginal effect on the probability of a primary share offering (a 
combmed offenng) of a smaller change in MKTRT is as high as -132.18% (132 18%) 
The RRRs of MKTRT are far from I. There results suggest that market return has a 
very strong impact on the choice of !PO structure. The combmed results of PYRE and 
MKTRT indicate that, compared to growth prospects, market return IS much more 
cntical for firms when they decide theu !PO structure 
I09 
Overall, these results suggest that firms with h1gher growth prospects are more likely to 
utilise !PO as an exit device In particular, the selling shareholders tend to time the 
offering at a h1gher market return in order to maximise the proceeds from divestment. 
LEV is also correctly signed but is only significant at I 0% for pnmary share offerings 
In short, the results prov1de supportive evidence for the pred1ctions Older and larger 
firms w1th better growth prospects are more likely to exploit ex1t opportunities m theu 
IPOs (by adding secondary shares), especially when market returns are higher. This is 
because these firms have substantial remvestment opportumties with high mtrinsic 
value. They also have mformational advantages, smce more firm-spec1fic information 
becomes publicly avmlable as firms grow mature This in return reduces informatwn 
production costs and alleviates adverse selectiOn problems These advantages warrant 
sufficient momtoring cap1tal in the stock market. The momtoring cap1tal (passive 
monitors) prov1des the selling shareholders (act1ve momtors) with an ex1t mechanism 
The two dummy variables, INDM and ACQDM are both significant but show d1fferent 
s1gns of coefficients for primary share offermg and secondary share offering The RRRs 
of the two indicators are far from I, implying that the probability ratios are sensitive to 
both dummy variables The margmal effects of the two are quantitatively similar The 
results of INDM ind1cate that shareholders of ICT firms are more hkely to exploit exit 
opportumties dunng their !PO. Th1s may also reflect the market conditions over the 
smnple penod when the ICT mdustry was in favour with mvestors, implymg that more 
monitonng capital available in the market for the ICT sector. Conversely, the ACQDM 
exerts a positive effect on the probability ratiO of primary share offering but a negative 
mfluence on that of secondary share offermg, suggestmg that the shareholders of the 
firms mvolved in acqms1tion financmg are less likely to exit from the firms m the IPOs 
It 1s also noticeable that the coefficients have large values for secondary share offenng49• 
This 1s caused by the small smnple s1ze of secondary share offenngs - there were only a 
total of five secondary share offenngs during the sample period and two of these were 
mcluded in the smnple Estimating the choice of !PO structure taken together the 
combined offerings and secondary share offenngs m a binary log1t model, the 
conclusions hold (shown m Table 6.6) 
49 When the RRR for secondary share offermg IS extremely large, the value JS not reported 
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Table 6.5 Determinants of the Choice of IPO Structure (MNL Model, n=204) 
Panel A: Tlte parameter estimates & relative risk ratios (or tlte multinomiallogit model (MNL) 
V . bl PSO- Pnmary Share Offermg (n-114) SSO-Secondary Share Offermg (n-2) arta e 
Parameter Esttmate RRR Parameter Esttmate RRR 
Intercept 11 6247** -54 1762*** 
(3 6350) (6 3930) 
AGE -0 4832* 0 6168* 18 0412*** ••• 
(0 1912) (0 1179) (0 5664) 
TA -0 4098* 0 6638* 11 7508*** ••• 
(0 1601) (0 1063) (0 4691) 
LEV 0 5794# I 7851# -567 6869*** 0 0000*** 
(03441) (0 6142) (14 4627) (0 0000) 
ROA -0 2359 07898 0 2181 I 2438 
(0 2954) (0 2333) (2 4207) (30107) 
DHI -2 1909 0 1118 -72 5885*** 0 0000*** 
(I 3972) (0 1562) (2 2223) (0 0000) 
DH2 2 7908 16 2933 91 2785*** ••• 
(I 8807) (30 6425) (3 2942) 
PYRE -0 7606# 0 4674# -12 1947*** 0 0000*** 
(0 4073) (0 1904) (0 5236) (0 0000) 
MKTRT -5 4691*** 0 0042*** -154 2656*** 0 0000*** 
(I 4270) (0 0060) (5 9775) (0 0000) 
INDM -0 9792* 0 3756* 3 8639* 47 6522* 
(0 4275) (0 1606) (I 5755) (75 0757) 
ACQDM I 2090** 3 3502** -61 4982*** 0 0000*** 
(0 4140) (I 3869) (I 7284) (0 0000) 
Wald Cht-sq 9680 12 Prob> Cht-sq 00000 
Pseudo R-sq 42 31% Log Pseudo-hkehhood -83 0682 
Panel B: Marginal effects a(ler tlte MNL 
Vanable rPr(PSO)=O 5912 y=Pr(CO)=O 4088 y=Pr(SSO)=O 0000 X 
dy/dx dy/dx dy/dx 
AGE -01168* 01168* 00000 18617 
(0 0455) (0 0455) (0) 
TA -0 0991* 0 0991 * 0 0000 8 0799 
~~~ ~~~ ® 
LEV 0 1400# -0 1400# 0 0 3656 
(0 0829) (0 0829) (0) 
ROA -0 0570 0 0570 0 0000 -0 2449 
(0 0709) (0 0709) (0) 
DHI -0 5295 0 5295 0 0 5078 
(0 3324) (0 3324) (0) 
DH2 0 6745 -0 6745 0 0000 0 3431 
(0 4484) (0 4484) (0) 
PYRE -0 1838# 0 1838# 0 9 8065 
(0 0968) (0 0968) (0) 
MKTRT -1 3218*** I 3218*** 0 0 0204 
(0 3457) (0 3457) (0) 
INDM -0 2388* 0 2388* 0 0000 0 2769 
(0 1015) (0 1015) (0) 
ACQDM 0 2878** -0 2878** 0 0000 0 5641 
(00941) (00941) (0) 
CO - combmed offenng (n-88) IS the base outcome Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses In Panel 
~ Y..hen the RRR IS extremely large, the value JS not reported The last column of Panel 8 (X) reports the mean values 
of the vanables All vanables use the value at the time ofiPO AGE IS the log value of firm age that IS the age smce the 
firms started busmess until the IPO year TA IS the log value of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS 
EBITDA (eammgs before mterest, tax, deprec1at10n and amortizatiOn) over total assets DHI (DH2) JS the percentage 
of shareholdmgs that dtrectors (wtth ownershtp exceedmg 3%) own before (after) IPO PYRE ts the log present value 
of expected restdual eammgs, calculated as the log value of the difference between the market value of eqUity and the 
book value of equity, where values below zero are truncated at zero MKTRT IS the annual market return m 12 months 
precedmg the !PO, calculated USing the FTSE All Share Index INDM equals I tfthe !PO firm belongs to ICT mduslry 
ACQDM equals 1 tfthe IPO ts related to acqutstt!On financmg # p<O 1, * p<O 05, ** p<O 01, * .. p<O 001 
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Table 6.6 Determinants of the Choice of IPO Structure (Binary Logit Model, n=204) 
Margmal Effects after the Log1t 
Yanable 
Pnmary Share Offenng (n=114) y=Pr(Pnmary Share Offerzng) 
=0 5748 
Parameter Estimate Odds Ratto dy/dx X 
Intercept 9 2962** 
(2 7416) 
AGE -0 5891** 0 5548** -0.1440** I 8617 
(0 2168) (0 1203) (0 0525) 
TA -0 4614** 0 6304** -0 1128** 8 0799 
(0 1639) (0 I 034) (0 0406) 
LEY 0 6689* 1.9522* 0 1635* 0 3656 
(0 3413) (0 6663) (0 0835) 
ROA -0 1342 0 8744 -0 0328 -0 2449 
(0 2574) (0.2251) (0 0628) 
OHI -1.3840 0 2506 -0 3383 0 5078 
(I 3419) (0 3362) (0 3263) 
DH2 2 1518 8 6002 0 5259 0 3431 
(1.7843) (15 3449) (0 4340) 
PYRE -0 4849 0 6158 -0 1185 9 8065 
(0 3131) (0 1928) (0 0760) 
MKTRT -5 833*** 0 0029*** -I 4256*** 00204 
(I 5381) (0.0045) (0 3804) 
INDM -1.0017* 0 3673* -0 2450* 02769 
(0 4282) (0.1572) (0 1012) 
ACQDM 1.1859** 3 2738** 0 2848** 0 5641 
(0 3955) (I 2946) (0 0906) 
Wald Ch1-sq 43 93 Prob> Ch1-sq 0 0000 
Pseudo R-sq 3496% Log Pseudo-hkehhood -87 4340 
Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses The last column (X) reports the mean values of the vanables 
All vanables use the value at the t1me of !PO AGE 1s the log value of firm age that 1s the age smce the firms 
started busmess until the !PO year TA IS the log value of total assets LEV 1s total debt over total assets ROA 
1s EBITDA (eammgs before mterest, tax, deprecJatJOn and amort1zatwn) over total assets DHJ (DH2) IS the 
percentage of shareholdmgs that d1rectors (w1th ownership exceedmg 3%) own before (after) !PO PYRE 1s 
the log present value of expected res1dual eammgs, calculated as the Jog value of the d1fference between the 
market value of eqmty and the book value of eqmty, where values below zero are truncated at zero MKTRT IS 
the annual market return m 12 months precedmg the !PO, calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index INDM 
equals I 1f the !PO firm belongs to JCT mdustry ACQDM equals I 1f the !PO 1s related to acqms1t1on 
financmg # p<O I, * p<O 05, ** p<O 0 I, * * * p<O 00 I 
6.5 Determinants of Primary Size, Secondary Size, and Proportion 
In thts section, I conduct regression analyses to exanune the determinants of the stze of 
the respective issues: pnmary shares (Primary Size), secondary shares (Secondary Size), 
and the proportwn of pnmary shares mcluded in an !PO (Proportion). Ftrst, I estimate 
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OLS models to identify the determinants of these Sizes. The sizes of pnmary and 
secondary shares might be simultaneously determined Therefore, I then estimate 2SLS 
models for the Primary Size and Secondary Size, controllmg for this simultaneity. 
Table 6.7 Definitions of the 'Sizes' 
Dependent Variable Definition 
Pnmary Size The ratio of the number ofpnmary shares to the number of 
total shares outstanding after IPO 
Secondary S1ze The ratio of the number of secondary shares to the number 
of total shares outstanding after IPO. 
Proportion The ratio of the number ofpnmary shares to the number of 
total IPO shares. 
6.5.1 The OLS Models and the Results 
6.5.1.1 The Models 
Primary Size 
On the basis of the discussion m section 6.2 I, it IS expected a positive relation between 
Pnmary Size and LEV, DTMIX, INCOV, DH, MKTRT but a negative relation between 
Pnmary Size and ROA and possibly AGE and SIZE. To further indentify the Impact of 
the concentratiOn of managerial ownership and control on the size of pnmary share, I 
add a duector dummy (DHDM) that equals I If the directors' shareholdmgs are above 
50% Immediately before the IPO takes place. An AIM dummy (AIM) IS added to 
d1stmgmsh the IPOs hsted on the AIM from those listed on the Main Market AGE, 
DTMIX and INCOV were dropped due to insignificance (Wald, F, and t- tests were 
used to elimmate msigmficant variables) Thus, the model of the size of primary share 
IS given by: 
Model!: 
Pnmary_Size = f({31SIZE + {32 LEV + f33ROA + {34DH1 + f3sDH2 + f35DHDM + 
{37MKTRT + {38AIM) (6.9) 
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Secondary Size 
I turn next to the determmants of Secondary Size On the basis of the discussion m 
section 6.2.2, It IS expected a negative relatiOn between Secondary Size and LEV, 
DTMIX, INCOV, DH, MKTRT but a positive relation between Secondary S1ze and 
ROA, AGE and SIZE. However, DTMIX was insigmficant, but DTMIX_LT (long-term 
bank loan over total assets) showed s1gmficant. An AIM dummy (AIM) is added to 
d1stmgmsh the IPOs hsted on the AIM from those listed on the Main Market. Thus, the 
model of the size of secondary share is given by: 
Model2 
Secondary_Stze = f(P1AGE + f]zSIZE + P3LEV + P4ROA + PsDTMIX_LT + 
P6INCOV + P7DH1 + P8 DHZ + P9MKTRT + P10 AIM) (6.10) 
Proportion 
To further Identify the determmants of a trade-off between pnmary and secondary 
shares, a ProportiOn equation IS estimated 
Model3: 
Proportwn = f(P1AGE + PzSIZE + P3LEV + P4DTMIX + PslNCOV + P6DH1 + 
P7DHZ + PsMKTRT + P9INDM + P1oACQDM + PuAIM) (6.11) 
EstimatiOn for these models can use the OLS estimator. Under the assumptiOn of liD 
errors, the OLS estimator is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) However, a 
typical feature of the cross-sectiOnal dataset at firm level Is that the error term is likely 
to be heteroskedastic (1 e. non-liD errors) To detect heteroskedastic1ty, one can use the 
White test, the Breusch-Pagan test (BP test) and the Cameron & Tnvedi's 
decomposition of !M test. In the presence of heteroskedasticity problems, the statistical 
mference should be based on heteroskedastic robust standard errors. White correction 
for the standard errors is a popular way to control for heteroskedastic1ty 
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6.5.1.2 The Results 
The results for Pnmary Size, Secondary Size, and Proportwn are respectively presented 
in Table 6.8, 6 9 and 6.1 0. The standard errors reported are heteroskedasticlty-consistent, 
using White's correction. 
Primary Size 
In general, the results confirm the earlier predictions Financial constraints are an 
important force dnving the size of primary share. More highly leveraged firms issue 
more primary shares (as indicated by the significant and positively signed coefficient 
for leverage (LEV)), profitability (ROA) IS also negatively signed, as expected, 
although 1t is not statistically s1gmficant. Dependence on bank borrowmgs (DTMIX) 
and ability to meet interest payment on outstandmg debt (INCOV) do not explam 
Primary S1ze, suggestmg that It is the total borrowing capacity rather than constramts on 
bank borrowing that matters. Firm age and size also appear to have little Impact, 
mdicatmg that adverse selectiOn costs play little role m shapmg the size of primary 
share. 
Corporate governance (managenal ownership and control) 50 IS also an Important 
determmant of Primary Size Higher duector shareholdmgs (DHI) and director 
shareholdmgs greater than 50% before the !PO (DHDM) are associated with a larger 
size of primary shares, reflecting management's w!llmgness to retain control. Firms 
with more concentrated managenal shareholdings are able to issue more primary shares 
because the control of management is less likely to be diluted after !PO, even though 
the ownership becomes more diverse (as mdiCated by negatively signed DH2) 
Market return (MKTRT) has a negative sign, suggestmg that a larger increase m market 
pnces is correlated with a smaller size of pnmary shares. When I estimate equation 6.5 
usmg (i) the primary offenng subsample and (n) the subsample of the offenngs that 
mclude secondary shares, MKTRT IS statistically non-significant m the first regression 
50 Ownership concentration as measured by the percentage of shareholdmgs that blockholders own before (after) 
!PO (CONCI, CONC2) IS not statJstJcally s1gmficant 
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but significant and negatively s1gned m the second regression 
This raises the question as to why MKTRT 1s negatively signed, especially for IPOs that 
include secondary shares Perhaps when the market return IS relatively high the costs of 
rmsmg financing are also higher On the other hand, the increased stock pnces enable 
the firm to offer a smaller number of shares for the same amount of funds. As a result, it 
1s observed as a negative correlation between market return and the size of pnmary 
shares for the entue sample and for the subsaJnple of the offenngs that include 
secondary shares. Firms that offer only pnmary shares tend to be smaller and nskier, 
and consequently their stock prices are less responsive to mcreases in market prices. 
Therefore they m1ght have to offer a similar number of shares even when the market 
pnce 1s h1gh For this reason, MKTRT is not s1gmficant for the subsaJnple of primary 
share offenngs. 
In additiOn, firms listed on the AIM market seem to make larger pnmary share 1ssues 
(AIM dummy), indJCatmg stronger financmg needs for smaller growth firms 
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Table 6.8 Determinants ofPrima!r Size (Model Q 
The Entire Sample Pnmary Share The Offenngs that Vanable (n=204) Offenngs (n=ll4) Include Secondary Shares {n=90} 
Intercept 0 2386*** 0 2676*** 0 2022*** 
(0 0368) (0 0526) (0 0489) 
SIZE -0 0009 0 0020 -0 0001 
(0 0034) (0 0047) (0 0048) 
LEV 0.0509** 0.0342*** 0 I 144*** 
(0 0164) (0 0094) (0 0278) 
ROA -0 0047 -0 0042 -0 0075 
(0 0050) (0 0056) (00176) 
OH! 0 4643*** 0 4912*** 0 2765* 
(0.0823) (0 lOll) (0.1095) 
OH2 -0 8816*** -0 9570*** -0 5293*** 
(00921) (0 0973) (0 1454) 
OHOM 0 0850** 0 1012* 0 0515 
(0 0318) (0 0470) (0 0405) 
MKTRT -0.1541* -0 044 I -02801* 
(0 0764) (0 li 96) (0 li 88) 
AIM 0.0613** 0 0463 0 0330 
(0 0230) (0 0378) (0 0294) 
F-test· all coeffic1ents=O 0 0000 0 0000 0 0000 
Adjusted R-sq 0.5261 0 5986 0 4126 
RootMSE 0 1271 0 1298 0.1087 
Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses All vanables use the value at the t1me of !PO 
Pnmary S1ze IS the ratiO of the number of pnmary shares (secondary shares) to the number of total 
shares outstandmg after !PO SIZE IS the log value of total sales LEV IS total debt over total assets 
ROA IS EBITOA (eammgs before interest, tax, depreciatiOn and amort1zatwn) over total assets OH I 
(OH2) IS the percentage of shareholdmgs that directors (with ownership exceedmg 3%) own before 
(after) !PO OHOM equals I if OH! IS above 50% MKTRT IS the annual market return m 12 
months precedmg the !PO, calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index. AIM equals I 1fthe !PO firm 
hsts on the AIM market. The equation of Pnmary Size IS estimated separately usmg the entire 
sample, the subsample of IPOs that mc!ude only pnmary shares, and the subsample of IPOs that 
mclude also secondary shares.# p<O.l, * p<O 05, •• p<O 01, ••• p<O 001 
Secondary Size 
All the variables associated with financial constramts (LEV, DTMIX_LT, INCOV) are 
significant and negatively correlated with Secondary S1ze, which confirms that firms in 
a better financial pos1t10n sell more old shares hold by ongmal shareholders In addition, 
firm age and size are both sigmficant and positively signed. These all lend support to 
the hypothesis that adverse selectiOn costs are Important in determming the size of 
shares divested m IPOs. Thus adverse selectiOn problems are reduced when 
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firm-specific informatiOn accumulated in the pubhc domam favours !PO firms, 
enabling the selling shareholders to divest more by utilising the market ROA is 
positively signed, as expected, but not statistically sigmficant. 
Managerial control51 also has some influence on Secondary S1ze, but it is not as 
sigmficant as in the Primary Size equation Smaller (larger) director shareholdmgs 
1mmedmtely before (after) the !PO are related to larger size of secondary shares sold. 
This prov1des ev1dence m support of Zingales (1995). For a firm with h1gher managenal 
concentratiOn there IS a potential nsk that the director-shareholders' pnvate benefit of 
control IS affected by the transfer of a large number of shares to public mvestors, so 
they may lim1t the number of shares sold. On the other hand, for firms less controlled 
by management, non-manager shareholders are able to sell a larger proportion of the1r 
holdmgs. However, by making the share allocation contmgent on public mvestors, 
management can gain a higher proportion of ownership and control rights after !PO. So 
m both cases, management can ensure that the1r control w1ll not be jeopardised and may 
even be enhanced after !PO, which can mcrease the proceeds from the eventual sale of 
the control rights of the firm. 
In contrast to the Pnmary Size equation, MKTRT is Significant and positively s1gned. 
However, when I drop IPOs that offered primary shares only, MKTRT is not s1gnificant 
This seems to suggest that IPOs wh1ch mclude secondary shares are offered at a h1gher 
market return than for pnmary share offerings. However, there 1s no s1gnificant relatiOn 
between MKTRT and Secondary S1ze for firms that 1ssue secondary shares 
Furthermore, the results show that firms floated on AIM offer fewer secondary shares 
Th1s is not surprismg, as smaller and riskier firms are less able to d1vest shares at an 
!PO. 
51 Ownership concentration as measured by the percentage ofshareholdmgs that blockholders own before (after) 
IPO (CONCI, CONC2) IS not statiStically SJgmficant 
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Table 6.9 Determinants of Secondary Size (Model 2) 
Vanable 
Intercept 
AGE 
SIZE 
LEV 
ROA 
OTMIX_LT 
!NCO V 
OH! 
OH2 
MKTRT 
AIM 
F-test. all coeffic1ents=O 
AdJusted R-sq 
Root MSE 
The Entire Sample 
(n=204) 
0 0521. 
(0 0225) 
0 0137** 
(0 0049) 
0 0069*** 
(0 0019) 
-00100# 
(0 0059) 
0 0001 
(0 0024) 
-0 0477** 
(0 0144) 
-0 0156*** 
(0 0042) 
-0 0388# 
(0 0202) 
0 0210 
(0.031 I) 
0 1184* 
(0 0498) 
-0.0684*** 
(0 0155) 
0 0000 
0 3787 
0.0696 
The Offermgs that Include 
Secondary Shares (n=90) 
0 0517 
(0 0352) 
0 0250* 
(00113) 
0 0102** 
(0 0029) 
-0 0225 
(0 0144) 
0 0129 
(00114) 
-0 0595** 
(0 01 74) 
-0 0387** 
(00134) 
-0 1290* 
(0 0540) 
0 I 133 
(0 0874) 
0 0499 
(0 0958) 
-0 0476* 
(00182) 
0 0000 
0 3786 
0 0783 
Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses All variables use the value at the time of !PO. 
Secondary S1ze is the ratio of the number of secondary shares to the number of total shares 
outstandmg after !PO AGE IS the log value of firm age that IS the age since the firms started 
busmess until the !PO year. SIZE IS the log value of total sales LEV IS total debt over total assets 
ROA is EBITOA (earnmgs before mterest, tax, depreciation and amortizatiOn) over total assets 
OTMIX_LT IS long-term bank loan over total debt. INCOV IS mterest expense over EBIT (earnings 
before mterest and tax), and values below zero are truncated at zero OH! (OH2) IS the percentage 
of shareholdmgs that directors (with ownership exceeding 3%) own before (after) !PO MKTRT IS 
the annual market return m I 2 months precedmg the !PO, calculated using the FTSE All Share Index 
AIM equals I If the !PO firm hsts on the AIM market. The equation of Secondary S1ze IS estimated 
separately usmg the entire sample, the subsample of IPOs that m elude only pnmary shares, and the 
subsample of!POs that mclude also secondary shares.# p<O I,* p<O 05, ** p<O 01, *** p<O.OOJ 
Proportion 
The results for ProportiOn suggest that smaller, younger firms and firms which are more 
dependent on bank borrowmg and less able to meet interest payments, mclude a larger 
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proportion of primary shares m their IPOs. Thts is not surpnsmg These firms are more 
financtal constrained, and hence the 1ssued shares consist of a larger proportion of 
newly created shares. 
MKTRT is negatively related to the proportion of primary shares. This IS conststent 
wtth the earher results The !PO firms reduce the number of primary shares when the 
market returns are higher as the pubhc equity becomes more costly at a hotter market 
on the one hand, and on the other hand htgher stock prices reduce the number of shares 
reqmred for the same amount of proceeds While the number of new shares created IS 
reduced, the number of old shares sold IS increased Because when the market returns 
are htgher, 11 is also the !lme when the pubhc investors are more optimistic. Thts 
ensures that a larger proportion of old shares can be dtvested by the selling 
shareholders. 
INDM is negatively signed, sigmficant at 10% level Non-ICT firms have lower 
technology nsks, lower uncertain!les and lower mformation dtscount As a result, public 
eqmty is less costly for them than for ICT firms. Therefore, they rmse a larger 
proportion of new shares. In addl!ion, acqmsttion activtty related IPOs and AIM IPOs 
also include a larger proportion of pnmary shares 
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Table 6.10 Determinants of Proportion (Model3) 
Vanable Proport1on (n=204) 
Intercept 0 8525*** 
(0 0570) 
AGE 
-0 0385** 
(0 0130) 
SIZE 
-00172** 
(0 0053) 
LEV 0 0394 
(0 0250) 
OTMJX 0 0765* 
(0 0367) 
INCOV 0 0504*** 
(00136) 
OHl 00911# 
(00514) 
OH2 -0 0918 
(0 0789) 
MKTRT -0.3996** 
(0 1345) 
!NOM 
-0 0460# 
(0 0277) 
ACQOM 0 0559* 
(0 0276) 
AIM 0 1450** 
(0 0409) 
F-tcst all coeffic1ents=O 0 0000 
Adjusted R-sq 0 4162 
RootMSE 0.1799 
Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses. All vanables use the value at the t1me of !PO 
ProportiOn IS the ratiO of the number of pnmary shares to the number of total !PO shares. AGE IS the 
log value of firm age that IS the age smce the firms started busmess unt1l the !PO year. SIZE IS the log 
value of total sales LEV is total debt over total assets OTMIX IS bank loan over total debt. IN COY IS 
mterest expense over EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), and values below zero are truncated at 
zero. OHl (DH2) IS the percentage of shareholdmgs that dlfectors (w1th ownership exceedmg 3%) 
own before (after) !PO MKTRT IS the annual market return m 12 months precedmg the !PO, 
calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index !NOM IS a dummy equals 1 1fthe !PO firm belongs to ICT 
mdustry ACQOM 1s a dummy equals I 1f the !PO is related to acqUisitiOn act1v1t1es AIM equals I 1f 
the !PO firm hsts on the AIM market.# p<O I, * p<O 05, ** p<O 01; *** p<O 001. 
6.5.2 The 2SLS Models and the Results 
In the OLS model, the regressors may be correlated with the error term, i.e. the 
endogeneity problem This can lead to inconsistency of the OLS estimator. There are 
several posstble causes for such a problem, mcluding stmultaneity (when the regressant 
and the regressors are stmultaneously determmed), sample selection btas, omttted 
vartables, or measurement errors for the regressors. An Instrument Variables (IV) 
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estimator is a common solutiOn In cross-sectiOnal analysis, the 2SLS estimator (w1th 
mference based on heteroskedastlc robust standard errors) is often used for 1ts 
simplicity m computation 
At the time of structuring an !PO, there m1ght ex1st a trade-off between primary and 
secondary shares, and hence the s1zes of the pnmary shares and the secondary shares 
m1ght be Simultaneously dec1ded. To mcorporate this sJmultaneJty, Secondary S1ze 
(Pnmary Size) can be added to the equatiOn for Primary Size (Secondary S1ze). 
However, this would also bring in a potential endogeneity problem It is clear that 
Secondary Size would be an endogenous regressor m the Pnmary S1ze equation; 
Pnmary Size would be an endogenous regressor in the Secondary S1ze equation This 
sJmultaneJty problem can be dealt with usmg 2SLS regressions, where Secondary S1ze 
(Pnmary Size) 1s used as the instrumented var1able for the equation for Pnmary S1ze 
(Secondary Size). 
For each equation at least one parameter restnct10n is needed For the new Pnmary S1ze 
equatiOn the instruments AGE, DTMIX, INCOV are dropped in the second stage 
regressiOn, as these variables are not correlated with Primary Size according the results 
m sectwn 6.5 1. For the new Secondary Size equation the mstruments DH1, DH2, 
DHDM are dropped m the second stage regression because of their weak relation to 
Secondary Size I also run a test of over-1dent1fymg restnctwns (Sargan, 1958; 
Basmann, 1960) for each of the two equations The null hypothesis, that all instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term, cannot be rejected for either of the two equatwns, 
confirmmg the smtab1lity of the instrument sets for both equations. 
It can be seen from the results of the 2SLS models (Table 6 11) that Secondary Size JS 
not s1gmficant in the Primary S1ze equatiOn, Implying that Pnmary S1ze is not 
determmed by Secondary Size Similarly, Primary Size is not s1gnificant m the 
Secondary S1ze equatiOn, 1mplymg that Secondary S1ze IS not determmed by Pnmary 
Size either Therefore, the results seem to suggest that Primary S1ze and Secondary S1ze 
do not influence each other at the same time. Overall, the concluswns from the OLS 
models hold 
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Table 6.11 Determinants of Primary Size and Secondary Size (2SLS Regression, n=204) 
The Primary Size Eq uahon The Secondary Size Equation 
Vanable I' stage IV (2SLS) I' stage IV (2SLS) 
regressions regresswns regressions regressions 
Secondal]'_ Size PTimal]'_ Size Primal]'_ S1ze Secondar2_ Size 
Intercept 0 0517* 0 2621*** 0 2408*** 0 0507** 
(0 0215) (0 0411) (0 0364) (00186) 
Pnmary S1ze 
-0 0373 
(0 0304) 
Secondary S1ze 
-0 4516 
(0 3904) 
AGE 0 0137** -0 0092 00126** 
(0 0049) (0 0099) (0 0046) 
SIZE 0 0068*** 0 0027 0 0003 0 0070*** 
(00019) (0 0043) (0 0036) (00018) 
LEV -0 0100# 0 0464** 0 0516** -0 0062 
(0 0060) (0 0147) (00174) (0 0049) 
ROA 0 0001 -0 0045 -0 0042 -0 0002 
(0 0024) (0 0052) (00051) (0 0022) 
DTMIX -0 0475** 0 0054 -0 0491*** 
(0 0145) (00221) (00138) 
INCOV -0 0156*** 0 0117 -00154*** 
(0.0043) (00112) (0 0040) 
DHI -0 0347 0 4521*** 0 4653*** 
(0 0363) (0 0797) (0 0807) 
DH2 0 0215 -0 8706*** -0 8766*** 
(0 0302) (00891) (0 0914) 
DHDM -0 0033 0 0810** 0 0843** 
(0 0207) (0 0293) (0 0317) 
MKTRT 0 1193* -0 I 009 -0 1558* 0 1070* 
(00516) (0 0828) (0 0776) (0 0467) 
AIM -0 0683*** 0 0333 0 0628* -0 0699*** 
(00154) (00315) (00241) (0 0158) 
Test all coeffic1ents=O 0 0000 (F-test) 0 0000 (Wald test) 0 0000 (F-test) 0 0000 (Wald test) 
Adjusted R-sq 0 3754 0.5566 (R-sq) 0 5227 0.4143 (R-sq) 
RootMSE 0 0698 0.1228 0 1278 0 0674 
Test of over-1dent1fymg Score Chi-sq(2) = 0 9880 Score Ch1-sq(2) = 2 5927 
restrictions (Chi-sq) (p-value=O 6102) (p-value=O 2735) 
Robust standard errors are reported m the parentheses All vanables use the value at the t1me of IPO Pnmary S1ze IS 
the ratiO of the number of pnmary shares (secondary shares) to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO 
Secondary S1ze 1s the rat1o of the number of secondary shares to the number of total shares outstandmg after !PO 
AGE IS the log value of firm age that IS the age smce the firms started bus mess unt1l the !PO year SIZE IS the log 
value of total sales LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA ( eammgs before mterest, tax, deprec1at10n 
and amort1zat1on) over total assets DTMIX IS bank loan over total debt INCOV IS mterest expense over EBIT 
(eammgs before mterest and tax), and values below zero are truncated at zero DHI (DH2) IS the percentage of 
shareholdmgs that d1rectors (w1th ownership exceedmg 3%) own before (after) IPO DHDM equals I 1f DH I IS 
above 50% MKTRT 1s the annual market return m 12 months precedmg the !PO, calculated usmg the FTSE All 
Share Index AIM equals I 1f the !PO firm hsts on the AIM market # p<O I, • p<O 05, •• p<O 0 I, *** p<O 00 I 
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6.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have used cross-sectiOnal data of 204 UK JP Os to examine the motive 
and timing of the decision to go public. I studied the determinants of IPO structure and 
found results supporting that the !PO structure can indeed reveal important informatiOn 
about IPO decisions, in terms of both motive and timing. 
A key conclusion from a basic exammatlon of the data is that the financial profile, 
ownership structure and IPO structure of the UK IPOs appear to differ markedly from 
those of contmental European countnes. On average, UK firms are younger and smaller 
than other European IPO firms, and rely much less heavily on debt, especially bank 
lending. They also have a less concentrated ownership structure, which typically 
mvolves 'managerial ownership and control'. A substantial proportion of UK firms 
incorporate for the apparent purpose of flotatiOn; and the subsequent IPO is more 
related to financing for growth, rather than transfer of ownership (as m Belgmm) or 
restructunng from previOus expansion (as m Italy) 
Many theoretical implications about IPO motives and the related timing pattern are 
supported by the results in the UK context The UK IPO firms were driven by the 
motlve(s) of rmsmg funds for investment and/or divesting shares by existing 
shareholders The !PO firms rmse public equity at different stages of hfe cycle and for 
different reasons. Young and growth firms are constrained by weak internal cash 
generatiOn whereas mature firms are constrained by debt burden due to a long period of 
investment and expansiOn The stock market provides accessible financmg for firms at 
both of the two stages. In contrast, d1vestmg via an !PO is hkely to happen at a later 
stage of a firm's development There IS also evidence of market timmg for the 
divestment motive. But no clear evidence of market timmg for the investment motive is 
found 
Relating to the mvestment motives, financing need is an Important force that dnves 
firms to Issue additional eqmty capital. Firms that are more highly levered, and 
therefore threatened by debt overhang, offer a larger size of primary share Corporate 
governance is another important consideration behmd their !PO decisions. More highly 
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concentrated managenal shareholdings enable a larger size of primary shares, as the 
control of management is less likely to be diluted, although the ownership base does 
becomes more diverse after the !PO. I find no evidence that these firms raise more 
primary shares at a higher market price and revise their investment plan upwards so as 
to fac1htate their investment decision This seems to support the semi-rational theory of 
R1tter and Welch (2002). The Idea that asymmetric information and adverse selection 
problems influence on the size of pnmary share is not supported by the data 
As firms grow more mature (older and larger), substantial firm-specific information 
accumulates in the public domam, reducing mformatwn asymmetry. In particular, firms 
m good financial positions and With a number of valuable re-mvestment opportumties, 
potentially have a large amount of momtoring capital (passive momtors) avmlable in the 
market Therefore, m addition to obtaining financing for theu mvestment from the 
public market, the passive monitors in the market enable the onginal shareholders 
(active monitors) an exit route. For the secondary shares divested, adverse selection 
costs matter (the shareholders of older and larger firms can divest more) Furthermore, 
for firms in better financial positions and less controlled by management, the 
non-manager shareholders can sell more shares through !PO These IPOs m wh1ch 
shareholders sell out tend to time the market, by offering when market returns are 
higher, because m a more buoyant market mvestors tend to assess shareholders' exit 
more optimistically 
Fmally, established mature firms may go pubhc purely to sell existing shareholdmgs, 
although this seems to be relatively rare in the UK. 
Overall, I have found evidence that the UK stock market plays a positive role in 
supporting the growth of UK firms UK IPOs utilise the stock market as a channel for 
financmg more than as a facility for shareholders to sell out, and this is an Important 
feature that distmgmshes the UK market from contmental European markets 
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7 Private Information, Stock Market and the IPO Decision 
A Bzvarzate Sample Selectzon and a Treatment Effects Approach 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters 5 and 6, I examined the determmants of an IPO decision m two separate 
settings: (1) the determinants of the decision to go pubhc against the decision to stay 
private (chapter 5), (n) the determmants of the sizes of pnmary and secondary shares 
( 1ssumg primary shares is related to investment, whereas issuing secondary shares IS 
related to divestment) (chapter 6). One questiOn is worth further investigation - why 
does an !PO firm that goes pubhc for financing purpose add secondary shares Similarly, 
why does an IPO firm that goes public for divestment add primary shares? One may ask 
the same question from a different angle - is the mvestment motive or the divestment 
motive the ultimate reason that drives a firm to go public rather than to stay pnvate? 
There are two possible answers to this question. The first IS that going public is either 
related to mvestment or divestment Thus, It could be argued that a firm chooses to go 
pubhc ultimately for investment, and that secondary shares are added purely for 
increasmg the overall offer s1ze and hence increasing liqmd1ty of the stock in the 
aftermarket. Investment-based theoretical models of the !PO deciswn provided an 
explanation for the first half of th1s argument by showmg that gomg pubhc to ra1se 
capital for investment is cheaper at a certam stage and in a certain market conditions 
Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006) provided empmcal evidence from Belgian IPOs for 
the second half of this argument by demonstrating that the size of the secondary share is 
determined by the size of the primary share and that mcreasing !PO funds 52 
significantly increases stock hqmdity. On the other hand, it could also be argued that a 
firm chooses to go public ultimately for divestment, and primary shares are added to 
mcrease liqmdity of aftermarket stock trading Divestment-based theoretical models of 
the !PO deciswn suggested that complete exit 1s the ultimate goal for a firm going 
public, and gradually selling out can maximise the sellmg shareholders' total proceeds. 
Th1s helps to justify the first half of this argument. However, there IS as yet no empmcal 
52 IPO funds IS measured by log of the number of IPO shares times the offer pnce 
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ev1dence for th1s If only one of the two arguments can be true, the determmants of a 
dec1sion to go public or stay pnvate are expected to depend on whether an IPO IS 
investment or divestment driven 
The second possible answer is that going pubhc is related to both investment and 
divestment, i e. mvestrnent and divestment are not mutually exclusive Investment from 
new public investors and divestment by existmg shareholders jointly determine the 
optimal value of a firm To achieve the optimal firm value, the best way 1s to go pubhc. 
Investing m a firm is a contmuous process, although at a certain point some existmg 
shareholders may choose to exit from their investment and brmg in other more effect1ve 
investors monitors. The reason why it IS optimal to rmse capital and/or transfer 
ownership by gomg public at a certain stage in a certam market conditions IS that the 
stock market provides cheaper capital and promotes an optimal momtormg mechanism, 
maxim1sing firm value. 
In fact my results of the 2SLS on the sizes of pnmary and secondary shares (m chapter 
6) suggest that the size of pnmary (secondary) share is not determmed by the size of 
secondary (pnmary) share This seems to support the hypothesis (i e. the second answer) 
that going public is related to both investment and divestment, and that the numbers of 
new shares to rmse and old shares to divest are determmed by the ach1evable optimal 
firm value In th1s chapter, I further test this hypothesis 
To find out whiCh one of the two answers apphes in the UK context, 1t IS essential to 
examine the determmants of an IPO (agamst staying pnvate) and the determinants of 
the sizes of primary and secondary shares in a simultaneous equations system To 
achieve this, I employ a bivariate sample selectiOn model. 
A firm's chmce to be publicly listed or to stay private mcorporates the decision about 
how to structure the IPO. Therefore, the equation of the determinants of an IPO (against 
staymg pnvate) may offer extra informatiOn for the equatiOn of the determmants of the 
s1zes of pnmary and secondary shares. It 1s possible that the extra informatwn includes 
some unobservable factor that affects the way an IPO IS structured. By employing a 
selection model, the potential problem of om1tted varmbles (1 e. the unobservable) can 
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be avoided An additiOnal advantage of a selection model 1s that, 1f such an 
unobservable factor does ex1st, 1t should reflect the impact of a firm's pnvate 
mformation on its IPO decision 
In addition, to further verify whether or not the stock market helps the IPO firms 
enhance firm value, I examme the 'treatment53 effects' of going pubhc. More explicitly, 
this 1s to compare the changes in performance of IPO and non-IPO firms The 
performance of !PO firms after being publicly hsted 1s observable. However, the 
counter-factual performance ofiPO firms assuming that they had not been listed cannot 
be observed. Following the treatment effects approach, I use the performance of 
non-IPO firms (m the same year as !PO firms) to compute the potential performance of 
!PO firms presuming that they did not go public Therefore, the differences between the 
performance of !PO and non-IPO firms- the treatment effects- give the average causal 
effects of gomg public, 1 e. the extent to which a firm can benefit from the stock market. 
A potential problem of the treatment effects approach 1s selection bms. I match non-IPO 
firms (the control group) and !PO firms by similar firm s1ze and industry characteristics, 
to control for selection bias. 
Th1s chapter uses the same panel dataset as m chapter 5 The chapter 1s organised as 
follows· sectiOn 7.2 presents the empirical econometnc models, sectiOn 7 3 mvestigates 
the determmants of a complete !PO decision, analysmg the determmants of the !PO 
structure while incorporating the firms' choice of going pubhc; section 7 4 exammes the 
treatment effects of going public; section 7.5 provides concludmg remarks. 
53 
'Treatment' here refers to bemg pubhcly listed 
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7.2 Empirical Models 
7.2.1 A Bivariate Sample Selection Model 
Let y;t denote the net value of going pub he for firm i at time t, if th1s IS positive, it IS 
observed that firm z chooses to go pub he at lime t, i e Ytt = 154 Otherwise, 1t is 
observed that 1t stays pnvate, i e.y,t = 0. Such a choice mechamsm is presented in a 
selectton equation 
I[Y;t > 0 
1[ y,'t :5 0 (7.1) 
Consequently, 1f the ch01ce is IPO, it IS also observed that at time t firm z 1ssues pnmary 
and/or secondary shares Otherwise, 1t IS observed nothing The size of primary share is 
md1cated by di,t m an outcome equatiOn 
The s1ze of secondary share is indtcated by di,t m an outcome equatiOn 
d - {di,t 2It- _ 1[y,~>O 1[ y,'t :5 0 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
More specifically, y,'t 1s an unobserved latent variable measunng the net value of the 
IPO, observed as binary outcomes Based on the discussions and results m chapter 5, 
y,~ can be determined by firm size, leverage, mternal cash generatiOn, capital 
mvestment, ownership concentration and market conditions In addit10n, y;t may be 
determined by some unobservable factor, such as managers' pnvate information about 
the growth potential of the firm. Thus, the equation of the latent variable y,~ is g1ven 
by 
54 After a firm goes public. tts post-IPO observatiOns are subsequently dropped from the sample 
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(7 4) 
Here a, are firm effects 55, x;t are a set of firm and time variant regressors; w; are a 
set of year dummy variables56, E1t is the error term. Variables m x;t mclude LEV, 
CAPEX, ROA, SIZE, OWCON, followmg equation 52 in sectwn 5.3.1. 
Table 7.1 Definitions of Explanatory Variables in the Selection Equation (Eq. 7.4) 
Variable Theory Si!!n Abbr Definition 
Leverage Fmancial constramts + LEV (total debt)/(total assetS) 
(net cash flow from capital 
Capital Financial constraints, expenditure, sale of plant 
investment Cheaper capital - CAP EX and equipment and returns 
of eqmty instrument)/(total 
assets) 
Profitability Fmanc1al constraints - ROA EBITDA/(total assets) 
Firm size Cheaper capital - SIZE ln(sales) Shareholder exit + 
=0 If any smgle 
shareholding<25%, 
=0.25 If at least one 
Ownership Corporate governance - OWCON shareholdmg2:25% (<50%) 
concentratiOn =0.5 if at least one indirect 
shareholding2:50% 
=1 if at least one direct 
shareholdm/VSO% 
The above variables, except CAPEX, are also likely to mfluence the size of primary 
share offered. Thus the outcome equation for pnmary shares IS given by 
(7 5) 
Here di,t is Primary Size for firm 1 at time t, measured by the ratio of the number of 
primary shares to the number of total shares outstanding followmg the !PO, o, are firm 
effects. Variables m z;t include LEV, ROA, SIZE, OWCON w; include year dummy 
variables and V1t IS the error term. 
For the outcome equation for secondary shares, di,t is Secondary Size for firm 1 at 
55 The fixed effects estimator IS mcons1stent m short panel For random effects, ML esttmatJOn mvolvmg a b1vanate 
mtegral1s suggested (Hausman and Wtse, 1979), which allows correlatiOn between a1 and 8" and between E1t and 
v, 
56 Market return IS not sJgmficant for panel data Therefore, a set of year dummies were used to capture market 
conditions 
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time t, measured by the ratio of the number of secondary shares to the number of total 
shares outstandmg following the !PO. Year dummy variables are excluded Thus the 
outcome equatiOn for secondary shares IS given by 
(7 6) 
As firms' decisiOn to go public and the decision on the sizes of primary and secondary 
shares to be offered are correlated, the error term £1t in equatiOn 7 4 may contain 
information of some unobservable that could be correlated with the error terms V 1t in 
equation 7 5 and 7.6. Ignoring such mformation and estimatmg equatiOn 7.5 and 7.6 
through OLS or GLS may give rise to an omitted variables problem. This can be 
illustrated as follows, in the context ofHeckman two-step estimators 
For the primary share outcome equation: 
Similarly, for the secondary share outcome equation 
(7 9) 
(7.10) 
Here p is the correlatiOn between the two error terms v,t and £1t, u 2 is the variance 
of v,t, and it(.) IS the conditional expectatiOn of £1t given firms' chmce of !PO or 
staymg private (E(t:,tiY,t) =it(.)) The ex-ante expectatiOn of £1t should be zero 
Ex-post after firm 1 chooses to go pubhc or stay pnvate, the expectation of £ 1t is 
updated. And E(E,t Jy,t) is the revised expectation, which IS an updated estimate of the 
firm's pnvate mformation. If p * 0, OLS or GLS estimates will not consistently 
estimate y and e. Such a self-selection represents an omitted variable problem. In this 
case, it( ) can be viewed as firms' pnvate informatiOn about the net value (total 
benefits net total costs) of gomg pubhc 
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Such a potential om1tted variable problem is dealt with in the sample selectiOn model 
In the sample selection model, the correlated error terms v,t and E1t are assumed to 
be jointly normally distributed, i e bivanate normal57• The equatwns system 7 I, 7.2, 
7.4, 7.5, and the equations system 7 I, 7.3, 7.4, 7 6 can be est1mated e1ther by the 
Heckman two-stage technique (Heckman, 1979) or by the full informatiOn max1mum 
likelihood method (FIML estimates). Overall, FIML provides consistent estimates that 
are more efficient than the two-stage Heckman method (Nawata, (1993, 1994)). 
The models are based on panel data The observations for each firm may be correlated 
over the time honzon Therefore, the standard errors need to be adjusted to take mto 
account the mtra-firm correlatwn This can be done via the Huber-White estimator of 
varmnce (Huber (1967), White (1980)) 
7 .2.2 Treatment Effects of Going Public 
I exam me the consequences of going public from the perspective of the role ofthe stock 
market. More explicitly, th1s involves comparing the performance of !PO firms before 
and after gomg public to the performance of a control group of non-JPO firms over the 
same period I employ differences-m-differences estimators (DID) to evaluate such 
treatment effects, followmg Blundell and MaCurdy (2000) 
Let's consider two periods in penod I, both !PO and non-IPO firms are private, in 
period 2, !PO firms go pubhc and non-IPO firms stay private I first evaluate the 
treatment effects of gomg public without controlling for differences in performance in 
period I 
For penod 2, let D,t equal one if firm 1 is publicly listed in year t but equal zero 
otherwise One then has a fixed effects model for y,t (the variables of the operatmg 
performance under investigation): 
(7.11) 
57 Klaauw and Konmg (2003) demonstrated that m the sample selectiOn model, the parameter esttmates are not very 
sensitive to the dJstnbutJOnal assumptions of the error terms Even when the error terms are non-normal, the 
maxtmum hkehhood estimates under the assumption ofnonnal dtstnbutlon are close to the true value 
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Here u, and dt are respectively the firm-spec1fic and year-spec1fic effects By first 
differencing, u, are ehminated. Therefore, 
(7.12) 
Dropping the subscnpt t, D, equals one for the IPO firms and zero for the non-IPO 
firms. Thus, equation 7 12 can be re-wr1tten as 
(7 13) 
Equation 7.13 can then be consistently estimated by a pooled OLS regressiOn of !::.y, 
on the bmary treatment variable D, and the year dununies d Subsequently, one can 
compute the predicted average value of !::.y, m period 2 for both the IPO firm 
subsample (l::.yrbl<e) and for the non-IPO firm subsample (!::.yfnvate) So the 
differences-m-differences estimator for penod 2 (DID2) is g1ven by 
-8 = DIDZ _ A -publ<e -1::. -prwate z - - L.lYz Yz (7.14) 
In the same way, one can also obtain the DID estimator for period I. This gives 
estimates of the differences in the performance between the IPO-firms and the non-IPO 
firms m the pre-IPO penod (DIDI)· 
(7 .15) 
Therefore, the treatment effects of gomg pubhc are g1ven by· 
(7.16) 
In this way, the performance of the non-IPO firms is used as a control for that of the 
IPO firms over the IPO windows Such treatment effects can reflect the gams or losses 
from being a public company, the function of the stock market. 
I examme treatment effects for the same set of eleven performance van abies stud1ed m 
chapter 5 sect10n 5 4. The variables measure changes m firm size, leverage, mternal 
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cash generation, mvestment-related cash flow and current assets, growth rate and firm 
value 
Table 7.2 Definitions of Performance Variables 
Performance Variable Abbr Definition 
Firm size SIZE ln(sales) 
TA ln(total assets) 
Leverage LEV (total debt)/(total assets) 
Profitability ROA EBITDA/(total assets) 
Capital (net cash flow from capital expenditure, CAP EX sale of plant and equipment and returns 
Investment-related mvestment 
of equity instrument)iftotal assets) 
cash flow AcquisitiOn ACQ (net cash flow from acqmsitiOn and intensity d!sposal)/(total assets) 
Investment-related 
Inventory IN VEN (stock and work m progress)/(total assets) 
Cash in 
current assets hand CASH (cash and cash eqmvalent)/(total assets) 
Growth in GSIZE ( sales,-sales,_1 )/sales,_ 1 sales Growth rate 
Growth in GTA ( totalassets, -totalassets,_1 )/totalassets,_1 total assets 
Net worth of firms NWTH ln(shareholders' funds) 
7.3 Determinants of the IPO Decision 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 respectively present the results of the bivanate sample selection 
models for the Size of pnmary share and the size of secondary share, while controlling 
for the firms' choice of gomg pubhc 
For the independent IPOs, more financially constrained smaller firms Issue more 
primary shares (Table 7.3), as mdicated by the negatively signed SIZE and ROA, and 
the positively signed LEV in the outcome equation LEV IS statistiCally sigmficant, 
suggestmg the existence of an optimal capital structure. Although the mdependent !PO 
firms may not be necessanly more highly levered than the independent pnvate firms (as 
suggested by the selection equation), the weaker internal cash generatmg abihty of 
these firms indicates the needs to rmse relal!vely larger amounts of new eqmty capital to 
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avmd potential debt overhang problems and to fund growth 
Higher ownership dispersion increases the amount of new public eqmty raised. In 
chapter 6, I also found that higher managerial ownership is correlated with larger size of 
primary shares. This combmed evidence suggests that m the UK, firms w1th more 
dispersed ownership prefer public eqmty, so as to take advantage of the momtonng 
function of the stock market. At the same time, controlling management also tends to 
avoid d1lutwn of their controlling status, although in the presence of financial 
dil'ficulties they may have to surrender part of the1r ownership to outside public 
investors m exchange for capital to fund growth. 
In additiOn, the s1ze of primary share mcreases durmg a bull market. Therefore, it 
appears that taking into account of underpricing costs, firms tend to exploit wmdows of 
opportumty m a buoyant market. 
Importantly, the correlation (p) between v,t and <,t 1s as high as 0.9795, and a Wald 
test of the hypothesis that p = 0 1s rejected This suggests that estimatmg the 
'stand-alone' equatwn of the s1ze of primary share w1ll produce mconsistent estimates 
.?.(.) IS positive .?. reflects the firms' pnvate mformation about going public. Therefore, 
it seems that raismg fresh pubhc eqmty capital IS related to pos1t1ve informatiOn 
possessed pnvately by the firm, e g pnvate information about growth potential. The 
h1gher the growth potential, the greater amount of public equity IS rarsed. 
At the same time (Table 7 4), larger firms mclude larger s1ze of secondary shares (Le. 
smaller firms sell less existing shareholdmgs ), confirmmg that adverse selectiOn costs 
matter for firms whose original shareholders plan an ex1t- larger (more mature) firms 
have fewer uncertainties and hence lower adverse selection costs. In the secondary 
share equation, LEV and ROA show opposite signs to those m the pnmary share 
equation, although these vanables are not statistically significant 
Independent firms With more dispersed ownership sell larger s1ze of secondary share, 
reflecting their preference to bnng in the monitoring capital m the market (to allevmte 
manager-shareholder conflicts) On the other hand, mdependent firms w1th more 
135 
concentrated ownership sell smaller size of secondary share, suggestmg that controllmg 
shareholders wish to retain control undiluted .1(.) is negative, although the hypothesis 
that p = 0 carmot be rejected 
The selection equation of primary share and the one of secondary share show Similar 
results both qualitatively and quantitatively. This confirms the hypothesis that the 
mvestment and divestment motives are not mutually exclusive and are both correlated 
with the net value of going public 
The combined results of the primary share and the secondary share equatiOns for 
mdependent firms imply that rmsing fresh capital to support growth IS the dommant 
reason for these firms to go public m the UK. The stronger the growth potential, the 
more new shares are created. For larger firms, existing shareholders may also use the 
market device to cash in their shareholdmgs, transfemng wealth and ownership 
between new and ex1stmg shareholders 
I now turn to the results for the carve-outs. The hypothesis that p = 0 IS reJected for 
both primary share and secondary share equatiOns . .1( ) is positive m the pnmary 
share equation but negative in the secondary share equatiOn These suggest that for 
carve-outs rmsmg fresh capital is related to positive pnvate information whereas selhng 
old shares IS related to negative pnvate mformatwn If the firms' private informatiOn 
md1cates a higher growth potential by bemg public, less old shares are divested and 
more new shares are created by the subsidiaries In particular, It IS shown that 
carve-outs with more concentrated ownership sell more secondary shares (whereas the 
opposite IS true for independent IPOs) These results, combined with the results of the 
choice on a carve-out, suggest that exit motive IS the dommant reason for a carve-out 
Subsidiaries commonly have concentrated ownership and control structures, where 
parent companies are the ultimate controllers. A parent company might want to divest a 
highly indebted and less controlled subsidiary, and one way of carrying out such 
corporate restructuring is !PO A direct sale can maximise proceeds from selhng the 
control rights but, for a subsidiary less controlled by its parent, selhng out vm !PO can 
maximise total proceeds for the parent firm. This is a two-stage selling process, because 
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Improved monitoring of management can help to increase firm value of the carve-out m 
the after-market and hence Improve revenue from second stage sales (Zingales, 1995) 
Thus, for a subsidiary in a better shape financially (larger size, lower leverage) and 
comparatively more controlled by its parent firm, larger size of secondary shares can be 
sold in the first stage (because lower adverse selection costs and less dilution on the 
control of the parent are associated with the sale m the !PO) In addition, with higher 
growth potential (private mformation mdicated by il), more fresh capital can be raised, 
while fewer old shares are divested m the first stage (i e. the !PO) 
Overall, the results are consistent With the earher conclusiOn in chapter 5 and 6. In 
particular, It is confirmed that the investment and divestment motives are not 
necessanly mutually exclusive and can be explamed in a umfied framework. !PO firms 
appear to possess private mformatwn about the value of bemg publicly hsted. If a firm 
has a higher growth prospect, more pubhc equity will be raised to finance the growth to 
increase firm value. If a firm has a lower growth prospect, fewer funds are rmsed while 
some existing shareholders may transfer ownership to pubhc mvestors - market 
mformation may evaluate the firm more optimistically and market monitonng may 
improve firm value 
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Table 7.3 Determinants of Primary Size (Selection Model FIML Estimates) 
Van abies All Sample IPOs Independent IPOs Carve-Outs 
The Outcome E<J.uatwn 
Intercept -0 1120 -0 1030 0 6788*** 
(00721) (0 0768) (0 1715) 
LEV 0 0818*** 0 0807** 0 0680 
(0 0158) (00241) (0 0551) 
ROA -0 0485 # -0 0481 
(0 0281) (0.0298) 
SIZE -0 0372*** -0 0323*** -0 0277 
(0 0049) (0 0050) (0 0204) 
OWCON -04191*** -0 2558*** -0 9809 
(0 0598) (0 0581) (0 6867) 
Year 1998 0 1487** 0 0716 
(0 0491) (0 0474) 
Year 1999 0.1475** 0 1104* 
(0 0503) (0 0498) 
Year 2000 0.1477** 0 0991 * 
(0 0483) (0 0477) 
Year 2002 0 0438 0 0600 
(0 0675) (0 0637) 
Year2003 -0.1831 * -0 2321** 
(0 0901) (0 0894) 
The Se/ectwn Eq_uatwn 
Intercept -0 8162*** -I 0910*** I 5157 
(0.1254) (0 1373) (I 1019) 
LEV 0 0676 # 0 0515 0 1059 
(0 0383) (0 0718) (0 0649) 
CAP EX -0 5346*** -0 9472*** 0 1263 
(0.1392) (0.1878) (0 9760) 
ROA -0 1766* -02315** 
(0 0692) (00817) 
SIZE -0 0829*** -0 0770*** -0 0440 
(0 0098) (0 0098) (0 0451) 
OWCON -1 2170*** -0 8628*** -4 0533*** 
(0 0888) (0 0987) (0 4280) 
Year 1998 0 6280*** 0 5376*** 0 5106 
(0.1119) (0.1279) (I 9499) 
Year 1999 0 4871 *** 0 5257*** 0 0129 
(0 1158) (0 1274) (0 9750) 
Year 2000 0 5667*** 0 5323*** 0 5044 
(0.1119) (0.1239) (I 4805) 
Year 2002 -0 0926 -0 0385 -7 2298*** 
(0 1525) (0 1575) (I 2391) 
Year2003 -0.4709* -0 5657** -1 2969 
(0.1986) (0.2163) (3 1929) 
Number of ObservatiOns 9487 5840 3647 
Censored ObservatiOns 9304 5697 3607 
Uncensored Observations 183 143 40 
DiagnostiCS 
Wald test all coefficients=O (Chi-sq) I 07 37*** 58 81 *** 52 24*** 
Log pseudo-likelihood -605 5236 -458 0255 -886612 
Wald test· mdependent eqs (p=O) 36 48*** 17 43*** 13.20** 
p 0 9895 0 9795 0 9807 
A. 0 3658 0 3121 0 2651 
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Notes for Table 7.3: 
The effects of the vanables hsted above on the deciSIOn to go pubhc are estimated by a b1vanate sample 
{
1 tf y• > 0 
selectiOn model I) the selectiOn equatiOn y, = 0 f 'f 0 ; 2) the outcome equatiOn d1, = l Ytt :5 
{d;, l[ y,; > 0 ' ' ' ' f • , where Ytr = a1 + xltp + wrO + eu , diu= 81 + Z 1rY + WrO + V 1t The dependent - l Y,tSO 
vanable m the selectiOn equatiOn equals I tffinn 1 ts hsted m year 1, otherwise It equals 0 The dependent 
van able m the outcome equatiOn (Pnmary Size) equals d;, If finn 1 IS hsted m year I, otherwise nothmg 
1s observed The observatiOns for !PO finns m the post-IPO penod are dropped from the sample The 
observatiOns for pnvate finns are restricted to the penod 1996-2003 Pnmary Size IS the ratiO of the 
number of pnmary shares to the number of total shares outstandmg followmg the !PO The estimatiOn 
method IS FIML (full mfonnatiOn maximum hkehhood) The standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedast1c1ty and clustenng m firms (1 e allowmg for mtra-firm correlatiOn) Robust standard errors 
are reported m parentheses The selectiOn model IS estimated separately usmg the entire sample, 
mdependent finns only, and Bnt1sh ultimate holdmg firms only LEV IS total debt over total assets 
CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capital expenditure, sale of plant and equipment and returns (mcludmg 
sale) of eqUity mstrument over total assets ROA 1s EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest, taxes, depreciatiOn 
and amortization) over total assets SIZE IS the log value of turnover, which IS used as the mam measure 
of finn s1ze OWCON 1s an md1cator vanable It equals 0 If none of the shareholders has more than 25% 
shareholdmgs, equals 0 25 1f one or more shareholders have more than 25% but less than 50% 
shareholdmgs, equals 0 5 1f one shareholder has a total of more than 50% shareholdmgs (1 e mdirectly 
holds more than 50% ownership), and equals 1 If one shareholder has a direct ownership of over 50% 
Year 1998, Year 1999, Year 2000, Year 2002 and Year 2003 are year dummies, the year dummy Year 
2001 IS dropped # p<O 1, * p<O 05, •• p<O 01, ••• p<O 001 
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Table 7.4 Determinants of Secondary Size (Selection Model FIML Estimates) 
Van abies All Sample IPOs Independent IPOs Carve-Outs 
The Outcome Equat1on 
Intercept 0 0003 0 0072 -0 1827*** 
(0 0210) (00201) (0 0510) 
LEV -0 0055 -00017 -0 0309 # 
(0 0056) (0 0053) (0 0167) 
ROA 0 0069 0 0090 
(0 0057) (0 0060) 
SIZE 0 OI69*** 0 0124*** 0 0303*** 
(0 0028) (0 0025) (0 0066) 
OWCON -00191 -0.0451* 0 2567** 
(0 0235) (0 0220) (0 0930) 
The SelectiOn EquatiOn 
Intercept -0 8507*** -1.1717*** I 0967** 
(0.1281) (0.1433) (0 3533) 
LEV 0 0591 0 0308 0 I 083* 
(0 0414) (0 0858) (0 0540) 
CAPEX -0 6986** -1 5730*** -0 1751 
(0.2534) (0 2683) (0 2220) 
ROA -0 1972** -0 2379** 
(00716) (0 0856) 
SIZE -0 0834*** -0 0769*** -0 0422 
(0 0100) (0 0102) (0 0443) 
OWCON -1 2119*** -0 8513*** -4 1023*** 
(0 0886) (0 0993) (0 4073) 
Year 1998 0 6857*** 0 5686*** 11511** 
(0 1127) (01319) (0 3442) 
Year 1999 0 5072*** 0 5581*** 0 3316 
(0 1152) (0 1296) (0 3743) 
Year 2000 0 5688*** 0 5494*** 08101* 
(0 1133) (0 1267) (0 4029) 
Year 2002 -0 0668 -0 0059 -6 6493*** 
(0.1513) (0 1601) (0 3376) 
Year2003 -0 4683* -0 5473* 00344 
(0.1927) (0 2259) (0 4168) 
Number ofObserva!ions 9487 5840 3647 
Censored Observations 9304 5697 3607 
Uncensored ObservatiOns 183 143 40 
Dtagnosttcs· 
Wald test· all coefficients=O (Chi-sq) 45 39*** 27 52*** 22 94*** 
Log pseudo-hkehhood -499 3004 -364 9288 -68 1360 
Wald test. mdependent eqs (p=O) I 84 0 22 6 17* 
p -0 3301 -0 1150 -0 7929 
A -0 0269 -0 0083 -0 0947 
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Notes for Table 7.4: 
The effects of the vanables hsted above on the decisiOn to go pubhc are estimated by a b1vanate sample 
{
1 tf y' > 0 
selectiOn model 1) the selectiOn equation y, = 0 f •; 0 , 2) the outcome equatiOn d2, = l y,t s 
{di, rfy,~ > 0 • . . • . , _ f . < 0 , where y, =a,+ x,,/3 + w,e + '" , d2, = 81 + z,y + w,e + v, The dependent l Ytt -
vanable m the selectiOn equatwn equals lrffinn 11s hsted m year 1, otherwrse rt equals 0 The dependent 
vanable m the outcome equatron (Secondary Srze) equals d:, If firm 1 IS hsted m year 1, otherwise 
nothmg IS observed The observatiOns for !PO firms m post-IPO penod are dropped from the sample 
The observatiOns for pnvate firms are restncted to the penod I 996-2003 Secondary Size IS the ratio of 
the number of secondary shares to the number of total shares outstandmg followmg the !PO The 
estimation method IS FIML (full mformatiOn maximum hkehhood) Standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustenng m firms (1 e a!lowmg for mtra-firm correlatiOn) Robust standard errors 
are reported m parentheses The selectiOn mode! Is estimated separately usmg the entire sample, only the 
mdependent firms, and usmg only the Bnt1sh ultimate holdmg firms LEV IS total debt over total assets 
CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capital expenditure, sale of plant and equipment and returns (mcludmg 
sale) of equity mstrument over total assets ROA IS EBITDA ( earnmgs before mterest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortizatiOn) over total assets SIZE IS the log value of turnover, which IS used as the mam measure 
of firm size OWCON IS an md1cator vanable It equals 0 If none of the shareholders has more than 25% 
shareholdmgs, equals 0 25 If one or more shareholders have more than 25% but less than 50% 
shareholdmgs, equals 0 5 If one shareholder has a total of more than 50% shareholdmgs (1 e md!fectly 
holds more than 50% ownership), and equals I If one shareholder has a d!fect ownership of over 50% 
Year 1998, Year 1999, Year 2000, Year 2002 and Year 2003 are year dummies, the year dummy Year 
2001 IS dropped # p<O I, • p<O 05, •• p<O 0!, ••• p<O 001 
7.4 Consequences of the IPO Decision 
The treatment effects estimated by the dtfferences-m-differences esttmators (DID) are 
presented in Table 7.5 (for the entire sample IPOs), Table 7 6 (for the independent IPOs) 
and Table 7.7 (for the carve-out subsample) Controlhng for the performance of private 
firms, it can been seen that the performance of IPO firms actually dechned after IPO -
firm stze (total assets, sales), profitabthty (return on assets), growth rate (m total assets 
and m sales) and net worth all decreased, as indtcated by DID in the last column m the 
three tables. Therefore, although firms show stgmficant growth and mcrease their firm 
value after JPO compared to themselves in the pre-IPO period (results m chapter 5), 
such growth actually does not beat thetr performance before the IPOs when I used the 
performance of the pnvate firms as a control The market timmg theory argues that the 
stock market has a functiOn of reveahng information about firms' value and that tt is 
optimal for firms to go public at the peak of their growth when their market valuatiOn 
reaches a maxtmum. These results perhaps provide evtdence for the market timmg 
theory 
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The decreases in growth rate and net worth seem to be lower for the carve-outs (Table 
7. 7) than for the independent IPOs (Table 7 6). A possible reason m1ght be that the 
carve-outs have benefited from the improved pubhc1ty and the reputatiOn capital ofthe1r 
parent firms. 
However, one may argue that with an assumptiOn that the stock market helps the !PO 
firms to enhance firm value, a positive treatment effect on firms' net worth would be 
expected. It 1s possible that the results estimated by the treatment effects approach suffer 
an om1tted varmble bias At this stage, only firm s1ze and mdustry characteristics are 
controlled for the !PO firms and the non-IPO firms However there are uncontrolled 
observed and unobserved differences between the two groups. A treatment effects w1th 
sample selection approach might provide more accurate results. In this aspect, further 
research 1s reqmred 
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Table 7.5 Treatment Effects of the IPO Decision for the Entire Sample IPOs (Differences-in-Differences Estimates) 
Wald test all Wald test all 
Vanables Theta coefficients=O DID2 Obs Firms Theta coefficients=O DID! Obs Firms DID 
Prob>Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq 
For the Post-IPO Penod For the Pre-IPO Period 
SIZE 0 3585*** 0 0000 0 3837 14602 2495 0 5785*** 0 0000 0 7153 6978 2074 -0 3316 
(0 0357) (0 1271) 
TA 0 2301*** 0 0000 0 2300 14602 2495 0 2662*** 0 0000 0 3289 6978 2074 -0 0990 
(00190) (0 0527) 
LEV -0 0096 0 0000 0 0017 14602 2495 0 0183 0 2443 0 0377 6978 2074 -0 0360 
(0 0103) (0 0251) 
ROA -00131* 0 0000 -0 0053 14602 2495 0 0138 0 0091 0 0568 6978 2074 -0 0622 
(0 0067) (0 0454) 
CAPEX 0 0087 0 0000 0 0123 14602 2495 0 0097 0 0258 0 0086 6978 2074 0 0037 
(0 0066) (00100) 
ACQ 0 0124 0 0241 0 0184 14602 2495 0 0149 0 4370 0 0387 6978 2074 -0 0203 
(0 0096) (00104) 
INVEN -0 0022 0 0000 -0 0012 14602 2495 0 0027 0 1865 00027 6978 2074 -0 0039 
(00017) (0 0042) 
CASH 0 0032 0 0010 0 0050 14602 2495 -0 0130 0 4869 -0 0015 6978 2074 0 0065 
(00041) (0 0125) 
GSIZE -0 0517* 0 0000 -0 0505 14602 2495 0 4330* 0 0000 0 5229 6978 2074 -0 5734 
(0 0261) (01417) 
GTA -0 0389 0 0000 -0 0605 14602 2495 0 5066*** 00000 0 6156 6978 2074 -0 6760 
(0 0259) (0 1120) 
NWTH 0 3701*** 0 0000 0 3717 14602 2495 0 2169# 0 0060 0 4078 6978 2074 -0 0360 
(00421) (0 1317) 
The 'treatment effects' of the decision to go public on the vanables hsted above are estimated by differences-m-dtfferences estimators !:J.y1t = 911D1t + (dt- dr-1) + l1E1t D1r IS a dummy 
that equals I tf a firm r IS publicly hsted m year t dt IS the year dummy DID2 = tJ.yfublLc - t..yrtvate for the post-IPO penod (mcludmg the IPO year), DlDl = l1Yfubl!c - !:J.jifnvate for 
the pre-IPO penod, DID""=DlD2-DJD/, g1vmg the 'treatment effects' (the effects of gomg pubhc) I use the performance of non-IPO firms as a control for the performance of IPO firms 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustenng on firms Semi-robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The 'treatment effects' are estimated usmg the entire sample SIZE IS the log value 
of turnover, whtch IS used as the mam measure of firm stze TA IS the log value of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA (earnmgs before mterest. taxes, deprectal!on 
and amortizatiOn) over total assets CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capital expenditure, sale of plant and eqUipment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty mstrument over total assets ACQ IS 
the net cash flow from acquiSition and dtsposal over total assets INVEN IS stock and work m progress over total assets CASH IS cash and cash eqmvalent over total assets GSIZE IS the rate of 
growth of turnover GTA IS the rate of growth of total assets NWTH ts the log value of shareholders' funds, values below zero are truncated at zero # p<O I, * p<O 05, ** p<O 0 I, *** p<O 00 I 
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Table 7.6 Treatment Effects of the IPO Decision for the Independent IPO Subsample (Differences-in-Differences Estimates) 
Wald test all Wald test all 
Vanables Theta coeffic1ents=O DID2 Obs Fmns Theta coeffic1ents=O DID! Obs F1rms DID 
Prob>Ch1-sq Prob>Ch1-sq 
For the Post-IPO Penod For the Pre-IPO Penod 
SIZE 0 2403*** 0 0000 0 2427 8819 1371 0 4932*** 0 0000 0 6594 4458 1208 -0 4167 
(0 0307) (0 1365) 
TA 0 2259*** 0 0000 0 2199 8819 1371 0 2975*** 0 0000 0 3665 4458 1208 -0 1465 
(00190) (0 0627) 
LEV -0 0080 0 0053 -0 0004 8819 1371 0 0240 0 7328 0 0475 4458 1208 -0 0480 
(0 0105) (0 0302) 
ROA -0 0087 0 0002 0 0029 8819 1371 0 0103 0 0648 0 0655 4458 1208 -0 0626 
(0 0086) (0 0554) 
CAPEX 0 0103 0 1199 0 0134 8819 1371 0 0108 0 0010 00130 4458 1208 0 0004 
(0 0072) (0 0118) 
ACQ 0 0088 0 0429 0 0163 8819 1371 0 0128 0 0676 0 0413 4458 1208 -0 0250 
(0 0091) (00112) 
INVEN -0 0055** 0 0436 -0 0045 8819 1371 0 0027 0 3385 0 0031 4458 1208 -0 0076 
(0 0020) (0 0051) 
CASH 0 0053 0 0276 0 0073 8819 1371 -00118 0 7864 0 0022 4458 1208 0 0050 
(0 0059) (0 0150) 
GSIZE -0 0384 0 0004 -0 0472 8819 1371 0 4983** 0 0052 06113 4458 1208 -0 6585 
(0 0267) (0 1770) 
GTA -0 0484# 0 0000 -0 0708 8819 1371 0 5976*** 0 0000 0 7242 4458 1208 -0 7950 
(00261) (0 1412) 
NWTH 0 4045*** 0 0000 04028 8819 1371 0 3409* 0 0004 0 5554 4458 1208 -0 1526 
(00418) (0 1502) 
The 'treatment effects' of the dectston to go pub he on the vanables hsted above are esttmated by dtfferences-m-differences estimators ~Y1t = (J!J.D1t + (dt- dt_1) + liE1t D,t ts a dummy 
that equals ltfa firm tts publicly hsted m year t dt ts the year dummy D/D2 = .6.yfubltc -l!.yfnvate for the post-IPO penod (mcludmg the IPO year), D/Dl = 6yfub!tc - .6.jlr1Vate for 
the pre-IPO penod, DJD=D!D2-D!Dl, gtvmg the 'treatment effects' (the effects of gomg public) I use the performance of non-IPO firms as a control for the performance of IPO firms 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustermg on firms Semt-robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The 'treatment effects' are estimated usmg the mdependent IPO sub sample SIZE IS 
the log value of turnover TA 1s the log value of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA (eammgs before mterest. taxes, deprec1at10n and amortizatiOn) over total assets 
CAPEX IS the net cash flow from cap1tal expenditure, sale of plant and eqmpment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty mstrument over total assets ACQ IS the net cash flow from acqms1t1on 
and dtsposal over total assets INVEN 1s stock and work m progress over total assets CASH 1s cash and cash eqmvalent over total assets GSIZE IS the rate of growth of turnover GTA IS the 
rate of growth of total assets NWTH ts the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated at zero # p<O I, * p<O 05, • * p<O 01, *** p<O 00 I 
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Table 7. 7 Treatment Effects of the IPO Decision for the Carve-out Subsample (Differences-in-Differences Estimates) 
Wald test all Wald test all 
Vanables Theta coefficients=O DID2 Obs Firms Theta coefficients=O DID! Obs Finns DID 
Prob>Chi-sq Prob>Chi-sq 
For the Post-IPO Penod For the Pre-IPO Penod 
SIZE 0 2653* 0 0000 0 4942 5783 1124 1 0091 ** 0 0000 1 0100 2520 866 -0 5157 
(0 1246) (0 3574) 
TA 0 1593** 0 0000 0 2140 5783 1124 01811* 0 0000 0 2499 2520 866 -0 0358 
(0 0546) (0 0883) 
LEV -0 0118 0 0000 00304 5783 I 124 -00102 0 1553 0 0425 2520 866 -00121 
(0 0371) (0 0384) 
ROA -0 0370** 0 0012 -0 0502 5783 1124 0 0289 0 0108 0 0487 2520 866 -0 0989 
(0 0127) (0 0647) 
CAP EX -0 0013 0 0000 0 0051 5783 1124 0 0033 0 0470 0 0001 2520 866 00049 
(0 0081) (0 0139) 
ACQ 0 0327 0 0001 0 0235 5783 1124 0 0500 0 2110 0 0414 2520 866 -0 0179 
(0 0296) (0 0305) 
INVEN 0 0045* 0 0000 0 0019 5783 1124 0 0038 0 7889 0 0053 2520 866 -0 0034 
(00021) (0 0060) 
CASH -0 0005 0 0003 0 0029 5783 1124 -00139 0 4879 -0 0041 2520 866 0 0070 
(0 0055) (0 0194) 
GSIZE -0 0629** 0 0000 0 0171 5783 1124 0 2445* 0 0000 0 2712 2520 866 -0 2542 
(0 0239) (0 1159) 
GTA -0 0450 0 0000 0 0107 5783 1124 0 1924* 0 0000 0 3209 2520 866 -0 3102 
(0 0277) (0 0881) 
NWTH 0 2355# 0 0002 0 0803 5783 1124 -0 1621 0 3088 0 0879 2520 866 -0 0075 
(0 1333) (0 2345) 
The 'treatment effects' of the decJSIOO to go pub he on the van abies listed above are estimated by dtfferences-tn-dJfferences estimators .dy1e = (JtJ.D1e + (dt- dt_1) + fl.c,r D1r IS a dummy 
that equals I tf a firm' IS publicly hsted m year t dt IS the year dummy D/DZ = .1.Y:Ubltc - f1Yr'vate for the post-IPO penod (mcludmg the IPO year), DIDl = tJ.yfubltc - f1Yrtvate for 
the pre-IPO penod, D!D=DID2-D/DJ, gtvmg the 'treatment effects' (the effects of gomg pubhc) I use the performance of non-IPO firms as a control for the performance of IPO firms 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustermg on firms Semt-robust standard errors are reported m parentheses The 'treatment effects' are estimated usmg the carve~out subsample SIZE IS the log 
value of turnover TA ts the log value of total assets LEV IS total debt over total assets ROA IS EBITDA (earnmgs before tnterest, taxes, deprectatton and amortization) over total assets 
CAPEX IS the net cash flow from capttal expenditure, sale of plant and eqmpment and returns (mcludmg sale) of eqmty mstrument over total assets ACQ ts the net cash flow from acqmsttton 
and dtsposal over total assets INVEN ts stock and work m progress over total assets CASH ts cash and cash eqmvalent over total assets GSIZE ts the rate of growth of turnover GTA ts the 
rate of growth of total assets NWTH ts the log value of shareholders' funds, and values below zero are truncated at zero # p<O 1, • p<O 05, •• p<O 01, ••• p<O 001 
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I have used panel data of 183 UK IPO firms and 2315 UK private firms 
over twelve years from 1996 to 2007, to mvestigate the determinants of the choice to go 
public and the determinants of structuring an IPO m a unified framework. B1vanate 
sample selection models are used, which has allowed me to examine a complete IPO 
decision while controlling for omitted vanable problems (and examining the Impact of 
an IPO firm's private mformatwn). I have also compared the performance of IPO firms 
between pre- and post- IPO periods by investigatmg the treatment effects of going 
public 
It IS confirmed that the sizes of pnmary and secondary shares are jointly determined. 
IPO firms appear to possess pnvate information about the value of bemg publicly listed. 
If the pnvate informatiOn md1cates a higher growth prospect by going public, more 
public equity will be raised to finance the growth to increase firm value while less 
shares bemg divested This is different from Huyghebaert and Van Hulle (2006), which 
argued that the size of secondary shares IS determmed by the Size of primary shares and 
that the purpose to add secondary shares is to increase aftermarket liqUidity for the 
stock 
Earlier results about IPO motives and timmg m chapter 5 and 6 are further confirmed. 
For the UK sample, the IPOs of independent firms are mainly driven by financing needs, 
due to their limited ability to generate internal cash They also seem to take advantage 
of wmdows of opportunity m bull markets to raise more equity capital Larger 
mdependent firms are able to mclude secondary shares m their IPOs and to enable their 
ongmal shareholders (most likely the non-director shareholders) to divest their 
shareholdmgs, as there is less adverse selection cost associated with the divestment for 
them. However, this IS not the dommant reason for these mdependent IPOs. 
In contrast, the IPO decision of subsidiaries IS mainly dnven by corporate restructuring 
and divestment Parent firms tend to divest highly mdebted and less controlled 
subsidiaries via IPO The lower the value of their pnvate information about growth 
potential, the more the shares divested and the fewer the new shares raised in the IPOs 
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In this way, improved cash flows after the IPOs (from mvestment and Improved 
momtoring of management) and mcreased firm value of the subsidiaries generate 
maximum total proceeds from a two-stage selling process 
Smaller firms tend to go public purely to rmse new capital Firms whose existing 
shareholders sell out in IPOs tend to offer m rising markets while avmding hot issue 
markets, so as to maximise the total proceeds from the two-stage sellmg process 
The results of the treatment effects approach seem to suggest that firms time their IPOs 
at the peak of their growth. This seems to provide supportive evidence for the market 
timing theory However, It will be necessary to check the robustness of these results. A 
treatment effects with sample selection approach is suggested for future research. 
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8 Structuring the IPO, Ownership and Control and the IPO Underpricing 
An Event Study of the IPOs in the UK 
8.1 Introduction 
Underpncing of IPOs IS a well documented phenomenon m almost every stock market· 
it is widely observed that the offer price tends to be well below the first day's trading 
price. Numerous theoretical models and empincal researches have been developed to 
explain this anomaly, which appears to violate the efficient markets hypothesis. 
On the theoretical front, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (200 I), Rltter and Welch and 
LJungqvist (2006) reviewed varwus theoretical explanatiOns and concluded that 
although the various theones58 are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there is no smgle 
one that can completely resolve the underpricing anomaly. Empuically, different 
theones find supporting evidence m different markets. However, depending on the 
examined market and the chosen sample penod, the empmcal results vary. For example, 
supportive evidence has been found for the winner's curse hypothesis (an mformation 
based model) for the US (Barry and Jennmgs, 1993), Latm America (Aggarwal, Lea! 
and Hemandez, 1993) and Taiwan (Huang, 1999), but the hypothesis was rejected in 
Singapore (L1m, 1999) 
Given the complexity of the underpricing anomaly, and its Vital role in the development 
of the IPO market, research in this area IS likely to continue to receive great interest. In 
particular, the question as to what accounts for variatiOn in the extent of underpricmg 
over time and across countnes is both cntlcal and unresolved 
In this chapter, I empincally examme underpricmg m the sample of 183 UK IPOs (used 
in chapter 5 and 7) for the recent years 1998-2003. Earlier work on UK IPOs found that 
the winner's curse hypothesis can only partly explam the degree of underpricing ofUK 
IPOs (Levis, 1993) Therefore, it is necessary to test other underpncing hypotheses. In 
58 The theones ofiPO underpncmg are generally dtvtded mto four groups m formatiOn based models, the 
mstltut10nal explanations, the ownership and control models and the behavwural explanations 
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addition, Lev1s's study was based on early years (1980-1988) when 'offer for sale' (a 
fixed pncmg method) was the preferred IPO method. However, since the late 90s, 
'placmg' (a bookbmldmg pricmg method) has become the predommant IPO method. In 
the current bookbmldmg process, the underwriter plays an important role in IPO 
allocatwn as intermediary. Consequently, the old wmner's curse problem between 
issuers and mvestors that arises from pro-rata allocation rules (Rock, 1986) may no 
longer apply Moreover, since the establishment of AIM in 1995, many smaller and 
growth companies have been encouraged to JOin the stock market. The different risk 
profile of these new issuers may also have affected IPO underpncmg in the UK 
Changes m the IPO subscnptlon and allocation method, together w1th these different 
market partiCipants, make 1t necessary to re-examme UK IPO underpricing for the 
recent penod 
In another mterestmg example (although also based on an early sample penod 
1986-1989), Brennan and Franks (1997) suggested that the underpricing of UK IPOs is 
used as a mean to mduce oversubscnption and avoid outside block shareholders, so as 
to retain effective control by managers However, cntlcs argued that protectmg private 
benefits of control may not be the only reason why dispersed outside ownership 1s 
favoured - underpncmg may also be used to encourage monitormg and mimm1se 
agency costs (Stoughton and Zechner, 1998). Hence, explanatwns based on an 
ownership and control hypothesis also need to be Justified in the UK context. 
In th1s chapter, I test a relatively new underpricing theory - Entrepreneurial Wealth 
Losses theory (Hab1b and LJungqvJst, 2001) m conjunction w1th Ownership and Control 
explanations There are several reasons why I focus on these two theories First, the 
entrepreneurial wealth losses model takes mto consideratiOn the role of underwriters 
and is also applicable in a bookbmlding environment, thereby better reflectmg the 
current fashwn of the IPO market. Second, th1s model embraces the reasons why a firm 
goes public - whether to sell old shares or to rarse new money - and links th1s to !PO 
underpricing Although it is not complete, the various !PO scenanos are reasonablely 
incorporated m this model, allowing 1t to be distingmshed from other asymmetnc 
mformation models. Third, this model emphasises that the degree of underpricmg 1s 
affected by ins1der selling and the dilutwn of the original shareholdings caused by the 
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creation of new shares. Thts provides a lmk to the ownership and control theones and 
makes it posstble to test these and the entrepreneunal wealth losses theory at the same 
ttme Fourth, ownership and structure is a very important consideratiOn when a firm 
makes decisiOn to go pubhc, with evidence in the previOus chapters also showmg that 
primary and secondary share offerings are differentially affected As this Issue dtrectly 
affects entrepreneunal wealth losses in IPOs, mtegrating the ownership and control 
models and the entrepreneunal wealth losses model should provtde a more complete 
view of !PO underpricmg. At last but not least, recent developments in law and 
corporate finance have found that ownership and control structure ts strongly mfluenced 
by legal systems and institutional features. Therefore, understandmg the relatwnship 
between ownership and control structure, IPO structure and !PO underpricing may in 
part help to explain the cross-country differences m !PO underpncing m an institutiOnal 
framework. In short, focusing on these two theories should help to link together 
underpncmg and the motivation for going pubhc, extending the understanding of !PO 
underpricing and offering a more fundamental explanation. 
The variables I test, apart from ownership and control structure, include the !PO 
structure, which is for the first time embraced and emphasised in an empirical study of 
!PO underpricmg The IPO structure directly reveals informatwn about the motivation 
for going public and also serves as an ideal testable vanable for the entrepreneunal 
wealth losses model 
A different methodology- event study- ts adopted in thts chapter Event study has the 
advantage in an underpricmg study, of showing how stock prices react in the move from 
pnmary to secondary markets and how new stocks perform m the secondary market 
after flotation, reflecting valuable mformation However various problems artse from 
applying the event study procedure to the study of !PO underpncmg These are 
dtscussed and carefully controlled. Two sets of event-estimation wmdows are tested. 
Abnormal returns are calculated usmg both a market-adjusted approach and the market 
model. For the parameters of the market model, I perform both OLS and SUR 
regressiOns to control for the correlations of the error terms across IPOs. Testmg for 
statistical significance of ARs and CAARs IS based on both Patell and Boehmer tests. 
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Using the event study methodology, I examine the underpricing and short-run 
performance of UK IPOs and make a comparison between firms w1th different control 
and IPO structures. This is followed by cross-sectional regressiOns to test the 
relationship between underpncing and IPO structure, and ownership and control 
structure, while controllmg for market conditions 
The rest of the chapter 1s organised as follows sectiOn 8.2 discusses the theoretical 
background and generates testable implications; section 8 3 mtroduces the methodology; 
section 8 4 analyses results and sectwn 8.5 concludes. 
8.2 Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses, Ownership and Control, and Underpricing 
8.2.1 IPO Structure, Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses and Underpricing 
Gomg pubhc 1s costly because of market imperfectiOns InformatiOn fnction among 
IPO participants such as issuers, investors and investment banks g1ves rise to 
underpricing costs, which are used to compensate the less informed party in order to 
promote IPO success. 
Rock (1986)'s Winner's curse model1s one of the best known asymmetnc informatwn 
models for explaming the underpricmg puzzle In Rock's model, the presence of better 
informed mvestors gives rise to adverse selection problem. Issuers have to underprice 
theu IPOs to mduce less mformed mvestors to participate. 
Habib and Ljungqv1st (2001) introduced the role of promotion costs and extended 
Rock's model to recognise that the proportwns of better informed and less informed 
investors are determmed by the issuer They argue that issuers can reduce underpricmg 
costs by promoting the IPOs so as to reduce informatiOn asymmetnes, e g hinng 
reputable underwriters and auditors to attract a greater number of uninformed investors 
However, such promotion is costly and, hke underpncmg costs, 1t causes 
entrepreneurial wealth losses Hence, promotion costs and underpncmg costs are 
substitutes, and the trade-off between the two 1s determined by the minim1sat10n of 
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entrepreneurial wealth losses. 
In an IPO, the issuer either offers new shares (i e. primary shares) or/and sells existing 
shares (i.e. secondary shares). The larger the number of primary shares offered, the 
higher the promotion costs mcurred in attractmg larger numbers of less mformed 
investors. This would also be true for offenng secondary shares As the promotion costs 
increase, underpncmg costs would decrease. Therefore, the larger the number of 
pnmary shares (or secondary shares) offered, the lower the underpncing costs. Between 
primary share offerings and secondary share offerings, the Issuers' wealth suffers more 
from underpricing for the latter group, creating a net benefit of reduced underpricmg 
costs for secondary share offerings (reduced wealth losses). 
Therefore, m equilibnum, wealth losses are mvanant to promotwn costs, but mstead are 
determined by uncertainty and by the number of pnmary and secondary shares offered 
The extent to which the issuers would want to reduce underpricmg costs through 
promotwn depends on the type of shares offered Hence, a key implication that can be 
drawn from this entrepreneurial wealth losses model is that ms1der selhng IS related to 
lower underpricing in general: 
Hypothesis 1 Pnmary share offenngs are more underpnced than offenngs that 
mclude secondary shares 
The entrepreneurial wealth losses model makes a very interestmg point not only is 
mmim1sation of the wealth losses of the issuer (the entrepreneur) vital to the 1ssumg 
firm but also such wealth losses to the Issuer are affected differently by flotatwns that 
include the sale of existing shares and those that do not. This IS not hard to understand 
mtmtively, the selling shareholders would want to maximise the selhng pnce and would 
favour as low as possible underpncing. On the other hand, to reduce the promotion 
costs borne by themselves (so that their own wealth losses can be mimmised) they can 
choose to sell their shares m an IPO at a later stage of the firm's growth, when 
information costs (promotion costs) are reduced By contrast, for an IPO that does not 
include sales of existing shares, trade-off between promotwn costs and underpricing 
costs IS irrelevant to the firm Whether to incur higher promotion costs (i.e. to leave 
money to the underwnters ), or to m cur higher underpncmg costs ( 1 e. to leave money to 
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the investors), the total expense of the Issuer will be unaffected. In this case, the 
question only concerns the extent to which underwriters and other intermediates can 
share the benefits of the flotatiOn. 
8.2.2 Ownership and Control Structure and Underpricing 
The wealth losses model is incomplete and cannot fully answer the !PO underpricing 
question First, for a pnmary share offering, the issuer retains the existing shareholdmgs 
after the !PO. If the share pnce mcreases m the aftermarket, firm value will Improve 
consequently So the wealth losses mcurred at the !PO can be compensated by the 
increased firm value. In contrast, for a secondary share offering, the realised losses for 
the selling shareholders cannot be compensated by an mcrease m the share price in the 
aftermarket. Therefore, it remams unexplamed that why the existmg shareholders would 
want to sell theu shares in the !PO and bear the losses Second, !PO changes the 
ongmal ownership structure, and in most cases dilutes the original shareholdmgs. 
Whether such a change has an impact on underpncmg remams unanswered. 
To answer these questions and to determme whether or not msiders are ultimately better 
off, I need to return to ownership and control theories I start by answenng the second 
question One reason why the ownership and control problems (or agency problems) 
exist IS that the separation of ownership and control is mcomplete Managers have an 
mcentlve to grab firm resources for their private benefits, while non-managing 
shareholders bear the resultmg loss of firm value through the threat of bankruptcy 
(Jensen and Meckhng, 1976, Jensen, 1986). Apart from this manager-shareholder 
problem (an under-monitonng problem), gomg public will bring m minority outside 
shareholders, creating minority-controlling shareholder conflicts. If outside 
shareholders consist of block shareholders, It may create an over-momtoring problem 
since outside block shareholders may have incentive to mvolve in take over activities, 
Jeopardising controlling shareholders' controllmg status (Pagano and Roe!!, 1998) 
The issuers can solve ownership and control problems by underpncmg their IPOs 
However, there is a debate Brennan and Franks (1997) suggested that underpricing and 
the consequent over-subscription are used to restnct large mvestors with an aim to 
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avmd the over-monitoring problem. On the other hand, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) 
argued that underpricing and over-subscription are used to restnct small mvestors for 
the purpose of solving the under-momtoring problem 
There may be truth m both explanations, however, for a specific market it is Important 
to Identify whether the over-monitoring or the under-momtoring problem is the 
dominant Issue. If conflicts between outside block shareholders and original controlling 
shareholders are dominant, a h1gher ownership concentration should increase the 
tendency for controlling shareholders to favour small mvestors agamst large ones. 
Hence, following the argument of Brennan and Franks (1997), 1t is expected that· 
Hypothesis 2 Underprzcmg increases m ownersh1p concentratzon before !PO but 
decreases m ownership concentratzon after !PO 
On the other hand, if manger-shareholder conflicts are dominant, higher ownership 
dispersion mcreases the mcentive of Issuers to ratwn out small mvestors m favour of 
larger investors. So following the argument of Stoughton and Zechner (1998), it IS 
expected that: 
Hypothesis 3 Underprzcmg decreases m ownership concentration before !PO but 
mcreases m ownership concentratiOn after !PO 
In th1s sense, underpricmg not only matters for wealth losses at !PO but also potentially 
affects 'wealth losses' during an extended penod after !PO. Underpricing may induce 
optimal ownership structure and serve to increase finn value, boostmg ms1ders' wealth 
Now I address the first question as to why the original shareholders sell at !PO. 
Zingales (1995) argued that the selhng shareholders sell out in two stages. In the first 
stage (at the !PO), they sell only a small portiOn of their shareholdings to dispersed 
outsider-shareholders. The diffusion of the ownership structure can help to enhance the 
controllmg shareholders' controllmg status (the controllmg shareholders are assumed to 
be the eventual sellers). At the same time, infonnative stock prices can improve 
managenal mcentive, wh1ch helps to mcrease the value of the cash flow nghts for the 
remammg block shareholdings. This improves the bargaining power of the selhng 
shareholders Subsequently, the proceeds from selling the controlling blocks in the 
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second stage (some time after the !PO) are maximised As a result, the total proceeds 
for the sellmg shareholders are maximised from the two-stage selling process 
8.2.3 Extension of the Entrepreneurial Wealth Losses Theory 
Habib and L]ungqvist (200 1) stress that testing underpricing theory should be 
conditional on the issuers' mcentives to mcur costs m order to reduce their losses In 
addition to the type of shares offered at an !PO and the effect of the ownership and 
control structure, I extend the incentives by brmging in the Impact of market conditions. 
In booming market conditions, there are many investors, especially umnformed 
investors, who actively deal m the market. As the market is optimistic and the market 
return is high, the price of an IPO is hkely to increase substantially m the aftermarket 
(by behaviOural explanatiOns, over-pncing ts hkely). Therefore, there is httle incentive 
to incur costs in promoting the IPO to uninformed investors. This would consequently 
be observed as a htgher degree of underpricing. On the other hand, in pessimistic 
markets, it IS more difficult to attract umnformed mvestors, and therefore higher 
promotion costs will be incurred and underpricmg will be lower. This provides an 
alternative 'ratiOnal' explanatiOn to 'mational' explanations based on investor sentiment 
So the followmg hypothesis arises· 
Hypotheszs 4 Underprzczng zncreases as market returns zncrease 
8.3 Methodology 
Event study methodology59 is employed m this chapter In the first stage, usmg the 
event study method, I compute the degree of underpricing, abnormal returns (ARs) and 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), over two dtfferent post-event windows. 
Then I test the statistical sigmficant of ARs and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), 
and also compare them across the firms with dtfferent ownership and !PO structures In 
the second stage, I carry out cross-sectional regression to examme the relationship 
between !PO underpricmg, !PO structure and ownership structure and market returns 
59 MacKmlay (1997) provided a very good survey on event stud1es m Economtcs and Fmance 
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8.3.1 Computation of ARs and CAARs 
I. Event window 
(Event wmdow and post event window) 
EventWmdow Post-Event Window 
Listing 
Day 
The T1 -th The (T1 +I )·th 
Trading Da) Tradmg Day 
The T2-th 
TradmgDay 
According to the Efficient Markets HypothesiS, aftermarket tradmg should quickly 
bnng the pnce of an IPO to 1ts equilibnum price - that is, abnormal returns should 
disappear in a day or two after the listing Therefore, I assume that a 5-day event 
wmdow (five consecutive trading days, equivalent to about one week in calendar days) 
1s long enough to reflect the performance of the IPOs m the short-run I also test a 
longer period - a 60-day event wmdow - for a further confirmation and for extra 
mformation. The downside of this is that too long an event wmdow may adversely 
affect the power of the statistical tests of the sigmficance of abnormal returns. So, 
T1 = 5, 60 for the two event windows. T2 1s set to be the 260
1h tradmg day after an 
IPO, glVlng a 255-day post-event window (1 e. the estimatwn wmdow for the market 
model) for the 5-day event wmdow and a 200-day post-event window for the 60-day 
event window. 
11. Daily abnormal returns (ARs) 
The daily stock returns60 for IPO i at day tare calculated both for arithmetic returns· 
R - (P,t - P,,(t-1)) I 
tt - I P,,(t-1) 
and for loganthmic returns· 
60 Datly returns perform best for event studtes as compared to weekly or monthly returns (MacKmlay, 1997) 
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P,t IS the dmly closmg price for stock 1 on day I, adjusted for dtvidends and stock sphts 
It is commonly agreed that log returns are more likely to be normally dtstributed but 
make it more dtfficult to take a cross-sectional average, for which reason log returns are 
often used in long-run studies whereas anthmet1c returns are frequently used m 
short-run studtes In this study, I calculate and exa!lline both 
For ARs, two models are used market-adjusted ARs and market model adjusted ARs. 
The advantage of the market model adjusted ARs over the market-adJusted ARs IS that 
the former model allows the ARs to be adjusted for the beta nsk of each stock. 
For the market-adJusted ARs: 
(8 I) 
where I respectively use FTSE All Share Index and FTSE Industnal Indtces for the 
normal performance E (R,t) The second benchmark takes into account different stock 
performances across mdustries (t = 1,2, .. T1) 
For the market model adjusted ARs, I first compute E(R,t) usmg the Market Model 
(8 2) 
Because there are no observable tradmg pnces before listing, the post-event wmdow 
(from day (T1 +I) to day T2 , T2 = 260) is used as the estimation window for 
computmg alpha and beta parameters in the market model. The expected daily returns 
(normal returns) over the event window are defined as: 
(8.3) 
Here X, 1s the conditioning information for the market model on day I, a, 1s the 
constant term for stock 1, measunng the part of the normal return which 1s mdependent 
of market performance, {3, is the systemic nsk for stock 1 and Rm,t is the market 
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return on day t, calculated from the FTSE All Share Index ( t = T1 + 1, T1 + 2, . T2) 
The market model is estimated by both OLS regressiOn and SUR regressiOn (seemmgly 
unrelated regressiOn, Zeller 1962). 
Estimating the market model by SUR is simultaneously estimating the following hnear 
regressiOn equatiOns system, 
(8 4) 
SUR controls for the correlations of the error terms (ENt) across stocks When the 
residuals of the stock equations are highly correlated, there will be efficiency gains 
from SUR estimation 
Daily abnormal returns over the event wmdow (t = 1,2, ... T1) are defined as 
(8.5) 
Ill. Daily cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
The ARs are then aggregated for each stock 1 from day 1 until day t (t = 1,2, .. T1). The 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for stock 1 over penod (1,t) are defined as 
CAR,(1,t)=AR,1 +·· +AR, (8 6) 
IV. Daily cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) 
The cross-sectional average of CARs for the event window over penod (1, t) IS 
defined by the CAAR 
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CAAR(1, t) = 1~3 L~~f CAR, (1, t) (8.7) 
V. Testing for statistical significance of ARs and CARs 
61 1 perform Paten tests (Paten, 1976) and Boehmer tests (Boehmer, Musumeci and 
Poulsen, 1991) to test for the significance of ARs; and perform Paten tests, corrected 
Paten tests (Mtkkelson and Partch, 1988) and Boehmer tests to test for the sigmficance 
of CARs. The advantage of the Paten tests over simple /-tests is that the former are 
based on standardtsed abnormal returns (the abnormal returns are adJusted by the 
vanance of the total standardised prediction errors), which anows for the 
heteroskedastic1ty of ARs and CARs For the CARs, the corrected Paten test further 
accounts for the problem that the ARs of each stock may be senany correlated over the 
event window Senal correlatiOn arises for CARs because the ARs of each stock over 
the event window are computed by the same market model w1th the same slope 
es!imator. However, such a problem may be tnvml m a short event wmdow of less than 
60 days In add1t10n to a serial correlatiOn problem, the !PO event 1s likely to induce 
variation m abnormal performance across firms The Boehmer tests are more reliable in 
this aspect, as the ARs and CARs are adJusted for the cross-sectional variance. The test 
statistics are respectively g1ven in what fonows 
The tests for ARs: 
I) Paten tests· H0 : AR,t has zero mean, (t = 1,2, ... T1) 
2 2 [1 + 1 + (Rmt-R;;)
2 ] 
CTAR, = CTAR, L "T' (R .,.---.., 
1 L.T=Tt +1 mT-nmJ 
(8 8) 
(8.9) 
Here L1 denotes the number of observatiOns m the estimation wmdow- 255 for the 
5-day event window and 200 for the 60-day event wmdow Rm IS the average 
market return over the estimation wmdow. 
And, 
61 Alternative tests m elude non-parametnc tests- Rank and S1gn tests Brown and Warner (1980) found that the 
T-tests perform well. Rank tests the second well, but S1gn tests are not good Therefore, I perform T-tests 
!59 
SAR,t = AR., 
r1AR,t 
(8 10) 
Under H0, SAR,t follows a student-! d1stnbution with (L1-2) degrees of freedom, 
where Its mean is given by -N1 L:~=l SAR,t, and Its variance IS given by L,-z (N L,-4 
denotes the sample size, and N = 183) 
Therefore, under Ho, 
2) Boehmer tests: H0 • AR,t has zero mean 
Under H0 , 
The tests for CARs: 
-N (0, I) 
- N (0, I) 
I) Patell tests H0 : CAAR(1, t) has zero mean, (t = 1,2, ... T1) 
Under H0 , 
2) Corrected Patell tests: H0 • CAAR(1, t) has zero mean, (t = 1,2, .. T1) 
Under H0 , 
z = .2.. "I:'N_ CAR,(l,t) - N (0 I) 
l,t .JFi £.-t-l CTCAR ' 
' 
where T = t - 1 + 1, which is the length of event window 
3) Boehmer tests: H0 CAAR(1, t) has zero mean, (t = 1,2, ... T1) 
Under H0 , 
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(8.11) 
(8.12) 
(8 13) 
(8.14) 
(8.15) 
(8 16) 
z = 2... LN- SCAR,(1,t) - N (0 I) 
l,t ..{Fj !-1 O'SCAR i ' (8 17) 
SCAR,(1, t) = CAR,(1,t) 
a cAR I 
(8.18) 
2 - 1 "N 1 "N 2 O'scAR, - t:i:t "-•=1 (SCAR, (1, t) - "ii "-•=1 SCAR, (1, t)) (8 19) 
8.3.2 Cross-sectional Relation between Underpricing, IPO Structure, Ownership 
Structure and Market Return 
Based on the d1scussion in Section 2, I estimate the followmg model· 
Underprzcing = f(P1Market_Retum + P2CONCl + P3CONC2 + y1 Carve out+ 
Y2Portwn_Dummy + o1(CONCl• Carveout) + o2(CONCl• Portwn_Dummy) + 
o3 (Market_Retum • Carveout) + o4 (Market_Return • Portwn_Dummy)) 
(8.20) 
Underpricing 1s frequently measured by the first day return of an !PO The anthmetlc 
return 1s the ratio of the difference between the closmg pnce of the first tradmg day and 
the offer pnce relative to the offer pnce. The logarithmic return is the dtfference 
between the log value of the closing pnce of the first tradmg day and the log value of 
the offer price In addttlon to thts measurement, I also measure underpricmg by the AR 
of the first tradmg day, where AR is calculated by both the market-adJusted model (two 
benchmarks are applied the FTSE All Share Index and the FTSE Industnal Indtces) 
and the market modeL Two sets of event-post_event windows are applied: 5-255 and 
60-200. These are estimated by two methods· OLS and SUR. For each measurement of 
underpricing, both the logarithmic and the arithmetic returns are calculated. 
Market Return 1s the annual market return in the 12 months precedmg the !PO, 
calculated using the FTSE All Share Index By Hypothesis 4, it is expected to be 
positively related to Underpncing. 
CONCI, CONC2 are correspondmgly the percentage of shareholdmgs owned by 
blockholders (with ownership exceeding 3%) before and after the !PO. By hypothesis 2, 
1t ts expected that CONC I (CONC2) is pos1tively (negatively) related to Underpricing. 
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In contrast, by hypothesis 3, it is expected that CONC1 (CONC2) is negatively 
(positively) related to Underpncmg 
Portion_ Dummy is a dummy equals 1 If the !PO includes pnmary shares only and 
equals 0 If the !PO includes secondary shares. By Hypothesis 1, it is expected to be 
positively related to Underpricmg 
Caveout IS a dummy equals 1 If the !PO is a carve-out, which is the case when the 
holdmg parent company of the !PO firm is selhng Its shareholdmgs of the firm m the 
!PO; It equals 0 otherwise, ind1catmg that the !PO firm is an mdependent firm. While it 
is argued that carve-out firms go pubhc for different reasons (Pagano et a! 1998), this 
variable captures the effect on !PO underpricing of this particular type of ownership and 
control structure. 
CONC1 *Carveout, CONC1 *Portion_Dummy, Market_Retum*Portion_Dummy and 
Market Retum*Carveout control for interaction effects between the indicator variables 
and the quantitative factors 
8.4 Results62 
8.4.1 The Degree of Underpricing 
Table 8.1 reports summary statistics of the degree of underpricmg computed by 
different methods The mean of the raw first day return is slightly lower than those 
adjusted by various benchmarks. Underpncmg adjusted by the market model IS on 
average a little higher than that adjusted by the FTSE indices, possibly caused by 
underperformance of the IPOs m the aftermarket - because the expected returns in the 
market model are computed using post-event data. Market models estimated by OLS 
and SUR give qmte close results for the degree of underpricing. 
The logarithmic returns are on average about 6% lower than the correspondmg 
62 The results based on loganthmtc returns are reported m thts sectiOn The results based on anthmettc returns are 
reported m the Appendtces as references 
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arithmetic returns The reason can be explained as follows 1f let R denote the arithmetic 
return, and LR denote the logarithmic return, it is known that the relation between the 
two is g1ven by R "" LR + R2 /2 . This may underestimate the difference m the 
underpricing as compared to what were reported by earlier studies (usmg arithmetic 
return) 
The average degree of underpricmg (15.38%) for the period 1998-2003 m this study 
appears to be more than I 0% h1gher than that reported m earlier stud1es on UK IPOs -
9.42% for 1986-1989 in Brenna and Franks (1997), 115% for 1980-1988 in Lev1s 
( 1993 ), both usmg arithmetic raw returns in the first trading day as the measure of 
underpricing After the establishment of the AIM market, many smaller and/or growth 
firms with h1gher uncertainties and susceptibility to nsk JOined the London Stock 
Exchange, which may have led to the mcrease in the underpncmg. 
Table 8.1 Summary Statistics of the IPO Underpricing for the Entire Sample (Log) 
Vanable Model Obs Mean Std Dev. Mm Max 
Underpncmg I Market-adjusted. 183 0 1543 0 2544 -0 2917 I 4752 FTSE all share mdex 
Underpncmg2 Market-adjusted 183 0 1550 0 2547 -03118 I 4706 FTSE industnal ind1ces 
Underpncmg5 Market model. 200-day 183 0 1562 0 2540 -0 2866 I 4759 
estimation wmdow- OLS 
Underpncmg6 Market model 255-day 183 0.1560 0 2542 -0 2860 I 4808 
estimation wmdow- OLS 
Underpncing9 Market model· 200-day 183 0 1561 0 2539 -0 2865 I 4747 
estimatiOn wmdow- SUR 
Underpncmg I 0 Market model 255-day 183 0 1560 0 2543 -0 2856 I 4807 
estimation wmdow- SUR 
Underpncmgl3 Raw return 183 0.1538 0 2544 -0 2957 I 4663 
Underpncmg IS calculated usmg adjusted stock pnces - the offer pnce and da1ly closmg pnces are all 
adjusted for diVIdends and stock sphts 
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8.4.2 ARs and CARs over the Event Windows 
Summary statistics for abnormal returns over 60 days and 5 days (for the market model 
usmg 5-255 wmdows) are reported in Table 8.2 These can be better v1sualised in 
Figures 8.1 to 8 4 for the corresponding cumulative average abnormal returns For the 
market model adjusted ARs and CARs, only the OLS results are reported at th1s stage -
the SUR estimates will be discussed later. 
Table 8.2 Summary Statistics for ARs over 60-Day/5-Day Event Windows (Log Return) 
Day Obs Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
Pane/A Market-adjusted abnormal returns- usmg the FTSE all share mdex as a benchmark 
183 0.1543 0 2544 -0.2917 1.4752 
2 183 0 0035 0 0659 -0.1858 0.3052 
3 183 00037 0 0662 -0 3348 0 5688 
4 183 0 0047 0 0573 -0 2726 0 3876 
5 183 00006 0.0510 -0 2847 0 2917 
6 183 -0 0031 0 0360 -0 1756 0 2341 
7 183 -0 0031 0 0408 -0 2423 0 1769 
8 183 0 0016 0 0406 -0 2028 0 2033 
9 183 -0 0064 0 0288 -0 1618 0 0882 
10 183 -0 0037 0 0309 -0 2055 0 1256 
11 183 -0 0005 0.0418 -0 1398 0 3718 
12 183 -0 0049 0 0368 -0 2092 0 1981 
13 183 -0 0041 0 0347 -0.1593 0 1224 
14 183 0 0012 0 0423 -0 2895 0 1684 
15 183 0 0032 0 0441 -0 0789 0 3350 
16 183 -0 0007 0 0278 -0 1502 0 0827 
17 183 -0 0007 0 0295 -0 1545 0 1844 
18 183 -0 0066 0 0307 -0 2072 0 0820 
19 183 -0 0012 0 0267 -0 1082 0.1518 
20 183 0 0000 0.0284 -00917 0 2015 
21 183 0 0009 0.0279 -0 1190 0 1576 
22 183 -0 0045 0 0313 -0 1875 0 1644 
23 183 -0 0010 0 0249 -0.1064 0 1609 
24 183 -0 0026 0 0322 -0 2037 0.1742 
25 183 -0 0018 0 0257 -0 I 065 0 1173 
26 183 0 0019 0 0305 -0 1584 0 1136 
27 183 -0 0008 0 0358 -0 2100 0 1596 
28 183 0 0040 0 0347 -0 0720 0 3186 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev Mtn Max 
29 183 0 0025 0 0250 -0 0522 0.1822 
30 183 -0 0009 0 0262 -0 0899 0 1500 
31 183 -00015 00259 -0 1188 0 1183 
32 183 0 0013 0 0311 -0 1288 0 1262 
33 183 -0 0010 0 0273 -0 1137 0 1168 
34 183 0.0030 0 0351 -0 1232 0 1849 
35 183 0 0002 0 0255 -0 I 065 0 1251 
36 183 0 0030 0 0284 -0 0700 0 1464 
37 183 -0 0002 00248 -0.1454 0 1178 
38 183 -0 0014 0 0264 -0 1344 0 0889 
39 183 -0 0006 0 0236 -0 1016 0 1210 
40 183 0 0036 0 0504 -0 1200 0 5833 
41 183 0 0003 0 0314 -0 2280 0 1534 
42 183 0 0012 0 0281 -0 1322 0 1741 
43 183 -0 0049 0 0363 -0 2295 0.1197 
44 183 -0 0009 0 0338 -0 1501 0.1672 
45 183 0 0012 0 0315 -0 1514 0 1503 
46 183 -0 0014 0 0234 -0 1086 0.1152 
47 183 -0 0036 0 0254 -0 1428 0 0871 
48 183 -0 0003 0 0361 -0 0947 02906 
49 183 -0 0032 0.0301 -0 1353 0 1974 
50 183 -0 0030 0 0340 -0 1378 0 2263 
51 183 -0 0052 0 0290 -0 1402 0.1788 
52 183 0 0008 0 0324 -0 0754 0 2676 
53 183 -00019 0 0290 -0 1812 0 1072 
54 183 -0 0002 0 0307 -0 1194 0 2140 
55 183 0 0004 0 0382 -0 3285 0.1605 
56 183 -0 0001 0 0429 -0 2182 0 2898 
57 183 -0 0025 0 0309 -0 1321 0 1486 
58 183 0 0005 0 0392 -0 1309 02830 
59 183 -0 0022 0 0275 -0 1051 0.1256 
60 183 0.0009 0 0289 -0 1202 0 1788 
Panel B Market-adjusted abnormal returns- usmg the FTSE mdustnal mdzces as a benchmark 
I 183 0 1550 0 2547 -0 3118 1.4706 
2 183 00044 0 0650 -0 1828 0 3009 
3 183 0 0031 0 0682 -0 3507 0 5611 
4 183 0 0063 0 0592 -0 2719 0 3920 
5 183 0 0014 0 0528 -0 2943 02920 
6 183 -0 0027 0 0383 -0 1949 0 2181 
7 183 -0 0028 0 0443 -0 2439 0 1646 
8 183 0 0017 0 0414 -0 2233 0 1991 
9 183 -0 0045 0 0331 -0 1640 00877 
10 183 -0 0031 0 0333 -0 1898 0.1102 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev. Mm Max 
11 183 -0 0003 0 0436 ·0.1229 0 3662 
12 183 -0 0042 0 0387 -0 2136 0 1990 
13 183 -0 0033 0 0365 -01511 0 1306 
14 183 0.0018 0 0456 -0 2867 0.1757 
15 183 0.0043 0 0477 ·0 0912 0.3321 
16 183 -0 0001 0 0315 -0 1329 0 1138 
17 183 0 0010 0 0301 -0 1504 0 1573 
18 183 ·0 0064 0 0333 ·0 2105 0.1317 
19 183 0 0012 0 0318 -0 1193 0 1442 
20 183 -0 0009 0 0313 -0 1030 0.1629 
21 183 0 0032 0 0285 -0 0842 0 1546 
22 183 -0 0041 0 0354 ·0 2175 0 1639 
23 183 00013 0 0285 -0 0931 0 1478 
24 183 -0.0030 0 0348 ·0 2145 0 1309 
25 183 -0 0027 0 0301 -0 0906 0 1420 
26 183 0 0011 0 0323 ·0 1400 0.1149 
27 183 -00019 0 0387 -02163 0 1541 
28 183 0 0052 0 0378 -0 0810 0 3050 
29 183 0.0027 0 0290 -0 0877 0 1869 
30 183 -0 0017 0 0297 ·0 1050 0 1502 
31 183 -0 0014 0 0292 -0.1406 0 1227 
32 183 0 0001 0 0309 -01113 0 1193 
33 183 0 0021 0 0285 -0 1138 0 0930 
34 183 0 0032 0 0377 -0 1190 0 1950 
35 183 0 0017 0 0296 -01110 0 1230 
36 183 0 0035 0 0303 -0 0908 0 1559 
37 183 00006 0 0256 -0.1146 0 1427 
38 183 -0 0001 0 0290 -0 1288 0 1165 
39 183 0 0007 0 0265 -0 I 039 0 1213 
40 183 00039 0 0536 -0 1684 0 5950 
41 183 00002 0 0356 ·0 2331 0 1583 
42 183 0 0006 0 0313 -0 1540 0 1557 
43 183 -0 0061 0 0380 -0 2368 0 0988 
44 183 -0 0005 0 0361 -0 1533 0 1511 
45 183 00020 0 0351 -0 1513 0 2290 
46 183 -0 0014 0 0283 -0 1143 0 1280 
47 183 -0 0027 0 0318 ·0 0831 0 2181 
48 183 00002 0 0403 -0 1250 0 3160 
49 183 -00017 0 0322 -0 1454 0 2057 
50 183 -0 0030 0 0382 -0 1447 02296 
51 183 -0 0031 0 0333 ·0.1675 0 1798 
52 183 00037 0 0354 -0 0754 0 3101 
53 183 ·0 0002 0 0285 ·0 1517 0 0859 
54 183 0 0021 0 0342 -0 1037 0 2222 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
55 183 -0 0001 0 0402 -0 3285 0 1501 
56 183 0 0002 00423 -0 2171 0 2898 
57 183 -0 0037 00326 -0 1303 00960 
58 183 -0 0012 0 0425 -0.1268 0 2848 
59 183 -0 0008 0 0328 -0.1443 0 1602 
60 183 0 0026 0 0304 -0 1250 0 1791 
Panel C Market model- usmg the 60-200 event-post_event wmdows (estimated by OLS) 
183 0.1562 02540 -0 2866 I 4759 
2 183 0 0067 0 0645 -0.1784 0 3063 
3 183 0 0055 0 0652 -0 3279 0 5639 
4 183 0 0055 0 0563 -0 2705 0 3938 
5 183 0 0022 0 0510 -0 2813 0 2920 
6 183 -0.0001 0 0345 -0.1706 0 2331 
7 183 -0 0008 0 0397 -0 2457 01774 
8 183 0 0031 0 0409 -02122 0 2079 
9 183 -0 0045 0 0279 -0 1633 0 0838 
10 183 -00019 0 0292 -0 1919 0 1256 
11 183 0 0007 0 0418 -0 1349 0 3727 
12 183 -0 0035 0 0365 -0 2061 02085 
13 183 -0 0023 0 0350 -0 1626 0 1218 
14 183 0 0032 0 0392 -0.2622 0 1718 
15 183 0 0058 0 0431 -0 0733 0 3344 
16 183 0 0007 00273 -0 1502 0 1005 
17 183 0 0000 0 0284 -0 1575 0 1834 
18 183 -0 0049 0 0298 -0 2145 0 0752 
19 183 -0.0002 0 0253 -0 1142 0 1372 
20 183 0 0009 0 0259 -0 0765 0 1723 
21 183 0 0019 00279 -0 1279 0 1606 
22 183 -0 0023 0 0309 -01717 0 1645 
23 183 0 0012 0 0232 -0 0924 0 1643 
24 183 -0 0003 0 0309 -0 1881 0 1843 
25 183 -0 0001 0 0247 -0 1197 0 1279 
26 183 0 0029 0 0312 -0 1904 0 1158 
27 183 0 0015 0 0355 -02111 0 1628 
28 183 0 0053 0 0336 -0 0703 0 3136 
29 183 0.0034 0 0249 -0 0618 0 1837 
30 183 0 0016 0 0266 -0.1057 0 1632 
31 183 0 0007 0 0259 -0.1227 0 1287 
32 183 0 0023 0 0296 -0 I 066 0 1343 
33 183 0 0006 0 0257 -0 1154 0 1024 
34 183 0 0045 0 0331 -0 1129 0.1755 
35 183 0 0024 0 0231 -0 0964 0 1337 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev. Mm Max 
36 183 0 0038 0 0265 -0 0560 0 1435 
37 183 0 0008 00228 -0 1336 0 1184 
38 183 -0 0012 0 0249 -0 1311 00868 
39 183 00020 0 0226 -0 0959 01364 
40 183 0 0052 0 0504 -0 I 087 0 5995 
41 183 0 0024 00292 -0 2194 0 1551 
42 183 0 0033 0 0274 -0 1270 0 1806 
43 183 -0 0028 0 0371 -0 2273 0 1229 
44 183 0 0012 0 0327 -0 1558 0 1664 
45 183 0 0027 00293 -0 1460 0 1573 
46 183 0 0005 0 0224 -0 1067 0 1402 
47 183 -0.0020 0 0241 -0 1488 0 0871 
48 183 0 0006 0 0347 -0 0911 0 2916 
49 183 -0 0029 0 0290 -0 1384 01979 
50 183 -0 0012 0 0322 -0 1329 0 2244 
51 183 -0 0036 00274 -0 1328 0 1790 
52 183 0 0027 0 0297 -0 0700 02432 
53 183 -0 0006 0 0277 -0 1781 0 1120 
54 183 0 0030 0 0308 -0 1505 0 2288 
55 183 0 0007 0 0382 -0 3415 0 1577 
56 183 0 0018 00429 -0 2236 0 2802 
57 183 -0 0007 0 0304 -0 1247 0 1482 
58 183 0 0017 0 0380 -0 )332 0 2803 
59 183 -0.0003 00257 -0 1061 0 1260 
60 183 0 0028 0 0277 -0 1210 0 1762 
Panel D Market model- usmg the 5-255 event-post_event wmdows (est1mated by OLS) 
183 0 1560 0 2542 -0.2860 I 4808 
2 183 0 0065 0 0641 -0 1755 0 3045 
3 183 0 0053 0 0652 -0 3284 0.5611 
4 183 00054 0 0562 -0 2694 0 3947 
5 183 0 0019 0 0505 -0 2813 02910 
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As reflected m Figures 8.1 to 8 4 (logarithmic returns) and Appendix Ill (arithmetic 
returns), logarithmic returns and arithmetic returns provide different profiles of CAAR 
over the 60 days after the IPOs, whereas such differences do not present over the 5-day 
penod Th1s suggests that wh1le the results are sensitive to the choice between 
loganthm1c and arithmetic return for longer periods (over a month), th1s IS not the case 
for very short periods 
Overall, it seems that the IPOs of m dependent firms have higher CAARs in comparison 
to the !PO of carve-out firms, although the change in CAARs seems to be similar m the 
two groups Carve-outs are commonly backed by established parent companies and thus 
have mformat10nal advantages, and hence fewer asymmetric informatiOn problems than 
mdependent firms Th1s may have reduced the degree of underpncmg and hence 
CAARs for carve-outs 
IPOs that offer pnmary shares only appear to have a higher degree of underpricing than 
IPOs that also offer secondary shares, which seems to support Hypothesis I. However, 
the CAARs of the first group decrease over time wh1le those of the second group are 
mcreasing. The increasmg CAARs of IPOs that include secondary shares provide 
supporting evidence for the two-stage selling theory of Zmgales (I 995) As the CARs 
are contmually bmldmg, the selling envuonment keeps improving for the shareholders 
who hold controllmg blocks (the insiders), so that the selling shareholders are able to 
cash in on the improved conditiOns for second stage sales. 
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Figure 8.1 Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns - CAARs (Logarithmic Return) 
Ma rket-adjusted - using the FfSE all share index as a benchmark 
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I now turn to the resul ts of testing the statistical signifi cance of the ARs and ARs over 
the event windo\ s. The results based on the market model estimated by OL are 
presented in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. while those e timated by UR are pre ented in Tables 
8.6 and 8.7. The Pate ll test and the corrected Patell test g ive simi lar result for CARs, 
suggesting that serial corre lation problems arc not important for the short-run 
perfonnance o f the IPOs. However, for the tests on ARs, the Patell test suggests 
significant ARs for the first 3 days and day 8, I 5, 28, 29 and 40. whereas the Boehmer 
test only highl ights the fLrSt day and days 28 and 29. The difference in re ults comes 
from the variation in the market response to each different IPO. i.e. the event-induced 
variation. The different reasons for going public and the different risk profil es of the 
IPO finns might be the factors "hich have eau ed uch a variation. For thi reason, I 
believe that the variance-corrected Boehmer test is more robust. This te t suggests that 
the abnonnal return disappear immediately a flcr the first day 's trading, which is 
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consistent with the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. For a longer penod, the Significant 
ARs that occurred in days 28 and 29 might have arisen from other events, for example, 
the expiratiOn of lock-up period. For example, Ofek and R1chardson (2000), Field and 
Hanka (2001) found sigmficant negative abnormal returns around the time of expiry of 
the lock-up period from the US IPOs. However, the regulatiOn on lock-up penod m the 
UK is very different from the one in the US. In the US, there is a standard lock-up 
period of 180 days for maJority IPO firms (Bradley, Jordan, Roten and Yi, 2000). In 
contrast, Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) found that m the UK, there IS a 
great vanab1hty in the lock-up penod and often there are different lock-up penods for 
directors and other shareholders. The question as to whether the abnormal returns in day 
28 and 29 are indeed caused by the expiration of lock-up penod or related to other 
company events reqmres further study. 
The difference in the statistical sigmficance tests for the OLS and SUR results is very 
small for the entire sample (Table 8 3 - OLS, Table 8.6 - SUR), but larger for the 
sub-sample tests (Table 8.4 - OLS; Table 8.7 - SUR) I focus on the results from the 
Boehmer test for both ARs and CARs (Tables 8.4 and 8.7) The difference is reflected in 
the tests for the primary share offering sub-sample (Sub_bl), where the non-zero ARs 
hypothesis seems to be over reJected for the OLS results. The Breusch-Pagan tests of 
independence for SUR (Table 8 8) clearly md1cate a strong correlation among the 
residuals of the equatwns for each IPO stock, suggestmg that the SUR estimators 
should be more efficient than the OLS estimators It seems that the efficiency gam is 
especially Important for the subsample of primary share offenngs. It also seems that the 
risk factors are highly correlated among these sub-groups ofiPOs rather than correlated 
with the market return 
As seen m Table 8.7, overall, apart from the first day AR, there is no AR for the primary 
share offenngs and secondary share offerings sub-groups for the first two months of 
tradmg in calendar time (around 40 trading days). After 40 tradmg days, there are only 
ARs detected for the secondary share offerings, which may be related to ms1der trading 
Agam, this provides evidence for the entrepreneurial wealth losses theory and the 
two-stage selling process 
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On average, the primary share offermg IPOs consistently earn CARs until the 52"d 
tradmg day (Table 8. 7) (for the secondary share offenng JP Os, the CARs last until the 
301h trading day), due to the higher first day AR (Table 8.5). The CARs last for the 
shortest period for the carve-out sub-sample, because these firms have the lowest 
underpricmg level. 
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Table 8.3 Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 (5) Days in 
the Entire Sample (n=l83)- OLS Estimated Market Model (Log Return) 
AR CAR 
Day 
Patell test Boehmer test Patell test 
Corrected Boehmer test Patell test 
Panel A Market model-usmg the 60- 200 event-post_ event wmdows 
74.4676 9.5576 74 4676 74 8466 9 5577 
2 3.0508 I 3687 54 8138 55 0742 8 6620 
3 2.0550 I 2294 45 9417 46 1614 8 0786 
4 I 0551 0 6515 40 3143 40 5004 7 6651 
5 04062 0 1998 36 2398 364104 7 1057 
6 0 2734 0 1884 33 1939 333615 6 5059 
7 I 0249 0 7517 31 1190 31 2858 6 1798 
8 1.9891 I 2050 29 8124 29 9757 5 9328 
9 -1 8694 -2 2760 27 4842 27 6325 5 5049 
10 -1 1741 -1 1998 25 7025 25 8375 5 1807 
11 -0 2267 -0 2164 24 4381 24 5602 4 9713 
12 -I 5891 -1 3506 22 9389 23 0525 4 7018 
13 -I 2235 -I 0155 21 6997 21 7968 4 4217 
14 0 5219 0 3705 21 0498 21 1392 42727 
15 1.9624 I 5015 20 8427 20 9358 4 2375 
16 0 2412 0 2592 20 2412 20 3323 4 0981 
17 -0 0554 -0 0658 19 6234 19 7096 3 9736 
18 -2 0199 -2 0188 18 5944 18 6839 3 7555 
19 -0 0839 -0 0948 18 0792 18 1638 3 6624 
20 04294 0 5377 17 7175 17 7993 3 5884 
21 0 5603 0 5719 174128 17 4842 3 5372 
22 -1 3312 -I 4981 16 7286 16 7973 3 3894 
23 03477 0 4953 16 4334 16 4994 3 3358 
24 0 2551 0 2718 16 1395 16 1981 3 2819 
25 -0 I 056 -0 1606 15 7923 15 8516 3 2097 
26 I 2140 I 1580 15 7237 15 7805 3 1971 
27 0 7888 06309 15 5816 15 6396 3 1746 
28 2.1927 2.1776 15 7152 15 7734 3 2079 
29 1.9834 2.0995 15 8101 15 8705 3 2348 
30 0 4057 0 4785 15 6185 15 6833 3 1872 
31 0 3396 04463 15 4255 15 4915 3 1486 
32 0 5099 0 5826 15 2727 15 3368 3 1179 
33 0 3195 0 3943 15 0951 15 1597 3 0815 
34 I 7610 I 6441 15 1735 15 2420 3 1070 
35 I 4901 I 7824 15 2070 15 2733 3 1114 
36 I 6247 I 4715 15 2651 15 3320 3 1295 
37 0 8534 I 1113 15 1977 15 2635 3 1197 
38 -0 3544 -0 3939 14 9389 15 0033 3 0686 
39 0 5066 0 6632 14 8273 14 8897 3 0483 
40 2.9194 I 8228 15 1024 15 1665 3 1184 
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AR CAR 
Day 
Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Boehmer test Patell test 
41 I 1597 I 4703 15 0982 15 1587 3 1222 
42 I 2549 I 3201 151110 15 1729 3 1278 
43 -2 5054 -I 4911 14 5522 14 6064 2 9814 
44 I 1576 I 2050 14 5604 14 6135 2 9886 
45 I 3368 I 4960 14 5970 14 6489 2 9985 
46 03922 0 5301 14 4953 14 5470 2 9763 
47 -0 8080 -I 0914 14 2224 14 2770 2 9143 
48 0 6150 0 5593 14 1622 14 2124 2 8938 
49 -I 0437 -1 1801 13 8679 13 9161 2 8199 
50 -I 0079 -1 1305 13 5859 13 6328 2 7494 
51 -I 5711 -I 9430 13 2321 13 2745 2 6671 
52 0 8148 09704 13 2172 13 2639 2 6652 
53 0 1019 0 1028 13 1060 13 1522 2 6375 
54 0 8058 0 8528 13 0937 13 1404 2 6362 
55 0 0756 0 0578 12 9843 13 0285 2 6044 
56 I 3036 0 9667 13 0421 13 0871 2 6182 
57 -0 7483 -0 6636 12 8280 12 8734 2 5688 
58 I 5409 0 8314 12 9193 12 9653 2 5826 
59 -0 1603 -0 1651 12 7885 12 8329 2 5555 
60 I 9139 I 6994 12 9286 12 9724 2 5920 
Panel B Market mode/-usmg the 5-255 event-post_event wmdows 
I 71.9428 10.0092 71 9428 72 2289 10 0092 
2 2.7655 I 3824 52 8268 53 0158 94166 
3 I 8806 I 1835 44 2186 44 3788 9 1667 
4 I 1701 0 7436 38 8795 39 0166 9 1314 
5 -0 2683 -0 1361 34 6549 34 6219 8 9227 
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Table 8.4 Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 (5) Days after IPO in the Sub-samples- OLS Estimated Market Model (Log Return) 
Day 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n~40) 
Sub_bl 
(n~97) 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 
(n~O) 
Sub_bl 
(n~97) 
Panel A Market model- usmg the 60-200 event-post_event wmdows 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n~O) 
Sub_bl 
(n~7) 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) I Sub al (n~l43) 
CAR 
Corrected Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n~40) 
Sub_bl 
(n~7) 
Sub b21 Sub al 
(n~86) (n~l43) 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 
(n~40) 
Sub_bl 
(n~7) 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
64 5671 37.1993 49 6321 55 9178 7.8912 5.9299 6 5620 6 9440 64 5671 37 1993 49 6321 55 9178 64 8957 37 3886 49 8847 56 2024 7 8912 5 9300 6 5620 6 9438 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
19774 27864 06617 3.7475 08688 13502 07950 13437 470541 282742 355631 421897 472710 284210 357331 423890 71100 
2 3299 -0 0098 I 7622 I 1262 I 3538 -0 0066 I 8718 0 7270 39 7647 23 0801 30 0545 35 0980 39 9542 23 1918 30 1892 35 2755 6 7453 
0 7738 0 7937 I 9145 -0 4941 0 4416 0 7722 2 2362 -0 3051 34 8241 20 3848 26 9852 30 1487 34 9750 20 4977 27 0788 30 3208 6 4103 
-03249 14832 -05125 11369 -01442 17113 -04575 05858 310024 188960 239071 274742 311371 190062 239914 276336 58648 
-00621 07023 07774 -04268 -00407 06082 08480 -04062 282758 175363 221415 249062 284132 176349 222463 250393 53621 
0 5110 I 2259 0 5454 0 9159 0 3391 19717 0 6760 0 7881 26 3715 16 6989 20 7052 23 4048 26 5145 16 7851 20 8236 23 5223 5 0648 
20220 04313 3.0036 -02883 11551 03464 32654 -01878 253831 157728 204298 217913 255221 158594 205499 219019 48817 
-18503 -05002 -09504 -17177 -20718 -10217 -23027 -19805 233147 147041 189446 199725 234397 147847 190504 200764 45289 
-11741 -02914 -02468 -14507 -11731 -03218 -04905 -14372 217470 138573 178944 184888 218609 139305 179935 185804 42612 
-08765 11723 01971 -05400 -08301 11693 03438 -05356 204707 135659 171211 174656 205723 136350 172102 175491 40563 
-I 7278 -0 1322 -2 4072 0 2384 -I 3238 -0 2664 -3 1205 0 3301 19 1004 12 9502 15 6973 16 7908 19 1936 13 0169 15 7798 16 8689 3 8266 
-15105 02390 -10683 -06502 -11364 04234 -15397 -06030 179321 125085 147852 159518 180102 125686 148515 160231 3 5753 
12071 -11660 11652 -04762 09611 -06273 16675 -03166 176024 117419 145588 152442 176753 117952 146222 153073 3 5071 
21595 01143 2.5052 02020 14685 04152 3.0540 02117 175632 113732 147120 147795 176412 114247 147805 148424 35092 
00286 04618 12635 -09900 00276 12366 26131 -10557 170126111275 145607 140627 170897 111766 146306 141213 33824 
-01136 00963 02104 -03042 -01277 01483 04127 -04476 164771 108186 141770 135690 165486 108678 142445 136230 32776 
-17123 -10828 -00411 -29029 -15579 -20738-00974-24769 156093 102586 137678 125025 156873 103024 138399 125565 31039 
-02939 03761 01384 -02695 -03331 04160 02957 -03030 151255 100713 134324 121072 152005 101104 135009 121578 30230 
0 1973 0 5455 -0 4483 I 1025 0 2610 0 5774 -I 2811 I 1913 14 7866 9 9382 12 9920 12 0472 14 8573 9 9797 13 0579 12 0965 2 9586 
06821 -00912 00171 07993 06399 -01569 00295 09556 145791 96788 126826 119313 146397 97172 127355 119793 29312 
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5 4760 
4 7267 
4 4303 
4 3162 
3 9487 
3 8222 
3 6264 
3 3436 
3 1350 
3 0719 
2 9097 
2 7818 
2 5612 
2 4700 
2 4150 
2 3441 
2 1964 
2 1448 
2 1048 
2 0398 
6 2129 
5 7393 
5 3762 
4 8179 
4 4038 
4 1253 
4 0285 
3 7886 
3 6383 
3 5700 
3 3391 
3 1493 
3 1029 
3 1485 
3 1196 
3 0482 
2 9815 
2 9350 
2 8364 
2 7896 
6 0704 
5 6791 
5 4137 
5 1783 
4 7413 
4 5648 
4 3034 
3 9293 
3 6141 
3 3856 
3 2439 
3 0434 
2 8824 
2 7888 
2 6270 
2 5267 
22997 
2 2220 
2 2132 
2 1912 
Day 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
-0 8461 
0 1047 
0 9212 
0 2719 
0 1253 
-0 2349 
2 3335 
I 3536 
0 3850 
0 3255 
0 5134 
0 8736 
I 0453 
I 2971 
I 2935 
0 7481 
-0 1781 
0 6681 
3 6306 
09764 
0 9294 
-2 2904 
I 1586 
Patell test 
Sub_a2 Sub_bl 
(n=40) (n~7) 
-I 2477 
0 5458 
-1 1961 
-0 7399 
2 3597 
2.1314 
0 2779 
I 6830 
0 1397 
0 1110 
0 1198 
-0 9683 
I 7902 
0 7347 
I 0294 
0 4109 
-0 4213 
-0 1796 
-0 6203 
0 6344 
09269 
-I 0281 
0 2854 
-0 9130 
0 3898 
-0 0881 
-0 0942 
0 7419 
0 2339 
I 1142 
2 0339 
0 8782 
0 1584 
0 5717 
0 0504 
0 2655 
I 3014 
I 5520 
0 3949 
0 1982 
0 5201 
I 5528 
0 3077 
0 8214 
-2 2476 
-0 2865 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
-0 9723 
0 0932 
0 4657 
-0 0539 
0 9831 
0 9023 
2.0152 
0 7332 
-0 3409 
0 3272 
0 1367 
0 4126 
2 2869 
0 7915 
0 7218 
0 8255 
-0 7276 
0 1866 
2 6095 
I 3650 
0 9582 
-I 2677 
19928 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 
(n~40) 
Sub_bl 
(n~7) 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
-0 9486 -I 4164 -2 1780 -0 9817 
0 1502 0 7526 I 1184 0 1241 
0 9605 -I 4232 -0 2246 0 4143 
0 4167 -I 1025 -0 3536 -0 0675 
0 1142 
-0 1952 
2.3253 
I 5346 
0 4221 
0 3979 
0 5465 
I 0380 
I 0615 
I 5154 
I 1941 
2 9632 
I 5371 
02716 
I 4685 
0 2451 
0 2154 
0 1998 
-14514 
I 3371 
0 9533 
0 8655 
0 8900 0 9703 
-0 1910 -0 5395 
0 9959 -0 1729 
2 1417 
0 2891 
2.7019 
3 6437 
1.9912 
0 3695 
I 2957 
0 1048 
0 6317 
2 5408 
2.5747 
0 8897 
0 3674 
I 1782 
0 7193 
I 0767 
I 6558 
0 9140 
-0 3950 
0 4640 
0 1480 
0 6013 
I 7452 
I 1993 
0 6762 
I 2098 
-0 9789 
0 2746 
2 0363 -I 2026 I 5179 2.3279 
I 1722 I 0336 0 7122 I 8066 
0 8860 2 0391 I 4524 11953 
-I 3782 -0 5824 -3 3030 -0 6208 
I 1184 0 4529 -0 4861 2 7089 
Sub_al 
(n=l43) 
14 0636 
13 7763 
13 6742 
13 4524 
13 2157 
12 9234 
13 1316 
13 1545 
13 0037 
12 8507 
12 7391 
12 6967 
12 6878 
12 7245 
127621 
12 7115 
12 5142 
12 4597 
12 8770 
128715 
12 8608 
123610 
12 3944 
Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n=IO) 
9 1903 
9 1021 
8 6663 
8 3432 
8 6440 
8 8926 
8 7848 
8 9446 
8 8198 
8 6963 
8 5805 
8 2809 
8 4653 
8 4676 
8 5208 
8 4724 
8 2918 
8 1561 
7 9554 
7 9568 
8 0046 
7 7542 
7 7086 
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Sub_bl 
(n~97) 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
12 1964 114496 
12 0096 11 2174 
11 7388 11 0763 
11 4827 to 8417 
11 4052 I 0 8240 
11 2370 I 0 7953 
11 2451 to 9816 
11 4272 I 0 9268 
113955 106809 
11 2386 I 0 5659 
111627 104237 
110011 103364 
to 8836 10 5754 
10 9470 10 5570 
11 0525 I 0 5297 
to9671 to5221 
10 8540 10 2647 
10 7972 10 1622 
to 9069 10 4469 
10 8211 10 5319 
10 8182 10 5536 
10 3490 10 2369 
10 1875 to 4203 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
14 1236 
13 8332 
13 7238 
13 5039 
13 2648 
12 9725 
13 1812 
13 2036 
13 0574 
12 9042 
12 7902 
12 7487 
12 7451 
12 7791 
12 8173 
12 7656 
12 5701 
125133 
12 9312 
12 9234 
12 9137 
12 4112 
12 4422 
CAR 
Corrected Patell test 
Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 
(n~86) (n=40) (n~7) 
9 2237 
9 1355 
8 6980 
8 3727 
8 6726 
8 9239 
8 8155 
8 9807 
8 8569 
8 7363 
8 6210 
8 3208 
8 5035 
8 5061 
8 5595 
8 5106 
8 3240 
8 1882 
7 9902 
7 9882 
8 0370 
7 7753 
7 7317 
12 2494 11 4935 
120638 112561 
11 7849 11 1128 
11 5319 10 8761 
11 4530 10 8561 
11 2856 to 8284 
11 2953 11 0132 
11 4789 10 9599 
114517 107158 
11 2970 I 0 6002 
11 2200 I 0 4563 
11 0581 10 3700 
10 9446 10 6106 
11 0057 10 5913 
11 1127 10 5634 
11 0271 to 5543 
10 9118 10 2972 
108539 101929 
109626 104813 
to 8749 to 5631 
108725 105863 
10 3944 10 2676 
102305 to4521 
Sub_al 
(n~l43) 
2 8284 
2 7793 
2 7720 
2 7305 
2 6764 
2 6215 
2 6749 
2 6836 
2 6469 
2 6187 
2 5965 
2 5951 
2 5993 
2 6041 
2 6187 
2 6130 
2 5769 
2 5718 
2 6751 
2 6790 
2 6779 
2 5464 
2 5600 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 
(n=40) 
I 9097 
I 8859 
I 7767 
I 6979 
I 7790 
I 8383 
I 8034 
I 8464 
I 8131 
I 7823 
I 7580 
I 6783 
I 7266 
I 7271 
I 7375 
I 7266 
I 6848 
I 6493 
I 6025 
I 6032 
I 6175 
I 5534 
I 5430 
Sub_bl 
(n~7) 
2 6815 
2 6481 
2 5861 
2 5295 
2 5254 
2 4945 
2 5067 
2 5631 
2 5456 
2 5089 
2 49to 
2 4564 
2 4334 
2 4412 
2 4754 
2 4584 
2 4443 
2 4370 
24729 
2 4549 
2 4565 
2 3302 
2 2907 
Sub_b2 
(n~86) 
2 0936 
2 0525 
2 0348 
I 9898 
I 9801 
I 9784 
2 0134 
2 ooto 
I 9522 
I 9330 
I 9076 
I 8908 
I 9443 
I 9419 
19365 
I 9384 
I 8858 
I 8662 
19273 
I 9478 
I 9538 
I 8744 
I 9176 
Day 
45 
46 
47 
Sub_al 
(n=l4l) 
2.2410 
0 1697 
-I 0441 
Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n=40) 
Sub_bl 
(n=97) 
-I 3779 0 6504 
05180 02972 
0 2460 -I 1438 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
I 2593 
0 2565 
0 0362 
Sub_al 
(n=l4l) 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 
(n=40) 
Sub_bl 
(n=97) 
2.4189 -2 0099 I 4166 
0 2092 I 3231 0 7335 
-I 3548 0 3978 -2 6861 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
I 3614 
0 3595 
0 0549 
Patell test 
Sub_al 
(n=14J) 
Sub_a2 
(n=40) 
125900 74170 
12 4774 7 412] 
121917 73689 
Sub_bl 
(n=97) 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
Sub_al 
(n=l43) 
101706 104916 126368 
10 1033 10 4147 12 5237 
98284 103086 122418 
CAR 
Corrected Patell test 
Sub_a2 
(n=40) 
7 4397 
7 4357 
7 3910 
Sub_bl 
(n=97) 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
10 2126 10 5227 
10 1444 10 4466 
9 8699 10 3442 
Sub_al 
(n=14l) 
2 6091 
2 5841 
2 5194 
Boehmer test 
Sub_a2 Sub_bl 
(n=40) (n=97) 
I 4718 
I 4713 
I 4611 
2 2885 
2 2739 
2 2015 
Sub_b2 
(n=86) 
19326 
I 9166 
I 8980 
48 -01857 16667 00992 07918 -01742 1]888 01865 06589 120372 75323 97398 103150 120832 75528 97794 103462 24770 14970 21762 18938 
49 
so 
SI 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
-1 1180 
-0 6715 
-1 3318 
0 7968 
-0 1497 
0 6217 
-0 0397 
I 2419 
-I 8229 
-0 7654 
0 3323 
I 5730 
-0 1184 -I 0547 -0 4024 
-0 8860 -I 3901 0 0061 
-08424 -04804 -17817 
02364 05808 05718 
0 5009 
0 5480 
0 2367 
04402 
I 8463 
4 7431 
-0 9712 
I 1197 
-0 7204 
-0 2672 
-12441 
I 0300 
-2 4928 
2 1376 
-0 3873 
0 5523 
0 9137 
I 4592 
I 4316 
0 8078 
I 5560 
-0 0223 
0 1775 
2 2054 
-I 1953 -0 1747 -2 7980 -0 ]839 
-0 7238 -I 1743 -3 OJJO 0 0066 
-I 5654 -I 3070 -I 3827 -I 8765 
0 8639 0 5377 I 2750 0 6977 
-0 1359 
0 5906 
-0 0278 
0 8769 
-I 6927 
-0 8427 
0 3241 
I 3600 
I 2322 -I 7219 
15213 -06315 
0 3178 -2 0680 
0 4047 I 5530 
I 4818 -3 9912 
I 3417 I 7899 
-13138 -09508 
I 0940 0 9213 
07774 
I 3489 
0 9752 
0 5552 
I 5173 
-00178 
0 1529 
I 9753 
Panel B Market mode/-usmg the 5-255 event-post event wmdows 
2 
3 
4 
5 
61 7024 37 2155 
I 6159 2 8599 
2 2414 
0 9363 
-1 0319 
-0 2155 
0 7325 
I 3772 
47 4548 
0 2825 
I 7259 
I 8513 
-I 0543 
54 5471 
3 7340 
0 9103 
-0 2593 
0 7283 
8 3429 
0 8181 
I 3922 
0 5540 
-0 4735 
5 7757 
I 3653 
-0 1420 
0 6815 
I 5720 
7 0119 
0 1982 
0 9899 
I 1116 
-0 4838 
7 1450 
I 4999 
0 6486 
-0 1770 
0 4248 
11 7540 
11 5409 
11 2407 
11 2426 
11 1155 
11 0967 
10 9900 
11 0574 
10 7185 
10 5252 
10 4789 
10 5943 
7 4382 
7 2381 
7 0488 
7 0135 
7 0158 
7 0251 
69929 
6 9890 
7 1720 
7 7327 
7 5404 
7 6219 
9 4892 
9 1973 
9 0394 
9 0326 
8 8480 
8 7293 
8 4819 
8 5434 
8 1380 
8 3482 
8 2267 
8 2292 
10 1517 
10 0505 
9 7020 
9 6876 
9 7213 
9 8294 
9 9327 
9 9515 
10 0699 
9 9798 
9 9180 
10 1197 
11 7988 
11 5835 
11 2792 
11 2855 
11 1593 
11 1400 
11 0306 
11 0976 
10 7581 
10 5645 
10 5179 
10 6323 
7 4568 
7 2578 
7 0669 
7 0323 
7 0321 
7 0432 
7 0107 
7 0095 
7 1942 
7 7568 
7 5616 
7 6438 
9 5292 
9 2343 
9 0753 
9 0712 
8 8860 
8 7662 
8 5164 
8 5773 
8 1701 
8 3818 
8 2621 
8 2642 
10 1796 
10 0795 
9 7257 
9 7146 
9 7484 
9 8585 
9 9605 
9 9813 
10 1020 
10 0113 
9 9452 
10 1464 
2 4075 
2 3529 
2 2843 
2 2866 
2 2541 
2 2508 
2 2192 
2 2358 
2 1586 
2 1135 
2 1073 
2 1372 
14702 
14228 
I 3765 
I 3681 
I 3705 
I 3740 
I 3659 
I 3641 
I 4043 
I 5201 
14720 
I 4934 
61 7024 37 2155 47 4548 54 5471 61 9477 37 3634 47 6434 54 7640 8 3429 5 7757 
633183 400753 477373 582812 449287 284471 338730 413618 75531 53649 
65 5596 39 8598 49 4632 59 1915 37 9883 23 0958 28 6512 34 3084 7 1102 4 6005 
66 4959 40 5923 51 3145 58 9322 33 3586 20 3803 25 7233 29 5960 6 6757 4 2981 
654640 419695 502602 596605 292015 188405 224360 266765 60291 41898 
2 1117 
2 0341 
I 9974 
I 9989 
19544 
19233 
I 8593 
18756 
I 7729 
I 8161 
I 7891 
I 7926 
I 8539 
I 8296 
I 7543 
I 7509 
I 7542
1 
I 7794 
17946 
I 7986 
I 8247 
I 8039 
I 7921 
I 8375 
70119 71563 
65372 64521 
59618 60009 
5 5305 5 6622 
4 9045 5 3802 
Sub_al stands for the sub-sample that mcludes the IPOs ofmdependent firms only, Sub_a2 stands for the sub-sample that mcludes carve-out IPOs only, Sub_bl stands for the sub-sample ofiPOs that offer pnmary shares 
only, Sub_ b2 stands for the sub-sample of IPOs that mclude secondary shares 
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Table 8.5 Summary Statistics for ARs over the 60-Day Event Window after IPO 
(Log Return, Estimated by SUR) 
Day 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Mean Std Dev. 
The ent1re sctmple 
0 1561 0 2539 
0 0067 0 0646 
0 0054 0 0653 
0 0055 0 0563 
00022 00510 
6 -0 0002 0 0345 
7 -0 0007 0 0397 
8 0 0032 0 0408 
9 -0 0045 0 0280 
10 -0 0020 0 0292 
11 00007 00418 
12 -0 0035 0 0365 
13 -0 0023 0 0350 
14 0 0032 0 0395 
15 00058 00431 
16 0 0006 0 0273 
17 0 0000 0 0284 
18 -0 0048 0 0298 
19 -0 0002 0 0254 
20 00010 00260 
21 00019 00279 
22 -0 0022 0 0310 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
00012 00233 
-0 0004 0 0310 
-0 0002 0 0246 
00029 00312 
0 0015 0 0355 
0 0053 0 0335 
0 0034 0 0248 
00016 00266 
0 0007 0 0259 
0 0023 0 0295 
0 0006 0 0256 
0 0044 0 0330 
00023 00231 
0 0038 0 0265 
0 0008 0 0229 
-00012 00249 
0 0019 0 0225 
0 0053 0 0503 
0 0023 0 0292 
0 0033 0 0273 
-0 0029 0 0371 
0 0013 0 0327 
0 0027 0 0293 
0 0006 0 0224 
-0 0021 0 0242 
0 0005 0 0347 
Std Mean Dev 
Sub a! 
0 1643 0 2787 
0 0040 0 0632 
0 0073 0 0717 
0 0059 0 0611 
0 0008 0 0564 
·0 0007 0 0359 
·0 0026 0 0440 
0 0032 0 0440 
·0 0053 0 0309 
-0 0029 0 0311 
-0 0009 0 0440 
-0 0042 0 0403 
·0 0030 0 0389 
0 0038 0 0436 
0 0071 0 0485 
0 0002 0 0304 
-0 0003 0 0305 
·0 0049 0 0327 
-0 0001 0 0265 
0 0008 0 0271 
0 0026 0 0308 
-00013 00329 
0 0006 0 0235 
0 0014 0 0329 
0 0013 0 0254 
0 0009 0 0333 
0 0000 0 0384 
0 0070 0 0365 
0 0026 0 0243 
0 0022 0 0288 
0 0009 0 0285 
0 0028 0 0321 
0 0025 0 0260 
0 0043 0 0324 
0 0024 0 0236 
0 0046 0 0271 
0 0005 0 0248 
-00012 00257 
0 0023 0 0200 
0 0076 0 0558 
00022 00321 
0 0032 0 0302 
-0 0030 0 0376 
00016 00363 
0 0049 0 0311 
0 0002 0 0248 
-0 0029 0 0261 
-0 0010 0 0368 
Mean Std Dev. 
Sub a2 
0 1267 0 1296 
00166 00695 
-0 0013 0 0336 
0 0040 0 0347 
0 0071 0 0233 
00019 00292 
00063 00148 
0 0033 0 0269 
-0 0018 0 0129 
0 0013 0 0214 
0 0067 0 0329 
-00008 00174 
00002 00149 
0 0010 0 0187 
00012 00074 
0 0022 0 0104 
00012 00198 
-0 0047 0 0161 
-0 0007 0 0211 
0 0015 0 0218 
-0 0008 0 0132 
-0 0054 0 0232 
0 0032 0 0227 
-0 0065 0 0224 
-00055 00210 
0 0098 0 0207 
00068 00217 
-0 0006 0 0188 
0 0064 0 0269 
-00007 00160 
-00001 00135 
00008 00180 
-0 0063 0 0233 
0 0048 0 0358 
00021 00218 
0 0009 0 0242 
00018 00141 
-0 0012 0 0218 
0 0007 0 0300 
-00030 00193 
00028 00152 
00038 00131 
-0 0027 0 0357 
00002 00139 
-0 0051 0 0202 
00020 00101 
00006 00154 
0 0062 0 0255 
181 
Std Mean Dev 
Sub b1 
01696 02911 
0 0030 0 0591 
0 0118 0 0825 
00113 00651 
00020 00510 
0 0008 0 0405 
-0 0031 0 0484 
0 0054 0 0433 
-0 0048 0 0312 
-0 0025 0 0328 
0 0034 0 0507 
-0 0059 0 0458 
-0 0026 0 0399 
0 0043 0 0491 
0 0105 0 0539 
0 0035 0 0290 
0 0011 0 0347 
-0 0009 0 0235 
0 0014 0 0271 
-00015 00269 
00015 00297 
-0 0023 0 0280 
00015 00262 
-0 0009 0 0321 
-0 0003 0 0236 
0 0029 0 0252 
-0 0008 0 0389 
0 0049 0 0278 
0 0043 0 0231 
0 0041 0 0276 
0 0007 0 0272 
0 0023 0 0290 
-0 0005 0 0294 
0 0024 0 0332 
0 0025 0 0255 
0 0049 0 0292 
-0 0008 0 0251 
0 0000 0 0267 
0 0015 0 0257 
0 0044 0 0663 
-00001 00321 
0 0036 0 0313 
-0 0053 0 0322 
-0 0035 0 0389 
00015 00281 
0 0004 0 0246 
-0 0049 0 0297 
-0 0019 0 0303 
Std Mean Dev 
Sub b2 
0 1408 0 2046 
00110 00705 
-0 0018 0 0366 
-0 0011 0 0438 
00024 00513 
-0 0013 0 0265 
0 0020 0 0267 
0 0007 0 0380 
-0 0042 0 0241 
-00014 00248 
-0 0022 0 0287 
-00007 00219 
-0 0020 0 0288 
00019 00248 
0 0005 0 0252 
-0 0026 0 0249 
-0 0012 0 0192 
-0 0093 0 0352 
-0 0020 0 0233 
0 0037 0 0248 
0 0023 0 0258 
-0 0022 0 0343 
0 0008 
0 0002 
0 0000 
0 0029 
0 0041 
0 0058 
0 0024 
-00012 
0 0007 
0 0024 
0 0018 
0 0067 
0 0021 
0 0026 
0 0026 
-0 0025 
0 0024 
0 0063 
0 0051 
0 0030 
-0 0003 
0 0067 
0 0041 
0 0008 
0 0010 
0 0033 
0 0196 
0 0300 
0 0258 
0 0370 
0 0314 
0 0392 
0 0268 
0 0252 
0 0245 
0 0303 
0 0206 
0 0329 
0 0203 
0 0232 
0 0201 
0 0226 
0 0184 
0 0213 
0 0255 
0 0223 
0 0420 
0 0228 
0 0306 
0 0198 
0 0154 
0 0391 
Day Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Dev Dev Dev Dev Dev 
The entire sample Sub a! Sub a2 Sub b1 Sub b2 
49 -0 0029 0 0291 -0 0037 0 0318 0 0001 0 0156 -0 0042 0 0239 -0 0013 0 0341 
50 -00012 0 0322 -00010 0 0342 -00018 0 0242 -0 0026 0 0318 0 0004 0 0328 
51 -0 0036 0 0275 -0 0036 0 0298 -0 0039 0 0169 -0 0025 0 0256 -0 0049 0 0295 
52 0 0027 0 0294 0 0031 0 0327 0 0014 0 0121 0 0027 00325 0 0028 0 0258 
53 -0 0006 0 0278 -0 0018 0 0307 0 0039 0 0122 -0 0022 00235 0 0012 0 0320 
54 0 0030 0 0309 0 0031 0 0344 0 0028 0 0113 0 0022 0 0332 00040 0 0282 
55 0 0007 0 0383 0 0006 0 0419 0 0014 0 0210 -0 0036 0 0421 0 0056 0 0330 
56 0 0019 0 0429 0 0025 0 0458 -0 0004 0 0308 0 0038 0 0493 -0 0004 0 0345 
57 -0 0007 0 0304 -0 0038 0 0292 0 0102 0 0324 -0 0057 0 0315 0 0049 00282 
58 0 0016 0 0381 -0 0010 0 0322 0 0110 0 0535 0 0038 00377 -0 0008 0 0385 
59 -0 0003 0 0257 00007 0 0271 -0 0038 0 0194 0 0001 0 0238 -0 0007 0 0277 
60 0 0029 0 0276 00024 0 0283 0 0047 0 0253 0 0006 0 0259 0 0054 0 0295 
Sub_al stands for the sub-sample that mcludes the IPOs ofmdependent firms only, Sub_a2 stands for the sub-sample that 
mcludes carve-out IPOs only, Sub_bl stands for the sub-sample of lP Os that offer pnmary shares only, Sub_b2 stands for 
the sub~sample oflPOs that tnclude secondary shares 
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Table 8.6 Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 Days in the 
Entire Sample (n=183)- SUR Estimated Market Model (Log Return) 
AR CAR 
Day Corrected Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Patell test Boehmer test 
I 74.4389 9.5553 74 4676 74 8177 9 5553 
2 3.0494 I 3680 54 8138 55 0528 8 6578 
3 2.0453 I 2233 45 9417 46 1383 8 0732 
4 I 0694 0 6603 40 3143 40 4877 7 6628 
5 04295 0 2112 36 2398 36 4094 7 1077 
6 0 2603 0 1794 33 1939 33 3551 6 5067 
7 I 0841 0 7954 31 1190 31 3023 6 1861 
8 2.0143 I 2204 29 8124 30 0000 5 9406 
9 -I 8614 -2 263 I 27 4842 27 6582 5 5133 
10 -I 2034 -I 2278 25 7025 25 8525 5 1864 
11 -0 2313 -0 2205 24 4381 24 573 I 4 9765 
12 -I 5869 -I 3492 22 9389 23 0656 4 7073 
13 -12181 -I 0090 21 6997 21 8109 44268 
14 0 5046 0 3571 2 I 0498 21 1480 4 2766 
15 1.9633 I 5020 20 8427 20 9445 4 2413 
16 0 2435 0 2615 20 2412 20 3413 4 1020 
17 -0 0579 -0 0688 19 6234 197177 3 9773 
18 -2 0048 -1 9986 18 5944 18 6954 3 7597 
19 -0 1129 -0 1272 18 0792 18 1683 3 6648 
20 0 4443 0 5554 17 7175 17 8070 3 5919 
21 0 571 I 0 5832 17 4128 17 4940 3 5413 
22 -I 3036 -I 4625 16 7286 16 8128 3 3948 
23 0 3475 0 4930 16 4334 16 5145 3 3408 
24 0 2228 0 2370 16 1395 16 2062 3 2851 
25 -0 1231 -0 1883 15 7923 I 5 8560 3 2120 
26 I 2259 I 1703 15 7237 15 7870 3 1999 
27 0 7896 0 6311 15 5816 15 6462 3 1774 
28 2.1884 2.1780 I 5 7152 15 7791 3 2106 
29 2.0148 2.1308 15 8101 15 8819 3 2389 
30 0 4260 0 5042 15 6185 15 6982 3 1922 
31 0 3504 0 4603 15 4255 15 5080 3 1540 
32 0 5444 06237 15 2727 I 5 3592 3 1248 
33 0 3240 0 4005 15 095 I 15 1827 3 0883 
34 I 7435 I 6304 15 1735 15 2616 3 I 132 
35 I 4635 I 7500 I 5 2070 15 2879 3 I 164 
36 I 6200 1 4649 15 2651 15 3457 3 1343 
37 0 8195 I 0639 15 1977 15 2714 3 1230 
38 -0 3485 -0 3877 14 9389 15 0122 3 0722 
39 04845 06364 14 8273 14 8949 3 0509 
40 2.9458 I 8410 15 1024 15 1758 3 1221 
183 
-- ----------------
AR CAR 
Day Corrected Paten test Boehmer test Paten test Paten test Boehmer test 
41 I 1552 I 4666 IS 0982 IS 1672 3 1256 
42 I 2474 I 3144 IS 1110 IS 1802 3 1310 
43 ·25516 ·I 5175 14 5522 14 6064 2 9828 
44 I 1874 I 2372 14 5604 14 6181 2 9912 
45 1.3364 I 4934 14 5970 14 6534 3 0010 
46 0 4288 0 5797 14 4953 14 5569 2 9801 
47 ·0 8589 -1 1595 14 2224 14 2793 2 9163 
48 0 5942 0 5401 14 1622 14 2117 2 8950 
49 ·I 0384 .J 1731 13 8679 13 9161 2 8211 
50 ·I 0189 .J 1432 13 5859 13 6312 2 7502 
51 ·I 5868 -1 9573 13 2321 13 2707 2 6674 
52 0 8300 0 9946 13 2172 13 2623 2 6660 
53 0 0965 0 0970 13 1060 13 1499 2 6381 
54 0 8170 0 8646 13 0937 13 1397 2 6372 
55 0 1043 0 0797 12 9843 13 0316 2 6063 
56 I 3003 0 9642 13 0421 13 0898 26200 
57 ·07510 ·0 6655 12 8280 12 8757 2 5706 
58 I 5151 0 8171 12 9193 12 9643 2 5836 
59 ·0 1548 .Q 1596 12 7885 12 8325 2 5567 
60 I 9258 I 7108 12 9286 12 9735 2 5935 
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Table 8.7 Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 Days after IPO in the Sub-samples- SUR Estimated Market Model (Log Return) 
Day ~ CAR 
Patell test Boehrner test Patell test Corrected Pdtell test 13ochmcr test 
Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 I Sub al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 I Sub al Sub_a2 Sub_bl 
(n=143) (n=40) (n=97) (n=86) (n=143) (n=40) (n=97) (n=86) (n=l43) (n=40) (n=97) (n=86) (n=143) (n=40) (n=97) (n=86) (n=143) (n=40) (n=97) 
I 64 5369 371950 49.6144 55.8946 7 8890 5 9287 6 5625 6.9400 64 5369 37 1950 49 6144 55 8946 64 8653 37 3843 49 8669 56 1791 7 8890 5 9288 6 5625 
2 1.9652 2 8068 0 6568 3.7508 0 8636 I 3580 04167 I 3454 47 0241 28 2855 35 5471 42 1757 47 2409 28 4322 35 7169 42 3750 7 1099 5 4793 6 2106 
3 2 3205 -0 0128 I 7500 I 1250 I 3484 -0 0085 0 9832 0 7253 39 7347 23 0877 30 0344 35 0859 39 9242 23 1991 30 1690 35 2633 6 7435 4 7304 5 7346 
4 0 8058 0 7638 I 9423 -0 5028 0 4598 0 7438 I 1981 ·0 3110 348142 20 3764 26 9817 30 1338 34 9651 20 4891 27 0754 30 3059 6 4132 44293 5 3761 
5 -0 3114 I 5074 -0 4918 I 1487 -0 1382 I 7362 -0 2322 0 5917 30 9995 18 8994 23 9133 27 4663 31 1342 19 0095 23 9975 27 6256 5 8705 4 3191 4 8210 
6 -0 0680 0 6854 0 7784 -0 4469 -0 0446 0 5950 0 4488 -0 4254 28 2707 17 5325 22 1475 24 8907 28 4080 17 6310 22 2521 25 0238 5 3669 3 9490 4 4069 
7 0 5571 I 2654 0 5639 0 9825 0 3698 2 0316 0 3697 0 8461 26 3842 167102 20 7177 234156 26 5271 16 7967 20 8360 23 5333 5 0734 3 8275 4 1296 
8 2 0603 0 4128 3.0176 -0 2665 I 1765 0 3330 I 7393 -0 1730 25 4086 15 7769 20 4465 21 8091 25 5474 15 8636 20 5663 21 9200 4 8927 3 6292 4 0337 
9 -I 8422 -0 4981 -0 9299 -I 7277 -2 0595 -1 0192 -1 1887 -I 9913 23 3413 14 7086 18 9672 19 9859 23 4663 14 7894 19 0729 20 0900 4 5403 3 3463 3 7955 
10 -I 2055 -0 2948 -0 2712 -1 4674 -I 2009 -0 3272 -0 2846 -I 4517 21 7623 13 8606 17 9081 18 4963 21 8762 13 9339 18 0070 18 5880 4 2695 3 1377 3 6431 
11 -0 8842 I 1771 02110 -0 5615 -0 8356 I 1744 0 1942 -0 5561 20 4830 13 5705 17 1383 17 4662 20 5844 13 6397 17 2273 17 5498 4 0639 3 0746 3 5757 
12 -I 7368 -0 1104 -2 4007 0 2347 -13314 -0 2219 -16461 0 3251 19 1096 12 9609 15 7157 16 7904 19 2026 13 0279 15 7982 16 8684 3 8337 2 9141 3 3457 
13 -I 5210 0 2705 -1 0497 -0 6620 -1 1424 0 4761 -0 7996 -06112 17 9380 12 5274 14 8080 15 9480 18 0160 12 5878 14 8743 16 0193 3 5808 2 7883 3 1565 
14 I 2073 -I 2035 I 1614 -0 4973 09592 -0 6450 0 8764 -0 3297 17 6082 11 7501 14 5797 15 2350 17 6808 11 8037 14 6431 15 2979 3 5127 2 5640 3 1097 
15 2 1688 0 0985 2 5151 0 1928 14748 0 3553 I 6208 0 2022 17 5711 11 3771 14 7348 14 7682 17 6489 11 4288 14 8033 14 8310 3 5152 2 4717 3 1559 
16 0 0254 04727 I 2614 -0 9845 00246 I 2595 I 3787 -I 0488 17 0195 11 1340 14 5822 14 0531 17 0964 11 1833 14 6521 141116 3 3881 2 4176 3 1267 
17 -0 1060 0 0765 0 2208 -0 3190 -0 1192 0 1176 0 2290 -0 4682 16 4857 10 8201 14 2004 13 5562 16 5569 10 8695 14 2680 136100 3 2836 2 3453 3 0558 
18 -I 6931 -I 0868 -0 0304 -2 8922 -I 5364 -2 0811 -0 0380 -2 4595 15 6221 10 2591 13 7931 12 4925 15 7000 10 3030 13 8652 12 5463 3 1105 2 1971 2 9896 
19 -0 3209 0 3652 0 1376 -03107 -0 3621 0 4058 0 1549 -0 3487 15 1318 10 0693 13 4568 12 0880 15 2066 10 1085 13 5253 12 1384 3 0280 2 1448 2 9430 
20 0 2221 0 5303 -0 4329 I 1078 0 2933 0 5606 -0 6521 I 1959 14 7984 9 9329 13 0193 12 0297 14 8688 9 9745 13 0852 12 0788 2 9651 2 1040 2 8453 
21 0 6897 -0 0825 0 0030 0 8299 0 6476 -0 1413 0 0027 0 9938 14 5922 9 6755 12 7062 11 9209 14 6525 9 7140 12 7591 11 9687 2 9381 2 0396 2 7976 
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Sub_b: 
(n=86) 
6 940 
6 080 
5 700 
5 446 
5 219 
4 781 
4614 
4 354 
3 977 
3 658 
0 
E 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
I 
5 
3 
I 
3 4260 
3 2821 
3 0781 
2 9145 
2 819~ 
2 656, 
2 5541 
2 325( 
2 244: 
2 2361 
2 2151 
Day _AlL CAR 
Patell te~t Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Patell test Boehmer test 
Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b; 
(n~l43) (n~40) (ndJ7) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~97) (n~86) 
I 
22 -0 8097 -I 2573 -0 8882 -0 9583 -0 9046 -I 4273 -1 1164 -0 9650 14 0841 9 1850 12 2247 11 4425 14 1438 9 2186 12 2776 11 4862 2 8368 I 9091 2 6905 2 1175 
23 0 0917 0 5699 0 3679 0 1162 0 1310 0 7842 0 5587 0 1534 13 7936 9 1019 12 0327 112152 13 8503 9 1355 12 0868 11 2537 2 7867 I 8865 2 6557 2 0770 
24 0 9030 -I 2307 -0 0935 04244 0 9392 -I 4697 -0 1254 0 3777 13 6875 8 6591 11 7602 11 0657 13 7367 8 6908 11 8063 11 1018 2 7784 I 7753 2 5932 2 0574 
25 0 2567 -0 7488 -0 0899 -0 0841 0 3962 -1 1151 -0 1788 -0 1060 13 4623 8 3344 11 5046 10 8253 13 5135 8 3638 11 5537 10 8592 2 7361 I 6961 2 5366 2 0108 
26 0 1379 2.3613 0 7469 0 9950 0 1258 2.9531 I 1437 0 7282 13 2279 8 6356 11 4277 108102 13 2766 8 6642 11 4754 10 8419 2 6824 I 7773 2 5326 2 0015 
27 -0 2440 2.1504 0 2451 0 8916 -0 2027 I 5491 0 1602 I 0617 12 9337 8 8880 11 2613 10 7797 12 9824 8 9194 11 3098 10 8124 2 6269 I 8376 2 5023 I 9993 
28 2 3171 0 2998 I 0950 2.0294 2 3150 0 2930 I 4078 16725 13 1385 8 7845 11 2653 10 9690 13 1878 8 8152 11 3154 11 0002 2 6797 I 8039 2 5134 2 0355 
29 I 3924 I 6767 2 0679 0 7428 I 5808 I 4540 I 9571 09254 13 1686 8 9431 11 4533 10 9162 13 2174 8 9793 11 5050 10 9489 2 6902 I 8464 2 5714 2 02341 
30 0 4168 0 1231 0 8946 -0 3286 0 4588 0 2156 I 0746 -0 3827 13 0233 8 8153 11 4242 106727 13 0766 8 8524 11 4803 10 7072 2 6549 I 8123 2 5544 I 9747
1 31 0 3300 0 1256 0 1609 0 3403 0 4031 0 2445 0 1982 04829 12 8708 8 6945 11 2673 10 5602 12 9238 8 7345 11 3255 10 5941 26268 I 7821 2 5177 I 9559 
32 0 5556 0 1138 0 5921 0 1653 0 5933 0 1894 0 7101 0 1798 12 7663 8 5777 11 1945 10 4232 12 8170 8 6181 11 2516 104554 26064 I 7575 2 5009 I 9313 
33 08664 -0 9453 00460 0 4237 I 0316 -I 4168 0 0506 06200 12 7223 8 2822 11 0316 10 3378 12 7741 8 3220 11 0886 103711 2 6045 I 6789 2 4659 I 9147 
34 I 0380 I 7666 0 2707 2 2558 I 0533 I 3275 0 3400 I 7263 12 7118 8 4624 10 9146 10 5715 12 7688 8 5006 10 9755 10 6064 26084 I 7262 2 4430 I 9679 
35 I 2834 0 7037 I 3008 0 7534 I 5014 0 9061 I 3434 I 1395 12 7458 8 4596 10 9774 10 5467 12 8000 8 4979 11 0359 10 5806 2 6125 I 7254 2 4507 I 964 
36 I 3011 I 0050 I 5434 0 7240 I 1986 0 8450 I 3516 0 6774 12 7844 8 5088 11 0811 105199 12 8392 8 5474 11 1411 10 5532 2 6274 I 7348 2 4845 I 9587 
37 0 7211 0 3894 0 3668 0 8058 0 8556 0 9114 0 4357 I 1771 12 7290 8 4570 10 9906 10 5092 12 7828 8 4951 11 0505 10 5410 2 6205 I 7231 2 4660 I 960 
38 -0 1733 -0 4177 0 1874 -0 7074 -0 1860 -0 5366 0 1837 -0 9547 12 5323 8 2773 10 8754 10 2552 12 5878 8 3092 10 9331 10 2875 2 5845 I 6815 2 4515 I 907 
39 0 6435 -0 1803 0 4908 0 1855 0 9637 -0 1737 0 5882 0 2752 12 4736 8 1416 10 8137 10 1526 12 5269 8 1735 10 8703 10 1831 2 5783 I 6460 2 4429 I 887 
40 3 6461 -0 5929 I 5924 2 6061 2.0467 -1 1481 0 8240 2 3250 12 8932 7 9454 10 9295 10 4370 12 9471 7 9801 10 9851 104711 2 6824 I 6004 2 4805 I 949 
41 0 9653 0 6458 0 3149 I 3507 I 1600 I 0560 0 3855 I 7920 12 8857 7 9488 10 8445 105198 12 9373 7 9800 10 8982 10 5507 2 6858 I 6016 2 4627 I 969 
42 0 9236 0 9217 0 8265 0 9418 0 8816 2 0477 0 7732 I 1794 12 8739 7 9958 10 8422 10 5392 12 9266 8 0281 10 8963 10 5716 2 6845 I 6157 2 4644 I 975 
43 -2 3099 -I 0902 -2 2828 -I 2978 -I 3918 -06130 -I 7630 -0 6366 12 3711 7 7360 10 3672 10 2180 12 4210 7 7569 10 4125 10 2485 2 5521 I 5493 2 3363 I 894 
44 I 1863 0 2968 -0 2678 2 0165 I 1467 0 4693 -0 2406 2.7413 12 4085 76924 10 2084 10 4052 12 4562 7 7153 10 2512 10 4368 2 5667 I 5393 2 2976 I 938 
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Day _.AlL CAR 
Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Patell test Boehmer test 
Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b2 
Sub_al Sub_a2 Sub_bl Sub_b: 
(n~l43) (n~O) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~O) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~97) (n~86) (n~l43) (n~40) (n~7) (n~86) (n~l43) 
(n~40) (n~97) (n~86) 
45 2.2562 -I 4075 0 6497 I 2594 2 4336 -2 0485 0 7489 I 3565 12 6062 7 3966 10 1912 10 4767 12 6528 7 4190 I 0 2331 
10 5075 2 6165 I 4672 2 2952 I 9539 
46 0 2095 0 5211 0 2988 0 3083 0 2582 I 3344 0 3895 0 4327 12 4993 7 3926 10 1238 10 4077 12 5455 7 4156 
10 1649 10 4393 2 5928 14669 2 2805 I 9395 
47 -I 0774 0 1999 -1 1701 -0 0102 -I 3976 0 3222 -I 4489 -00155 12 2085 7 3427 9 8449 10 2948 12 2585 7 3644 9 8863 
10 3302 2 5267 I 4551 2 2069 I 9192 
48 -0 2000 I 6491 0 0795 0 7824 ·0 1874 I 3732 0 0790 0 6510 12 0518 7 5038 9 7533 10 3000 12 0976 7 5239 
9 7927 10 3309 2 4837 I 4904 2 1808 I 9146 
49 -1 1309 -0 0827 -1 0739 -0 3742 -1 2087 -0 1215 -I 5009 -0 3573 11 7666 7 4150 9 4998 10 1409 11 8112 7 4334 9 5396 
10 1686 2 4135 14650 2 1154 I 8749 
50 -0 6863 -08816 -I 3794 -0 0213 -0 7395 -1 1727 -I 5908 -0 0232 11 5513 7 2158 9 2093 10 0359 11 5936 7 2353 
9 2462 10 0646 2 3583 I 4179 2 0382 I 8494 
51 -I 3438 -0 8534 -0 4873 -I 7972 -I 5765 -I 3142 -0 7396 -1 8882 11 2493 7 0252 9 0503 9 6854 11 2875 7 0430 
9 0861 9 7087 2 2891 I 3713 2 0010 I 7726 
52 0 8205 0 2240 0 5878 0 5866 0 8947 0 5171 0 6870 0 7195 11 2544 6 9884 9 0444 9 6732 11 2970 7 0070 9 0829 
9 6998 22923 I 3625 2 0027 I 7697 
53 -0 1601 0 5090 -0 7231 0 9087 -0 1450 I 2427 -0 9116 0 7706 11 1257 6 9921 8 8593 9 7063 11 1693 7 0081 
8 8972 9 7331 2 2593 I 3653 I 9581 17728 
54 0 6181 0 5788 -0 2755 I 4844 0 5871 I 6002 -0 3438 I 3738 11 1063 7 0058 8 7394 9 8180 11 1495 7 0238 
8 7761 9 8468 2 2559 I 3698 I 9266 I 7993 
55 -00219 0 2644 -1 2561 I 4861 -00153 0 3523 -1 1015 I 0124 11 0020 6 9775 8 4902 9 9287 11 0424 6 9951 8 5247 
9 9563 2 2247 I 3628 I 8622 I 8161 
56 I 2204 0 4737 I 0164 0 8173 0 8619 0 4346 0 8092 0 5624 11 0664 6 9782 8 5499 9 9489 111063 6 9986 8 5837 
9 9784 2 2406 I 3619 I 8779 I 8204 
57 -I 8105 I 8170 -2 4946 I 5539 -I 6790 I 4570 -2 1099 I 5143 10 7291 7 1574 8 1441 100671 10 7684 
7 1795 81762 10 0989 2 1639 I 4013 I 7752 I 8469 
58 -0 7866 4.7280 2.1447 -0 0676 -0 8648 I 3371 09492 -0 0540 10 5329 7 7163 8 3552 9 9710 10 5721 7 7402 
8 3887 10 0023 2 1180 I 5167 I 8187 I 8245 
59 0 3498 -0 9925 -0 3777 0 1753 0 3413 -I 3540 -0 4902 0 1513 10 4888 7 5214 8 2349 9 9090 10 5276 7 5424 
8 2703 9 9359 2 1123 I 4680 I 7920 I 8125 
60 I 5812 I 1295 0 5566 2 2181 I 3679 I 1039 0 4911 1.9883 10 6051 7 6042 8 2379 10 1124 10 6430 7 6260 
82728 10 1389 2 1425 I 4898 I 7956 I 859 
Sub_ at stands for the sub~sample that mcludes the IPOs of mdependent finns only. Sub_a2 ::.t.mds for the sub-sample that mcludes carve.aut IPOs only, Sub_bl stands for the sub-sample of IPOs that offer pnmary shares only, 
Sub_ b2 stands for the sub-sample of IPOs that mclude secondary shares 
' 
I 
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Evidently, systemic nsk, as reflected by the beta coefficient m the market model, IS 
s1gmficantly lower for the primary share offerings sub-group than for the secondary 
share offermgs subgroup (Table 8 9) Together w1th the earher conclusion on the 
correlation of the residuals, this Implies that the risks of the pnmary-share-offering 
IPOs are more highly correlated and relatively less affected by overall market 
performance, compared to the secondary-share-offenng IPOs 
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Table 8.8 SUR Regression Diagnostics for the Market Model (Log Return) 
Vanable Obs Mean Std Dev Mm 
200-day estimatiOn wmdow 
Max 
Panel A The enllre sample 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Chi-sq 
p-value 
183 -0 0020 0 0035 -0 0117 0 0095 
183 0 2679 
183 0 0317 
183 00210 
183 55 838 
0 4573 
0 0160 
0 0348 
92 814 
-0 8521 2 2616 
0 0023 0 0973 
-00013 02353 
0 0200 654 05 
183 0 0876 0 1850 0 0000 0 8910 
Panel B (Sub_al) The IPOs ofmdependentfirms 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Chi-sq 
143 -00022 
143 0 2725 
143 0 0329 
143 0 0208 
143 53 000 
0 0036 
0 4830 
0 0166 
0 0363 
90216 
-0 0117 0 0095 
-0 8521 2 2616 
0 0023 0 0973 
-0 0013 0 2353 
0 0200 654 05 
p-value 143 0 0883 0 1834 0 0000 0 8910 
Panel C (Sub_al) The IPOs of carve-out firms 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Chi-sq 
p-value 
40 -0 0015 
40 02515 
40 0 0271 
40 0 0221 
40 65 984 
40 0 0851 
0 0033 
0 3551 
0 0127 
0 0296 
102 13 
0 1931 
-0 0085 0 0061 
-0 2853 I 5589 
0 0055 0 0663 
-0 0009 0 1245 
0 0600 478 38 
00000 08117 
Panel D (Sub_bl) The pnmary share offermgs 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
97 -0 0025 
97 0 1842 
97 0 0341 
97 0 0148 
0 0035 -0 0117 0 0058 
0 4436 -0 8521 2 1961 
0 0176 0 0023 0 0973 
0 0290 -0 0005 0 2353 
Chi-sq 97 40 124 81 069 0 0600 654 05 
p-value 97 0 I 085 0 1994 0 0000 0 8117 
Panel E (Sub_bl) The offermgs mcludmg secondary shares 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Chi-sq 
p-value 
86 -0 0015 0 0036 -0 0103 0 0095 
86 03623 04566 -03821 22616 
86 0 0289 0 0135 0 0055 0 0888 
86 0 0280 0 0394 -0 0013 0 1869 
86 73 563 I 02 09 0 0200 478 38 
86 0 0641 0 1653 0 0000 0 8910 
Breusch-Pagan test ofmdependence for SUR 
Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
255-day estimatiOn wmdow 
-00019 00031 -00116 00071 
0 2831 
0 0312 
0 0191 
19 290 
0 4450 -0 5294 2 3577 
00148 00021 00882 
0 0318 -0 0054 0 2117 
32 096 0 0000 223 79 
0 1466 0 2602 0 0000 0 9974 
-0 0020 
0 2961 
0 0327 
0 0192 
19 277 
0 0032 
04702 
0 0155 
0 0330 
33 246 
-00116 00071 
-0 5294 2 3577 
0 0021 0 0882 
-0 0036 0 2117 
0 0000 223 79 
0 1496 0 2658 0 0000 0 9778 
-0 0013 0 0029 -0 0077 0 0043 
0 2365 0 3408 -0 3226 I 4237 
0 0262 0 0111 0 0062 0 0594 
00188 00271 -00054 01162 
19 339 27 979 0 0000 131 56 
0 1362 0 2418 0 0000 0 9974 
-0 0024 0 0030 -0 0116 0 0049 
0 2063 0 4476 -0 5294 2 3577 
00337 00164 00021 00882 
0 0137 0 0297 -0 0054 0 2117 
13 284 
0 1786 
29 074 
0 2808 
0 0000 223 79 
0 0000 0 9778 
-0 0013 0 0033 -0 0093 0 0071 
0 3698 0 4282 -0 2282 2 0815 
00285 00124 00062 00791 
00251 00331 -00013 01544 
26 064 34 109 0 0000 148 91 
0 1106 0 2310 0 0000 0 9974 
200-day estimatton wmdow (LoganthmiC return) Cht2(16653) ~ 17137 511, Pr ~ 0 0042 
255-day estimatiOn wmdow (Loganthmic return) Chi2(16653) ~ 17340 310, Pr ~ 0 0001 
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Table 8.9 Equality Tests (Mean and Median) on the Alpha and the Beta of the 
Sub-samples (Estimated by SUR, Log Return) 
200-day esttmation 255-day estimatiOn 
Sub-samples Tests window wmdow 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta 
Sub_a1 vs Sub_a2 Wtlcoxon rank-sum test 0 267 0 962 0 194 0 589 
Medtan test 0 451 0499 0 266 0 080 
Contmwty corrected medtan test 0 565 0 619 0 351 0 116 
Sub b1 vs Sub_b2 W!lcoxon rank-sum test 0.134 0.002 0.026 0.000 
Medtan test 0 210 0.006 0 210 0.015 
Contmuity corrected medtan test 0 269 0.010 0 269 0.022 
Sub_al stands for the sub-sample that mcludes the IPOs ofmdependent firms only, Sub_a2 stands for the 
sub-sample that mcludes carve-out IPOs only, Sub_ b I stands for the sub-sample of IPOs that offer 
pnmary shares only, Sub_b2 stands for the sub-sample of IPOs that mclude secondary shares Thts table 
reports the p-value of the non-parametric Wtlcoxon rank-sum test (testmg equality of mean) and the 
Medtan test (testmg equality of medtan) between the two sub-samples (carve-outs versus mdependent 
firms, pnmary share IPOs versus secondary share IPOs) For the Medtan test, the Pearson cht-squared test 
stattsttc ts computed both wtth and wtthout a contmmty correction 
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8.4.3 The Relationship between Underpricing, Ownership Structure, and IPO 
Structure 
Table 8.10 presents the results of the cross-sectional OLS regresswns of underpricing 
on market performance (Market_ Return), ownership concentration (CONCI, CONC2) 
and control (Carve-out), and IPO structure (Portion_ Dummy). Fourteen different types 
of underpricmg calculated by various methods are analysed. As shown by the table, the 
results do not vary much. 
For several reasons, I favour Underpncing!O, wh1ch is computed usmg 5-255 
event-post_ event windows based on Joganthnuc returns estimated by the market model 
usmg SUR. First, g1ven the fact that the daily abnormal returns disappeared shortly after 
trading began (zero ARs from the second tradmg day), a 5-day event window 1s long 
enough to capture underpncing wh1le avoiding contamination by other events Second, 
Jog returns are preferred as they are more hkely to be normally d1stnbuted, therefore 
prov1dmg better accuracy for estimatiOn by the market model. Third, the market model 
is supenor to the market-adjusted model and raw returns m that 1t deals w1th the 
poss1bility that a change m a stock price may come from eo-movement w1th market 
performance Fourth, SUR estimation adjusts for correlation between the res1duals of 
different equations 
Evidently, Market_ Return 1s an important determmant of the degree of underpricmg, 
while underpricing mcreases in market performance, wh1ch confirms Hypothesis 4. For 
vanables related to ownership and control structure, CONCI IS significant and positive 
whereas CONC2 IS negative but not significant (CONCI and CONC2 are Jointly 
s1gmficant), wh1le Carve-out IS significant and positive. Therefore Hypothesis 2 IS 
confirmed whereas HypotheSIS 3 1s reJected. The dominant concern for the UK IPO 
firms seems to be to avmd dilution on the owners' control status. The higher IS 
ownership concentratiOn (in another words, the more highly controlled of the IPO firm 
by the owners), the less likely 1t 1s that under-monitoring will be a problem On the 
other hand, the control nghts of the owners w1ll be more valuable This implies that 
1ssuers would prefer to underprice in order to induce a larger number investors (more 
mtense ratwning) to m1mmJse the potential threat to their control rights and to keep out 
non-value-maxJmJzmg momtonng from outside block shareholders 
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PortiOn_ Dummy is s1gmficant and positive, suggesting that when other factors are kept 
constant (controlling for both market conditions and ownership concentration and 
control), underpricing vanes w1th IPO structure. IPOs that offer pnmary shares only are 
more highly underpnced than those m which the ongmal shareholders are selling out. 
This result supports Hypothesis 1 and confirms that the degree of underpncmg is 
significantly influenced by the entrepreneunal wealth losses effect 
When I examme the interactiOn effects between the carve-out dummy, portion dummy 
and ownership concentration at IPO (CONC1), 1t is found that ownership concentration 
actually reduces underpncing for the carve-outs that offer primary shares only 
(0.3466- 0.3294- 0 2663 = -0.2491). An explanatiOn for this 1s that there may be 
a threshold for the impact of ownership concentratiOn on underpricing when the Issue 
company is so firmly controlled by a smgle shareholder ( e g. with over 50% 
shareholding), d1lutwn of control nghts is less hkely to be a problem for an Issuer that 
goes pubhc purely for raismg new finance. 
Comparing between the independent firms that offer pnmary shares only and the ones 
that include secondary shares, the change m underpricmg IS much more sensitive to the 
degree of ownership concentration for the latter group. Here a one-umt mcrease m 
ownership concentratiOn at the time of the IPO Will produce an increase of 34 66% for 
the independent secondary-share-offenng lP Os but only 8 03% ( = 0.3466 - 0.2663) 
for the independent pnmary-share-offermg IPOs. This imphes that for independent 
firms, when the IPO involves ms1der sellmg, the change m underpncing is much more 
sensitive to the degree of ownership concentratiOn than when it does not. This provides 
further supportmg evidence for Hypothesis 2. To retain their original control is a very 
important consideratiOn for the owners of IPO firms, especmlly for owners planning an 
ms1der exit, and underpncmg is used as a means to discriminate among mvestors so as 
to protect the msiders' controlling status. 
There is also an interactiOn effect between the carve-out dununy, portiOn dummy and 
market performance (Market_ Return), significant at 10% level While underpncmg 
increases m market return for both the IPOs of mdependent firms and carve-outs, the 
former group shows a higher sensitivity of the performance to market movement. In 
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addition, the performance of the carve-outs that offer primary shares only IS more 
sensitive to market movement (0 6299 + 0.0843- 0 3980 = 0 3162), as compared to 
the carve-outs that include secondary shares (0 6299 - 0 3980 = 0.2319) 
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Table 8.10 Determinants of Under 
Panel A Market-adjusted abnormal return on day I Panel B Market model esllmated abnormal return on day I 
(OLS regressiOn) 
Underpncmg I U nderpncmg2 Underpncmg5 Underpncmg6 
(FTSE all share mdex) (FTSE mdustnal md1ces) (Market model (200)) (Market model (255)) 
Model! Model2 Model! Model2 Model! Model2 Model! Model2 
Intercept -0 0584 -0 0643 .o 0476 .Q 0566 -0 0601 -0 0665 .o 0606 
.Q 0669 
(0 0917) (0 0875) (0 0936) (0 0889) (0 0917) (0 0877) (0 0916) (0 0876) 
Market Return 0 6380'' 0 6805" 0 6054" 0 6706" 0 6272" 06739" 0 6303" 
06758" 
(0 2235) (02061) (0 2249) (0 2076) (0 2233) (0 2060) (0 2228) (0 2059) 
CON Cl 0 3391" 0 3449" 0 3332'* 0 3421" 03460" 03524" 03464" 0 3527" 
(0 1201) (0 1201) (0 1220) (0 1213) (0 1200) (0 1200) (0 1201) (0 1201) 
CONC2 ·0 1471 -0 1498 .o 1459 -0 1501 ·0 1484 -0 1514 -0 1488 
.01517 
(0 1116) (0 1150) (0 1112) (0 1147) (0 1114) (0 1147) (01115) (0 1148) 
Carve-out 0 2156' 0 2212' 0 1936' 0 2022' 0 2160' 0 2223' 0 2165* 0 2225' 
(0 0931) (0 0902) (0 0961) (0 0926) (0 0926) (0 0897) (0 0924) (0 0895) 
PortiOn_ Dummy 0 2790' 0 2838' 0 2766' 0 2838' 0 2859' 0 2911' 0 2864' 0 2915' 
(0 1146) (0 1179) (0 1155) (0 1184) (0 1146) (0 1180) (0 1145) (0 1180) 
CONC !*Carve-out -0 3262" .o 3318" .o 3040' .03126" -0 3293" .o 3355" .o 3296" .Q 3356" 
(0 1176) (0 1158) (0 1200) (0 1175) (0 1167) (0 1148) (0 1166) (0 1147) 
CONC I*Port10n _Dummy -0 2567# .o 2597# -0 2636# -0 2682# -0 2657# .o 2690# -0 2659# 
.Q 2692# 
(0 1388) (0 1383) (0 1394) (0 1386) (0 1385) (0 1381) (0 1384) (0 1381) 
Market Retum*Carve-out -04103# -04261# -0 3873 .Q 4116# .Q 3948# -0 4123# -0 3980# 
.Q 4150# 
(0 2397) (0 2437) (0 2416) (0 2445) (0 2365) (0 2409) (0 2367) (02412) 
Market_Retum 'PortiOn_ Dummy 0 0769 0 1178 0 0844 0 0823 
(0 3088) (03104) (0 3080) (0 3080) 
Prob>F 0 0155 00111 0 0278 0 0174 0 0131 0 0088 0 0129 
0 0088 
R-sq 0 1426 0 1422 0 1386 0 1378 0 1438 0 1434 0 1441 
0 1437 
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Panel C Market model esllmated abnormal return on day 1 Panel D Raw return on day 1 
(SUR regresswn) 
Underpncmg9 UnderpricmglO Underpncmgl3 
(Market model (200)) (Market model (255)) (Raw return) 
Model I Model2 Model I Model2 Model I Model2 
Intercept -0 0600 -0 0665 -0 0605 -0 0669 -0 0630 -0 0691 
(00917) (0 0877) (0 0917) (0.0877) (0 0919) (0 0879) 
Market_ Return 0 6267** 06741** 0.6299'' 0 6765" 0 6309'' 0 6751" 
(0 2233) (0 2058) (0.2229) (0.2059) (0 2233) (0 2062) 
CONCI 03459** 0 3524" 0.3466" 03530" 0 3461" 0 3521" 
(0 1201) (0 1200) (0.1201) (0 1201) (0 1203) (0 1202) 
CONC2 -0 1486 -0 1516 -0 1490 -0 1520 -0 1488 -0 1517 
(0 1113) (01146) (0.1115) (0.1148) (0 1113) (0 1146) 
Carve-out 0 2161' 0 2224' 0 2162' 0.2224' 0 2189' 0 2248' 
(0 0926) (0 0897) (0 0925) (0 0896) (0 0928) (0 0899) 
PortiOn_ Dummy 0 2860' 0 2912' 0.2865' 0 2917' 0 2847' 0 2896' 
(0 1146) (0 1180) (0 1145) (0 1180) (0 1147) (0 1181) 
CONC I *Carve-out -0 3294** -0 3356** -0 3294" -0 3355'* -03312** -0 3371** 
(0 1167) (0 1147) (0 1167) (0 1148) (0 1172) (01153) 
CONCl *Portwn_Dummy -0 2658# -0 2692# -0.2663# -0 2696# -02631' -0 2662# 
(0 1385) (0 1381) (0 1385) (0 1381) (0 1389) (0 1385) 
Market_ Return 'Carve-out -0 3942# -04119# -0.3980# -0 4154# -0 3945# -04110# 
(0 2364) (0 2407) (0 2367) (0 2411) (0 237) (02416) 
Market_ Return *Portlon _Dummy 0 0857 0.0843 0 0799 
(0 3078) (0 3079) (0 3086) 
Prob>F 0 0129 0 0085 0.0128 0 0087 0 0125 0 0085 
R-sq 0 1440 0 1435 0 1443 0.1438 0 1437 0 1433 
Market_ Return IS the annual market return m the 12 months precedmg the !PO, calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index CONC I 
(CONC2) IS the percentage of shareholdmgs that block holders own before (after) the !PO Carve-out IS a dummy equals I 1f the !PO 
firm IS a carve-out Portwn_Dummy equals I 1fthe !PO mcludes pnmary shares only # p<O I, • p<O 05, •• p<O I, *** p<O 001 
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8.5 Concluding Remarks 
In thts chapter, usmg a sample of 183 IPOs floated on the London Stock Exchange from 
1998 to 2003, I have exammed both the performance of IPOs in the short-run and the 
determmants of underpricmg. Event study methodology has been employed, with 
vanous approaches used and compared. Of these, the market model usmg 5-255 
event-post_event wmdows and log returns and estimated by SUR is preferred. 
The average degree of underpricmg m the UK for the studted period is greater than m 
earlier periods Thts may have been caused by mcreased nsks of firms floated in the 
market, following the establishment of AIM for smaller and/or growth firms 
The entrepreneurial wealth losses model and the theory of retaining control are 
exammed and supporttve evidence ts found. Firms that go public purely for financmg 
reasons have htgher uncertainties but less systemic nsk and hence are more highly 
underpriced. On the other hand, firms that go public also for the purpose of divestmg 
shares are relatively less underpriced, probably so as to reduce mstders' wealth losses 
from the continuous sales. At the same time, underpncmg is used as a means for the 
anginal controlling shareholders to dtscnminate among mvestors so as to protect theu 
control nghts. 
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9 Conclusions 
In this thes1s, I have used a sample of 204 UK IPO firms and 2315 UK private firms to 
systematically investigate the decision to go public m the UK I have examined the 
determinants of the likelihood of an IPO, IPO structure and IPO underpricmg so as to 
attempt an answer to the quest10n 'why and when do firms go public in the UK?' 
UK IPO activities indeed show different characteristics from contmental European IPOs 
Over the sample period from 1998 through 2003, UK IPOs utilise the stock market as a 
channel for financmg rather than as a facility for shareholders to sell out. The UK 
market prov1des access to a large pool of equity capital for firms at different stages of 
growth- not only for mature firms, but (more importantly) also for young growth firms 
These are two important features d1stmguishing the UK market from contmental 
European markets. The different roles played by the UK stock market can be explamed 
by its h1gh market efficiency, informative stock prices and strong investor protectiOn. A 
deep market with high efficiency m revealing firm value reduces asymmetriC 
information problems in the market, hence reducing information costs and 1mprovmg 
evaluation accuracy. In addit10n, strong mvestor protection enhances the confidence of 
dispersed public investors, hence encouraging mvestment m firms at an earlier stage of 
their life cycle These features serve to lower the barrier to stock market entries for 
younger firms and enable them to seek public equity to fund growth. In contrast, 
contmental European markets have relatively weaker market efficiency and weaker 
investor protectiOn, which gives rise to more sigmficant problems of adverse selection 
and mcreases the nsks of investmg m young firms. Consequently, firms tend to go 
public at a later stage, and use the market as a channel to raise funds to reduce leverage 
or as a fac1hty for shareholders to divest 
Why and When Do Firms Go Public in the UK? 
Overall for the UK IPOs, their reasons for resortmg to the stock market appear to be 
different over the life cycle of firms For firms at a relatively earlier stage of growth, 
lim1ted cash generation ability drives these growth firms to seek additional equity 
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capital from the stock market to overcome financml constraints As firms grow more 
mature (older and larger), a htgh leverage level drives these firms to seek fresh equity in 
order to avotd the potential threat of debt overhang. Meanwhtle, the accumulation in the 
pubhc domain of substantial firm-specific information about the mature firms reduces 
both information asymmetnes and potential adverse selectiOn costs Ftrms in good 
financial health and with a number of valuable re-investment opportunities, potentially 
have a large amount of monitoring capttal (passtve monitors) available m the market. 
Therefore, in addttton to obtammg investment financmg from the public market, 
passive momtoring in the market enables the original shareholders (active monitors) an 
extt route. Established mature firms may go public purely to sell existing shareholdmgs, 
although this seems to be very rare in the UK. 
The market timmg patterns also appear to be different across the firms wtth different 
reasons of gomg public. IPOs which involve sellmg-out by shareholders tend to be 
timed so as to offer m rising markets but avoiding the market peak so as to maximtse 
the total proceeds from a two-stage selling process These IPOs tend to be ttmed at a 
htgher market return in companson to IPOs purely for mvestment financing On the 
other hand, at the peak of the market (a hot issue market), more firms float on the 
market purely for financing, probably to take advantage of the buoyant market 
condtttons and wmdow of opportunity. 
Independent firms and substdtaries appear to go pubhc for dtfferent reasons. The IPOs 
of mdependent firms are mainly dnven by the need for capital to fund investment, due 
to limited mternal cash generatiOn ability These firms appear to be smaller, have a more 
dispersed ownershtp structure and in an earher stage of growth In contrast, the !PO 
decision of subsidiaries is mamly driven by corporate restructuring and divestment. 
Parent firms tend to dtvest highly indebted and less controlled substdtaries via !PO. 
This result of carve-outs is consistent with the results from the ltahan market. 
For all the UK !PO firms, corporate governance ts an Important consideratiOn when 
firms make their !PO deciswns More htghly concentrated managenal shareholdings 
enable a firm to gtve away more new shares to pubhc investors, as managerial control is 
less likely to be dtluted by dtspersed pubhc investors. For the firms less controlled by 
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management, the non-manager shareholders dtvest more at IPOs. Ownershtp dtspersion 
increases the amount of fresh capl!al offered (bringing in monitoring capttal) but 
decreases the number of shares dtvested (maximtzing the proceeds from two-stage 
sellmg). 
A Unified Investment-Divestment Framework for IPO Decision 
Although in the UK an !PO decision is related to vanous factors, these can be 
incorporated into a umfied mvestment-dtvestment framework. !PO firms appear to 
possess pnvate information about the value of thetr growth potential. The htgher the 
value, the greater is the amount of fresh capttal raised to finance mvestment whtle the 
lower ts the number of shares divested by extstmg shareholders. In this way, firm value 
can be enhanced, benefiting from new investment. On the other hand, the lower the 
value of growth potential (evaluated by the !PO firms), the greater amount of 
dtvestment In thts way, ownership is transferred to pubhc mvestors who may possess 
superior market informatwn and evaluate firms more optimtsttcally. The changmg 
ownershtp and control structure may also improve monitonng efficiency for these firms 
and enhance firm value 
The Relation between IPO Decision and IPO Underpricing 
The 'entrepreneunal wealth losses' and the 'ownershtp and control' theones are found 
to provide more fundamental explanatiOns for the underpncmg of UK lP Os. Fmns that 
go pubhc purely for financing have higher uncertainty and htgher risk profiles, and 
hence are more underpnced On the other hand, firms that go pubhc also to divest 
shares are relatively less underpriced, so as to reduce mstders' wealth losses from 
continuous sales At the same ttme, underpncmg ts also used as means for the ongmal 
controllmg shareholders to dtscnmmate among investors so as to protect thetr control 
nghts 
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Further Research 
Whether going pubhc for investment or for divestment, th1s is a contmuous process A 
firm that ra1ses capital from an IPO may continue to rruse funds from SEOs Reduced 
informatiOn asymmetnes may improve the offer pnce and increase funds raised. On the 
other hand, d1vestmg via an IPO is expected to follow a two-stage selling process, m 
wh1ch the firm only sells a mmority portion m the first stage and sells the controlling 
block later on in 1ts SEOs. To venfy the hypothesis of th1s two-stage process, 1t would 
be helpful to track changes in ownership structure over the post-IPO period and to 
examme the seasoned equity offenngs (SEOs) ofiPO firms 
In the appendix, some statistics of the SEOs of the srunpled IPO firms are shown. These 
statistics seem to suggest that financing 1s the dommant reason for UK IPOs, as a 
majonty of the subsequent SEOs raised new capital at much Improved offer pnces 
There is also evidence for two-stage selling, smce SEOs which involve shareholder 
selling show much increased offer s1ze (ind1catmg possible sales of controlling block) 
and price. However, to confirm the conclusions, further studies on SEOs would be 
beneficial 
This thesis has focused only on non-financial firms. To draw more robust conclusions, 
further studies on financial firms are suggested. As financial firms are subject to 
different regulation from non-financial firms, whether or not they go pubhc for the 
srune reasons remains to be seen 
Finally, the analysis based on the treatment effects model may suffer a selection bias 
problem. A trea!inent effects model with sample selection is suggested for further 
research 
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Appendix I Summary Statistics of the IPO Underpricing for the Entire Sample 
(Arithmetic Return) 
Vanable Model Obs Mean Std. Dev Mm Max 
Underpncmg3 Market-adjusted 183 0 2148 0 4541 -0 2520 3 3421 FTSE all share mdex 
Underpncmg4 Market-adjusted 183 0 2149 04542 -0 2850 3 3313 FTSE mdustnal mdtces 
Underpncmg7 Market model 200-day 183 0 2161 0 4536 -0 2476 3 3418 
estimation wmdow- OLS 
Underpncing8 Market model 255-day 183 0 2160 04537 -0 2470 3 3461 
estimation wmdow- OLS 
Underpncmgll Market model 200-day 183 0 2161 0 4536 -0 2476 3 3411 
estimation wmdow- SUR 
Underpncmg 12 Market model· 255-day 183 0 2160 04538 -0 2466 3 3460 
estimation wmdow- SUR 
Underpncmgl4 Raw return 183 0 2144 04539 -0 2560 3 3333 
Underpncmg IS calculated usmg adjusted stock pnces - the offer pnce and datly closmg pnces are all 
adjusted for diVIdends and stock sphts 
201 
Appendix 11 Summary Statistics for ARs over 60-Day and 5-Day Event Windows 
(Arithmetic Return) 
Day Obs Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
Panel A Market-adjusted abnormal returns- usmg the FTSE all share mdex as a benchmark 
183 0 2148 0 4541 -0 2520 3 3421 
2 183 00057 0 0705 -0.1700 0 3646 
3 183 0 0061 0 0781 -0 2833 0 7743 
4 183 0 0063 0 0615 -0 2387 0 4741 
5 183 0 0018 0 0522 -0 2487 0 3396 
6 183 -0 0025 0 0368 -0 1605 0 2624 
7 183 -0 0023 0 0398 -0.2147 0 1928 
8 183 0 0024 0 0418 -0 1866 0 2238 
9 183 -0 0060 0 0279 -0 1486 0 0930 
10 183 -0 0033 0 0301 -0.1829 0 1344 
11 183 0 0004 0 0459 -0.1301 0 4513 
12 183 -0 0043 0 0357 -0 1879 0 2191 
13 183 -0 0036 0 0340 -0 1461 0 1306 
14 183 0 0019 0 0422 -0 2582 0 1827 
15 183 0 0041 0 0488 -0 0756 0 3965 
16 183 -0 0004 0 0273 -0.1391 0 0875 
17 183 -0 0004 0 0296 -0 1421 0 2016 
18 183 -0 0062 0 0295 -0.1857 0 0836 
19 183 -0 0009 0 0272 -0 1015 0 1666 
20 183 00003 0 0294 -0 0848 02283 
21 183 0 0012 0 0283 -01113 0 1710 
22 183 -0.0040 0 0311 -0 1724 0 1788 
23 183 -0 0008 0 0251 -0 0988 0 1734 
24 183 -0 0021 0 0319 -0.1784 0 1936 
25 183 -0 0016 0 0259 -0 1024 0 1251 
26 183 0.0024 0 0302 -01418 0 1205 
27 183 -0 0002 0 0355 -0.1888 01729 
28 183 00045 0 0379 -0 0692 0 3711 
29 183 0 0027 0 0261 -0 0505 0.1992 
30 183 -0 0006 0.0267 -0 0845 0 1646 
31 183 -0 0013 0 0259 -0 I 109 0 1255 
32 183 0 0016 0 0312 -0 1228 01339 
33 183 -0 0007 0 0272 -0.1097 0 1203 
34 183 0 0036 0 0364 -0.1154 0 2010 
35 183 00004 0 0255 -0 1000 01340 
36 183 0 0033 0 0291 -0 0680 0 1567 
37 183 0 0000 0 0246 -0 1375 0 1251 
38 183 -0 0012 0 0261 -0 1257 00927 
39 183 -0 0005 0 0238 -0 0967 0 1273 
40 183 0 0050 0 0649 -0.1141 0 8035 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev. Mm Max 
41 183 00006 0 0311 -0 2048 0 1661 
42 183 0 0016 0 0288 -0 1233 0 1903 
43 183 -0 0043 0 0351 -0 2047 0.1271 
44 183 -0 0005 0 0339 -0 1371 0.1811 
45 183 0 0016 0 0321 -0 1424 0 1622 
46 183 -0 0012 0 0234 -0 I 037 0 1252 
47 183 -0 0034 0 0248 -0 1321 0 0906 
48 183 00002 0 0382 -0 0908 0 3350 
49 183 -0 0029 0 0302 -0 1262 0 2164 
50 183 -0 0026 0 0349 -0 1284 0 2498 
51 183 -0 0049 0 0293 -0 1313 0 1959 
52 183 0 0012 0 0343 -0 0722 0 3002 
53 183 -00015 0 0284 -0 1662 0 1142 
54 183 00002 0 0318 -0 JIOO 0 2408 
55 183 0 0010 0 0360 -0 2754 0 1734 
56 183 0 0008 0 0439 -0 1951 0 3320 
57 183 -0 0021 0 0308 -0 1244 0 1597 
58 183 0 0012 0 0416 -0 1244 0.3244 
59 183 -00019 0 0275 -0 0998 0 1369 
60 183 0 0012 0 0297 -01118 0 1953 
Panel B Market-adjusted abnormal returns- uszng the FTSE mdustrzal md1ces as a benchmark 
I 183 0 2149 0 4542 -0 2850 3 3313 
2 183 00065 0 0692 -01715 0 3601 
3 183 0 0054 0 0797 -0 2992 0.7664 
4 183 0 0078 0 0632 -0 2381 0 4785 
5 183 0 0026 0 0538 -0 2584 0 3399 
6 183 -0 0022 0 0389 -0 1801 0 2464 
7 183 -0 0022 0 0433 -0 2163 0 1805 
8 183 0 0023 0 0425 -0 2078 0 2223 
9 183 -0 0042 0 0322 -0 1508 0 0925 
10 183 -0 0029 0 0325 -0 1676 0 1189 
Jl 183 0 0005 0 0475 -O.ll43 04457 
12 183 -0 0037 0 0377 -0 1923 0 2200 
13 183 -0 0028 0 0358 -0 1394 0 1336 
14 183 00024 0 0456 -0 2554 0.1899 
15 183 0 0051 0 0521 -0 0955 0 3936 
16 183 0 0001 0 0312 -01219 0.1138 
17 183 0 0013 0 0301 -0.1379 0 1742 
18 183 -0 0061 0 0321 -0 1889 0 1311 
19 183 0 0014 0 0321 -0 ll91 0 1589 
20 183 -0 0007 0 0321 -0.1072 0 1881 
21 183 0 0034 0 0290 -0 0829 0.1680 
22 183 -0 0038 0 0353 -0 2031 0 1783 
23 183 0 0013 0 0286 -0 0873 0 1603 
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Day Obs Mean Std. Dev Mm Max 
24 183 -0 0026 0 0341 -0 1889 0 1485 
25 183 -0.0027 0 0302 -0 0905 0 1397 
26 183 0.0014 0 0324 -0.1371 0 1218 
27 183 -00015 0 0385 -0.1951 0 1674 
28 183 0 0056 0 0406 -0 0850 0 3575 
29 183 0 0029 0 0300 -0 0878 0 2039 
30 183 -0 0015 0 0300 -0.1013 0 1648 
31 183 -0 0013 0 0291 -0 1327 0 1299 
32 183 0 0004 0 0311 -0 1090 0 1270 
33 183 0 0022 0 0283 -0 1074 0 0969 
34 183 0 0036 0 0388 -0.1112 0 2110 
35 183 0 0018 0 0295 -0 1031 0 1320 
36 183 0 0037 0 0309 -00910 0 1661 
37 183 0 0007 0 0254 -0 1067 0 1497 
38 183 0.0001 0 0288 -0 1200 0 1197 
39 183 0 0008 0 0266 -0 0991 0 1276 
40 183 0 0052 0 0677 -0 1641 0 8154 
41 183 0.0004 0 0353 -02100 0 1709 
42 183 0.0008 0 0318 -0 1453 0 1717 
43 183 -0 0056 0 0369 -0 2121 0 1060 
44 183 -0 0002 0 0364 -0.1402 0 1650 
45 183 0 0023 0 0355 -0 1423 0 2317 
46 183 -0 0013 0 0282 -0 1090 0 1382 
47 183 -0 0027 0 0306 -0 0786 0 1962 
48 183 0 0007 0 0423 -0 1219 0 3599 
49 183 -0 0014 0 0322 -0 1363 0 2246 
50 183 -0 0026 0 0392 -0 1475 0.2531 
51 183 -0 0029 00334 -0 1590 0 1968 
52 183 0 0040 0 0372 -0 0750 0 3409 
53 183 0 0000 0 0282 -0 1370 0 0899 
54 183 0 0024 0 0352 -0 0948 0 2491 
55 183 0 0004 0 0383 -0 2754 0 1631 
56 183 0 0010 0 0434 -0 1940 0 3320 
57 183 -0 0034 00325 -0 1226 0 1059 
58 183 -0 0007 0 0451 -0 1202 0 3262 
59 183 -0 0007 0 0331 -0 1520 0 1717 
60 183 0 0028 0 0311 -0 1166 0 1956 
Panel C Market model- usmg the 60-200 event-post_event wmdows (estzmated by OLS) 
183 0 2162 0 4536 -0 2476 3 3418 
2 183 0 0084 0 0692 -0 1641 0 3546 
3 183 0 0073 0 0770 -0 2776 0 7690 
4 183 0 0066 0 0604 -0 2379 0 4791 
5 183 0 0028 00523 -0 2454 0.3397 
6 183 -0 0001 0 0352 -0 1563 0 2612 
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Day Obs Mean Std Dev Mm Max 
7 183 -0 0007 0 0388 -02194 0 1932 
8 183 0.0033 0 0420 -0 1949 0 2306 
9 183 -0 0047 0 0269 -0 1513 0 0862 
10 183 -0 0021 0 0284 -0.1758 01323 
11 183 0 0010 0 0458 -0 1264 04500 
12 183 -0 0034 0 0355 -0 1863 0 2269 
13 183 -0 0023 0 0342 -0.1503 0 1294 
14 183 0 0034 0 0392 -02311 0 1846 
15 183 0 0062 0 0478 -0 0712 0 3948 
16 183 0 0004 0 0268 -0 1394 0 1052 
17 183 -0 0002 0 0285 -0 1455 0 1999 
18 183 -0 0051 0 0286 -0 1935 0 0782 
19 183 -0.0005 0 0257 -0.1085 0 1463 
20 183 0 0007 0 0270 -0 0776 0 1980 
21 183 0 0017 0 0282 -0 1208 0 1737 
22 183 -0.0025 0 0306 -0.1577 0 1778 
23 183 0.0008 0 0236 -0 0889 0 1755 
24 183 -0 0004 0 0306 -0 1632 0 2034 
25 183 -0 0005 0 0248 -0 1176 0 1326 
26 183 0 0027 0 0309 -0 1742 0 1208 
27 183 0 0015 0 0352 -0 1908 0 1753 
28 183 0 0053 0 0367 -0 0683 0 3648 
29 183 0 0031 0 0260 -0 0606 0 1998 
30 183 0 0013 0 0270 -0 1007 0.1776 
31 183 0 0003 0 0260 -0.1160 0 1334 
32 183 0 0020 0 0298 -0 I 039 0 1406 
33 183 0 0003 00256 -0.1097 0 1076 
34 183 0 0044 0 0342 -0 1072 0 1869 
35 183 0 0020 0 0234 -00915 0 1426 
36 183 0 0035 0 0273 -0 0557 0 1536 
37 183 0 0005 00227 -0 1270 0 1256 
38 183 -0 0014 0 0245 -0 1232 0 0904 
39 183 0 0016 0 0227 -0 0921 0 1414 
40 183 0 0061 00652 -0.1039 0 8193 
41 183 0 0022 0 0290 -0 1978 0 1659 
42 183 0 0031 0 0281 -0 1187 0 1959 
43 183 -0 0028 0 0357 -0 2026 0.1294 
44 183 0 0011 0.0327 -0.1441 0 1798 
45 183 0.0024 0 0300 -0 1386 0 1683 
46 183 0 0001 0 0224 -0 1019 0 1500 
47 183 -0 0024 00234 -0 1388 0 0901 
48 183 0 0006 00369 -0 0879 0 3355 
49 183 -0 0031 0 0291 -0 1305 0 2165 
50 183 -0 0013 0 0331 -0.1241 0 2476 
51 183 -0 0038 00276 -0 1247 0 1954 
205 
Day Obs Mean Std Dev M in Max 
52 183 00026 0 0316 -0 0680 0 2762 
53 183 -0 0007 0 0271 -0.1635 0 1189 
54 183 0 0029 0 0319 -0.1415 02540 
55 183 0 0007 0 0358 -0 2896 0 1705 
56 183 0 0021 0 0436 -0 2019 0 3214 
57 183 -00010 0 0303 -0 1175 0 1588 
58 183 0 0018 0 0405 -0 1248 0 3215 
59 183 -0 0006 0 0257 -0 lOll 0 1362 
60 183 0 0026 0 0286 -0 1131 0 1926 
Panel D Market model- usmg the 5-255 event-post_event wmdows (estzmated by OLS) 
183 0 2160 0 4537 -0 2470 3 3461 
2 183 0 0082 0 0687 -0.1615 0 3531 
3 183 0 0071 0 0769 -0 2781 0 7649 
4 183 00065 0 0603 -0 2366 0 4801 
5 183 0 0026 0 0518 -0 2454 03386 
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Appendix IV Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 (5) Days after 
IPO in the Entire Sample (n=183)- OLS Estimated Market Model (Arithmetic Return) 
AR CAR 
Day 
Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Boehmer test Patell test 
Panel A Market model-usmg the 60- 200 event-post_event wmdows 
96.5948 8.2264 96 5948 97 0864 8 2265 
2 3.8144 I 6083 71 0001 71 3405 7 7852 
3 2.4282 1.3958 59 3732 59 6578 7 3813 
4 I 5872 0 9422 52 2123 524515 7 0781 
5 I 0810 0 5297 47 1835 47 4038 6 7181 
6 0 4851 0 3088 43 2705 43 4895 62442 
7 I 3258 0 9297 40 5618 40 7829 5 9801 
8 2.3728 I 3635 38 7810 38 9906 5 7632 
9 -I 8518 -2 3349 35 9459 36 1387 5 4109 
10 -1 1558 -1 1975 33 7357 33 9144 5 1284 
11 -0 2035 -0 1913 32 1044 32 2698 4 9357 
12 -1 5723 -1 3839 30 2838 30 4387 4 7041 
13 -1 1291 -0 9535 28 7825 28 9180 4 4713 
14 0 6373 0 4578 27 9059 28 0337 4 3365 
15 2.1381 I 5176 27 5117 27 6428 4 2885 
16 0 3068 0 3282 26 7148 26 8420 4 1593 
17 -0 0970 -0 1166 25 8936 26 0146 4 0381 
18 -2 0582 -2 1562 24 6790 24 8029 3 8445 
19 -01136 -0 1244 23 9947 24 1119 3 7501 
20 0 4043 0 4873 23 4775 23 5904 3 6700 
21 0 6160 0 6081 23 0461 23 1462 3 6167 
22 -I 3241 -I 5086 22 2340 22 3323 3 4846 
23 0 2844 0 3936 21 8046 21 8996 3 4219 
24 0 3460 0 3697 21 4161 21 5010 3 3686 
25 -0 1887 -0 2859 20 9457 21 0318 3 2948 
26 I 2540 I 2149 20 7848 20 8680 3 2743 
27 0 8836 0 6907 20 5664 20 6527 3 2496 
28 2.2692 2.0945 20 6246 20 7112 3 2650 
29 1.9958 2.0230 20 6365 20 7244 3 2739 
30 0 4367 0 4989 20 3694 20 4620 3 2245 
31 0 2816 0 3637 20 0887 20 1830 3 1802 
32 04625 0 5230 19 8541 19 9458 3 1418 
33 02904 0 3597 19 6015 19 6939 3 1014 
34 I 7567 I 5962 19 6124 19 7077 3 1085 
35 14796 I 6692 19 5803 19 6732 3 0992 
36 I 6246 I 4293 19 5772 19 6706 3 1030 
37 0 7822 I 0021 19 4394 19 5312 3 0836 
38 -0 3753 -04152 19 1210 192107 3 0347 
39 04784 0 6173 18 9509 19 0384 3 0091 
40 3.3474 I 6523 19 2418 19 3302 3 0674 
211 
AR CAR 
Day 
Paten test Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Boehmer test Patell test 
41 I 1617 I 4487 19 1871 19 2708 3 0619 
42 I 2544 I 2863 19 1509 19 2371 3 0591 
43 -2 4046 -I 5031 18 5602 18 6390 2 9434 
44 I 1545 I 1860 18 5221 18 5994 2 9411 
45 I 3414 I 4690 18 5151 18 5902 2 9415 
46 0 3043 0 4101 18 3576 18 4319 2 9151 
47 -0 8786 -I 2044 18 0331 181112 2 8591 
48 0 6958 0 5930 17 9447 180175 2 8388 
49 -I 0437 -1 1697 176116 17 6825 2 7754 
50 -I 0027 -1 1123 17 2928 173615 2 7141 
51 -I 6227 -1 9736 16 8952 16 9594 2 6434 
52 0 7891 0 9177 16 8413 16 9107 2 6354 
53 0 1291 0 1332 16 6994 16 7686 2 6108 
54 0 8372 0 8622 16 6580 16 7273 2 6053 
55 02447 0 1939 16 5389 16 6051 2 5799 
56 I 4182 I 0374 16 5800 16 6470 2 5890 
57 -0 7853 -0 6925 16 3300 16 3975 2 5450 
58 I 8931 0 8866 16 4371 16 5051 2 5597 
59 -0 1662 -0 1671 16 2756 16 3420 2 5335 
60 I 9456 I 6698 16 3906 16 4564 2 5581 
Panel B Market mode/-usmg the 5-255 event-post_event wmdows 
I 92.2695 8.5928 92 2695 92 6364 8 5928 
2 3.4072 I 5943 67 6537 67 8979 8 3643 
3 2 2259 I 3419 56 5241 56 7284 82110 
4 I 6500 0 9972 49 7763 49 9493 82112 
5 0 2802 0 1484 44 6466 44 5966 82002 
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Appendix V Testing for Statistical Significance of ARs and CARs over 60 Days after IPO 
in the Entire Sample (n=l83)- SUR Estimated Market Model (Arithmetic Return) 
AR CAR 
Day 
Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Corrected Boehmer test Patell test 
96.5513 8.2248 96 5948 97 0426 8 2249 
2 3.8109 I 6071 71 0001 71 3070 7 7823 
3 2.4241 I 3937 59 3732 59 6279 7 3782 
4 I 5986 0 9493 52 2123 52 4317 7 0766 
5 I 0890 0 5337 47 1835 47 3895 6 7182 
6 0 4752 0 3025 43 2705 43 4723 6 2437 
7 I 3824 0 9698 40 5618 40 7885 5 9836 
8 2.3875 I 3724 387810 39 0010 5 7671 
9 -I 8509 -2 3325 35 9459 36 1488 5 4148 
10 -1 1858 -I 2279 33 7357 33 9145 5 1305 
11 -0 2065 -0 1940 32 1044 32 2689 4 9379 
12 -1 5662 -I 3783 30 2838 30 4397 4 7068 
13 -1 1233 -0 9472 28 7825 28 9205 44738 
14 06320 0 4527 27 9059 28 0346 4 3388 
15 2.1376 I 5176 27 5117 27 6435 42907 
16 0 2974 0 3184 26 7148 26 8404 4 1612 
17 -0 1025 -0 1231 25 8936 26 0116 4 0397 
18 -2 0427 -2 1372 24 6790 24 8038 3 8466 
19 -0 1335 -0 1458 23 9947 24 1081 3 7512 
20 04244 0 5098 23 4775 23 5913 3 6721 
21 06269 0 6193 23 0461 23 1493 3 6193 
22 -I 2908 -I 4651 22 2340 22 3425 3 4884 
23 0 2807 0 3872 21 8046 21 9088 3 4254 
24 0 3215 0 3431 21 4161 21 5048 3 3711 
25 -0 2095 -0 3195 20 9457 21 0314 3 2964 
26 I 2675 I 2284 20 7848 20 8701 3 2764 
27 0 8901 0 6954 20 5664 20 6561 3 2518 
28 2.2636 2.0941 20 6246 20 7136 3 2672 
29 2.0289 2.0529 20 6365 20 7328 3 2772 
30 0 4584 0 5244 20 3694 20 4742 3 2284 
31 0 3048 0 3939 20 0887 20 1992 3 1849 
32 0 4892 0 5554 19 8541 19 9665 3 1473 
33 02907 0 3605 19 6015 19 7145 3 1068 
34 I 7333 I 5800 196124 19 7239 3 I 131 
35 I 4530 I 6389 19 5803 19 6845 3 1030 
36 I 6329 I 4353 19 5772 19 6832 3 1070 
37 0 7544 0 9641 19 4394 19 5390 3 0867 
38 -0 3664 -0 4059 19 1210 19 2199 3.0380 
39 0 4489 0 5810 18 9509 19 0428 3 0115 
40 3.3746 I 6673 192418 19 3388 3 0707 
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AR CAR 
Day Corrected Patell test Boehmer test Patell test Patell test Boehmer test 
41 I 1630 I 4539 19 1871 19 2796 3 0652 
42 I 2455 I 2794 19 1509 19 2444 3 0621 
43 -2 4470 -I 5291 18 5602 18 6397 2 9451 
44 I 1605 I 1926 185221 18 6010 2 9430 
45 I 3478 I 4748 18 5151 18 5927 2 9436 
46 0 3383 04562 18 3576 18 4395 2 9181 
47 -0 9253 -I 2676 18 0331 18lll8 2 8608 
48 0 6696 05709 179447 18 0142 2 8398 
49 -I 0174 -1 1396 176116 17 6831 2 7770 
50 -I 0166 -1 1286 17 2928 17 3601 2 7153 
51 -I 6328 -I 9799 16 8952 16 9566 26442 
52 0 7958 0 9300 168413 16 9089 2 6365 
53 0 1249 0 1286 16 6994 16 7661 2 6118 
54 0 8508 0 8769 16 6580 16 7268 2 6066 
55 0 2575 02039 16 5389 16 6063 2 5815 
56 I 4116 I 0332 16 5800 16 6474 2 5905 
57 -0 7823 -0 6895 16 3300 16 3982 2 5466 
58 I 8743 0 8776 16 4371 16 5034 2 5608 
59 -0 1721 -0 1732 16 2756 16 3396 2 5344 
60 I 9576 I 68ll 16 3906 16 4555 2 5593 
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Appendix V SUR Regression Diagnostics for the Market Model (Arithmetic Return) 
Vanable Obs Mean 
Std 
Dev Mm Max 
200-day est1mat1on wmdow 
Panel A The ent1re sample 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Ch1-sq 
p-value 
183 -0 0014 
183 0 2659 
183 0 0311 
183 0 0207 
183 55 749 
0 0033 
0 4486 
0 0159 
0 0343 
92 211 
-0 0104 0 0103 
-0 8463 2 3028 
0 0024 0 1179 
-00015 02325 
0 0000 619 10 
183 00911 02197 00000 09901 
Panel B (Sub_al) The IPOs ofmdependentfirms 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Ch1-sq 
p-value 
143 -0 0015 0 0034 -0 0104 0 0103 
143 0 2696 
143 0 0323 
143 0 0205 
0 4741 
0 0165 
0 0358 
-0 8463 2 3028 
0 0024 0 1179 
-00015 02325 
143 53 969 91 303 0 0000 619 10 
143 0 0862 0 2085 0 0000 0 9649 
Panel C (Sub_al) The JPOs of carve-out firms 
Alpha 
Beta 
nnse 
R-sq 
Ch1-sq 
p-value 
40 -00011 0 0031 -0 0083 0 0064 
40 0 2529 0 3471 -0 2604 I 5255 
40 0 0268 0 0128 0 0054 0 0713 
40 0 0212 0 0287 -0 0005 0 1201 
40 62 Ill 96 303 0 0000 453 73 
40 01087 02580 00000 09901 
Panel D (Sub_bl) The pnmary share offermgs 
Alpha 97 -0 0017 0 0033 -0 0 I 04 0 0065 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Ch1-sq 
p-value 
97 0 1793 0 4274 -0 8463 2 1691 
97 0 0337 00182 00024 01179 
97 00145 0 0283 -0 0002 0 2325 
97 39 199 76 861 0 0000 619 10 
97 0 1127 0 2365 0 0000 0 9901 
Panel E (Sub_bl) The offermgs mcludmg secondary shares 
Alpha 
Beta 
rmse 
R-sq 
Ch1-sq 
p-value 
86 -0 0010 
86 0 3637 
86 0 0282 
86 0 0277 
86 74 416 
86 0 0667 
00034 
0 4542 
0 0121 
0 0390 
104 25 
0 1976 
-0 0091 0 0103 
-0 3546 2 3028 
0 0054 0 0604 
-0 0015 0 1846 
0 0000 523 37 
0 0000 0 9649 
Breusch-Pagan test ofmdependence for SUR 
Mean 
Std 
Dev Mm Max 
255-day est1matwn wmdow 
-0 0013 0 0030 
0 2792 0 4366 
0 0309 0 0150 
00186 00312 
18 454 30 725 
-00105 00077 
-0 4871 2 3342 
0 0021 0 1063 
-0 0042 0 2090 
0 0000 207 27 
0 1362 0 2364 0 0000 0 9561 
-00014 00030 -00105 00077 
02922 
0 0323 
0 0187 
04627 
0 0157 
0 0326 
-0 4871 2 3342 
0 0021 0 1063 
-0 0034 0 2090 
18543 31943 00100 20727 
0 1370 0 2420 0 0000 0 9300 
-0 0009 0 0027 
0 2328 
00260 
0 0181 
0 3350 
0 0112 
0 0263 
-0 0069 0 0045 
-0 3336 I 3973 
00061 00638 
-0 0042 0 1123 
18135 26731 00000 12570 
01334 02214 00000 09561 
-0 0017 0 0028 -0 0105 0 0054 
0 2010 0 4359 
00335 00172 
0 0133 0 0292 
-0 4871 2 3342 
0 0021 0 1063 
-0 0042 0 2090 
12 381 27254 0 0100 207 27 
0 1684 0 2595 0 0000 0 9300 
-0 0008 0 0031 
0 3674 0 4254 
00280 00114 
0 0246 0 0326 
25 303 33 226 
0 0998 0 2043 
-0 0084 0 0077 
-0 2234 2 1126 
0 0061 0 0575 
-00017 01497 
0 0000 144 38 
00000 09561 
200-day estimatiOn wmdow (Loganthm1c return) Chl2(16653) ~ 17137 511, Pr ~ 0 0042 
255-day est1matJon wmdow (LoganthmJC return) Ch12( 16653) ~ 17340 310, Pr ~ 0 000 I 
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Appendix VI Equality Tests (Mean and Median) on the Alpha and the Beta 
(Estimated by SUR) of the Sub-samples (Arithmetic Return) 
200-day estimatiOn 255-day estimation 
Sub-samples Tests wmdow wmdow 
Alpha Beta Alpha Beta 
Sub_a1 vs Sub_a2 WI!coxon rank-sum test 0.460 0957 0.391 0 526 
Median test 0 691 0 301 0 451 0 164 
Contmmty corrected median test 0 827 0 392 0.565 0 225 
Sub_b1 vs Sub_b2 WIIcoxon rank-sum test 0 262 0.001 0.088 0.000 
Median test 0.338 0.006 0 121 0.015 
Contmmty corrected median test 0 418 0.010 0 161 0.022 
Sub _a I stands for the sub-sample that mcludes the lPOs of mdependent firms only, Sub_ a2 stands for the 
sub-sample that mcludes carve-out lPOs only, Sub_bl stands for the sub-sample of 1POs that offer pnmary 
shares only, Sub_b2 stands for the sub-sample of 1POs that mclude secondary shares ThiS table reports the 
p-value of the non-parametnc WI!coxon rank-sum test (testmg equality of mean) and the Median test (testmg 
equality of median) between the two sub-samples (carve-outs versus mdependent firms, pnmary share IPOs 
versus secondary share 1P0s) For the Median test, the Pearson chi-squared test statiStic ts computed both 
with and without a contmUity correction 
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A endix VII Determinants of Under 
Panel A Market-adjusted abnormal return on day I 
Panel B Market model esttmated abnormal return on day I 
(OLS regresswn) 
Underpncmg3 Underpncmg4 Underpncmg7 Underpncmg8 
(FTSE all share mdex) (FTSE mdustnal mdtces) (Market model (200)) (Market model (255)) 
Model! Model2 Model! Model2 Model! Model2 Model! Model2 
Intercept -0 0484 -0 0815 -0 0404 -0 0759 -0 0507 -0 0844 -0 0511 
-0 0846 
(01316) (0 1221) (0 1326) (0 1228) (0 1317) (0 1223) (0 1316) (0 1222) 
Market Return 0 9601" I 1991 .. 0 9380'' l 1946** 0 9493" I 1930" 0 9521" I 1944" 
(0 3519) (0 4021) (0 3524) (0 4035) (0 3517) (04018) (03513) (0 4017) 
CONCI 0 4886" 0 5214" 04836" 0 5189" 0 4954" 0 5289" 04958" 
0 5290" 
(0 1760) (0 1837) (0 1771) (0 1841) (0 1761) (0 1836) (0 1761) (0 1837) 
CONC2 -0 3016 -0 3169 -0 3003 -0 3168 -0 3027 -0 3183 
-0 3031 -03187 
(0 2257) (0 2358) (0 2253) (0 2355) (0 2254) (0 2355) (0 2255) (0 2356) 
Carve-out 0 2474' 0 2792' 0 2275# 0 2617' 0 2478' 0 2803' 0 2482' 
0 2805* 
(01231) (0 1165) (0 1253) (0 1183) (0 1228) (0 1161) (0 1227) (0 1161) 
PortiOn Dummy 0 4289' 0 4555' 0 4287' 0 4573* 0 4355' 0 4627' 
0 4360* 0 4630' 
(0 1939) (0 2097) (0 1941) (0 2098) (0 1939) (0 2098) (0 1938) (0 2098) 
CONCI *Carve-out -0 4288" -0 4604" -0 4080' -0 4419" -04317" -0 4639" -0 4320" 
-0 4640'* 
(0 1603) (0 1580) (0 1618) (0 1590) (0 1596) (0 1571) (0 1595) (0 1571) 
CONCI*Port10n_Dummy -0 3529 -0 3698# -0 3608 -0 3789# -03618 -0 3790# -0 3621 
-0 3792# 
(0 2210) (0 2247) (02210) (0 2245) (0 2206) (0 2245) (0 2206) (0 2245) 
Market_ Return *Carve-out -0 8155* -0 9047' -0 7993' -08951* -0 8004' -0 8914' -0 8031' 
-0 8935* 
(0 3967) (0 4288) (0 3983) (0 4300) (0 3942) (0 4270) (0 3943) (0 4272) 
Market_ Return *PortiOn_ Dummy 0 4323 0 4642 0 4409 0 4382 
(0 5838) (0 5851) (0 5831) (0 5829) 
Prob>F 0 0631 0 0470 0 0803 0 0559 0 0590 0 0417 0 0583 
0 0419 
R-sq 0 1418 0 1382 0 1408 0 1367 0 1425 0 1387 
0 1426 0 1389 
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Panel C Market model estimated abnormal return on day I Panel D Raw return on day I (SUR regressiOn) 
Underpncmg 11 Underpncmg 12 Underpncmg 14 
(Market model (200)) (Market model (255)) (Raw return) 
Model I Model2 Model! Model! Model! Model2 
Intercept -0 0506 -0 0844 -0 0509 -0 0846 -0 0531 -0 0864 
(01317) (0 1223) (0 1317) (0 1223) (0 1318) (0 1225) 
Market Return 0 9489** I 1932'' 0 9516" I 1950" 0 9531" I 1936'* 
(0 3518) (04017) (0 3513) (0 4016) (0 3518) (04019) 
CONCI 0 4953" 0 5288" 0 4958" 0 5293" 0 4955" 0 5286" 
(0 1761) (0 1837) (0 1761) (0 1838) (0 1762) (0 1837) 
CONC2 -0 3029 -03186 -0 3033 -0 3189 -0 3033 -0 3187 
(0 2254) (0 2355) (0 2256) (0 2356) (0 2253) (0 2353) 
Carve-out 0 2479' 0 2804' 0 2479' 0 2803* 0 2506' 0 2827' 
(0 1228) (0 1162) (0 1228) (0 1161) (0 1230) (0 1164) 
PortiOn Dummy 0 4356' 0 4628' 0 4361' 0 4632' 0 4346' 0 4614' 
(0 1939) (0 2098) (0 1939) (0 2098) (0 1940) (0 2098) 
CONC !'Carve-out -04318" -0 4641" -04317" -0 4639" -0 4338" -0 4656" 
(0 1596) (0 1572) (0 1595) (0 1572) (0 1600) (0 1577) 
CONCI*Port10n_Dummy -03619 -0 3791# -0 3624 -0 3796# -0 3594 -0 3763# 
(0 2207) (0 2245) (0 2206) (0 2245) (0 2210) (0 2248) 
Market Return*Carve-out -0 8000' -0 8911' -0 8030' -0 8938* -0 8001' -0 8899' 
(0 3942) (0 4269) (0 3943) (0 4271) (0 3948) (0 4276) 
Market_ Return*Port10n_ Dummy 0 4419 0 4403 0 4352 
(0 5829) (0 5829) (0 5835) 
Prob>F 0 0587 0 0413 0 0584 0 0416 0 0577 0 0413 
R-sq 01425 0 1388 0 1427 0 1389 0 1423 0 1387 
Market_ Return IS the annual market return m the 12 months precedmg the IPO, calculated usmg the FTSE All Share Index CONC I 
(CONC2) IS the percentage ofshareholdmgs that block holders own before (after) the IPO Carve-out IS a dummy equals I 1fthe IPO 
firm IS a carve-out Port10n_Dummy equals I 1fthe IPO mcludes pnmary shares only# p<O I,* p<O 05, •• p<O I,*** p<O 001 
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Appendix VIII SEOs 
VIII-1 Summary: the number of firms that conducted SEOs within 3 years after their IPO 
Offered only Offered only Offered Pnmary No SEOs Pnmary Secondary and Secondary 
m 3 Years Shares m Shares m Shares in 
after !PO SEO(s) SEO(s) SEO(s) 
Pnmary Share Offermg m !PO 38 0 4 72 (I 14 !inns) 
Combmed offenng m !PO 22 9 6 51 (88 firms) 
Secondary Share Offenng m IPO 0 0 0 2 2 firms 
Total (204 !inns) 60 9 10 123 
VIII-2 Summary statistics: the percentage changes in offer prices and numbers of 
shares offered from the IPOs to their SEOs 
(within 3 years after the IPOs, 79 /PO firms conducted SEOs with 188 deals in total) 
Variable Offer Price of SEO/Offer Price of IPO* Total Shares Offered in SEO!Total Shares Offered m IPO 
Pnmary Share Combined Pnmary Share Combmed 
Total Offenng m offermg m Total Offenng m offenng m 
IPO IPO !PO !PO 
Obs 188 102 86 188 102 86 
Mean 140 74% 115 08% 171 16% 260 03% 239 31% 284 61% 
Std Dev I 9105 2 0013 I 7602 9.1780 5.9942 11 9379 
Mm 024% 024% 0 83% 028% 028% 040% 
Max 1900 00% 1900 00% 1307 02% 8682 48% 4880 00% 8682 48% 
*The ratiO of the offer pnce of SEO to that of IPO IS Sigmficantly higher for combmed share IPOs than for 
pnmary share IPOs 
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